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ABSTRACT 
 
“Trafalgar Refought”: The Professional and Cultural Memory of Horatio Nelson During 
Britain’s Navalist Era, 1880-1914. (December 2011) 
Bradley M. Cesario, B.A., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. R.J.Q. Adams 
 
 Horatio Lord Nelson, Britain’s most famous naval figure, revolutionized what 
victory meant to the British Royal Navy and the British populace at the turn of the 
nineteenth century.  But his legacy continued after his death in 1805, and a century after 
his untimely passing Nelson meant as much or more to Britain than he did during his 
lifetime.  This thesis utilizes primary sources from the British Royal Navy and the 
general British public to explore what the cultural memory of Horatio Nelson’s life and 
achievements meant to Britain throughout the Edwardian era and to the dawn of the First 
World War. 
 An introductory literature review provides a thorough explanation of how 
Nelson’s legacy has been perceived by past historians and how this legacy will be 
examined throughout the thesis.  The manner in which Nelson was viewed by both his 
naval contemporaries and the general British public during his lifetime is then surveyed, 
with a specific focus on the outpouring of national grief that followed Nelson’s death at 
the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805.  A major portion of the thesis explores how Nelson’s 
legacy developed throughout the century following his death.  Separate studies of 
iv 
 
Nelson’s professional memory among his Royal Navy successors and his cultural 
memory in British society as it became ever more focused on naval concerns follow; 
these take the thesis chronologically up through the final decades of the nineteenth 
century and are then combined in a discussion of the degree to which Nelson’s legacy 
permeated all Britons, regardless of profession, in the early years of the twentieth 
century.  The thesis concludes with a brief discussion of the impact Nelson’s legacy had 
on Britain during the early months of the First World War and a broader analysis of how 
the cultural and professional memory of Horatio Nelson’s naval achievements in 1805 
created an atmosphere in which a naval victory decisive enough to satisfy all aspects of 
British society was impossible in 1914. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION – THE FIFTH FACTOR 
Horatio Lord Nelson redefined what constituted success in the British Royal 
Navy.  At the height of the wars with revolutionary France Nelson reeled off a string of 
naval victories that dazzled the British imagination – as a captain at Cape St. Vincent in 
1797 and as a fleet commander at the Nile in 1798, Copenhagen in 1801, and Trafalgar 
in 1805.  His death at the moment of victory at Trafalgar ensured Nelson’s legacy.  A 
popular military or naval hero, particularly in monument-conscious Britain, could expect 
to receive the honor of a public statue or perhaps a burial in Westminster.  It has been 
over two centuries since Trafalgar, and Nelson’s name and image has been utilized ever 
since his death on everything from public statuary to advertisements for automobile 
insurance with no sign of abating. 
To contemporary historians the study of Nelson can seem anachronistic, a return 
to the time when histories of great men dominated the literature.  Nelson’s very 
popularity makes another simple narrative retelling of the Trafalgar story an unnecessary 
effort.  While it can never truly be said that no stone has been left unturned in a historical 
investigation, when it comes to the details of Nelson’s career the historian has been 
reduced to the merest of pebbles.  Nelson has always been a popular subject for 
biography, beginning with the poet Robert Southey’s 1813 opus that has never been out 
of print.
1
  More recently, the years from 1995 through the Trafalgar Bicentennial of 2005 
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 Robert Southey, The Life of Nelson (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1962; originally published 1813). 
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were known as the ‘Nelson Decade’ by many in the British and international academic 
community.  Multiple new works on Nelson and his times were called for and released 
in the period leading up to 2005 as part of a program run by Britain’s National Maritime 
Museum.
2
 
The Nelson Decade led to an explosion of scholarly and popular works on 
Nelson and his Royal Navy.  Many were updated biographies; major works in this vein 
appeared from Terry Coleman in 2002, Edgar Vincent in 2003, Andrew Lambert in 2004 
and Roger Knight in 2005, among others.
3
  Others were more specialized works.  The 
traditional military history approach, in-depth studies of Nelson’s battles, remained 
widespread, with books by Nicholas Tracy in 1996, Tim Clayton and Phil Craig in 2004, 
and separate contributions by Roy Adkins, Nicholas Best, and Colin White in 2005.
4
  
Diverse collections also appeared on nearly every aspect of Nelson’s life, from his early 
naval career
5
 to compilations of Nelson’s thoughts on war and discussions of Nelson’s 
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‘way of war.’6 
However, the Nelson Decade also brought an intriguing new development to 
British naval scholarship.  This was the in-depth study of how Nelson was viewed after 
his death by the British public and his naval successors, the subfield this thesis places 
itself firmly into.  The majority of works dealing with Nelson’s legacy – the so-called 
‘Nelson Legend’ – are essay collections.  Volumes appeared under the editorship of 
Pieter van der Merwe in 1995 and Colin White in 1997.
7
  A second rush of titles 
appeared in time to capitalize on the Trafalgar bicentennial; works edited by David 
Cannadine, Marianne Czisnik, Holger Hoock, and Alexander Stilwell were all released 
between 2005 and 2007.
8
  One of the few single-author book-length treatments of 
Nelson’s legacy, Adam Nicolson’s Men of Honour: Trafalgar and the Making of the 
English Hero was also released in 2005.
9
 
Nicolson’s work focused on the development of Nelson’s legacy while he still 
lived; the author states that he is searching for “that underlayer, the subtlest and 
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slipperiest of historical levels: pre-conceptions, and the way they shape present behavior.  
[Men of Honour] is an attempt to describe the mental landscape of the people who 
fought and commanded at one of the great battles in history and it asks, in particular, 
why and how the idea of the hero flowered here.”10  This thesis instead aims to examine 
Horatio Nelson’s legacy throughout the century following his death, from Trafalgar all 
the way to the next great British naval conflict in 1914. 
A longer chronological focus necessarily demands a broader historiographical 
base, and here the secondary literature appears less promising.  Surprisingly, there has 
been more recent work on the Victorian Royal Navy than its later Edwardian 
counterpart.  Andrew Lambert has established an industry unto himself, with books on 
the pre-Crimean War British steam navy, British strategy in the Crimea, the first British 
ironclads, and a broader survey of British warship development from 1815 to 1905.
11
  
John Beeler has also published two recent studies of British warship design in the mid-
Victorian era, and Roger Parkinson has added a third on the late-Victorian Royal Navy.
12
  
But when the focus is shifted to the years from 1900 to 1914, the pickings become slim.  
Recent scholarly building blocks for the period are limited to Robert Massie’s 1991 
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Dreadnought and 2003 Castles of Steel, as well as Nicholas Lambert’s 1999 Sir John 
Fisher’s Naval Revolution, one of few works published in the last twenty years that 
focuses on a man arguably as important to the Royal Navy’s technological development 
as Nelson was to its spirit.
13
  Perhaps this is due to a reluctance to challenge Arthur 
Marder’s seminal works on the growth of the Royal Navy in the years between 1880 and 
1920, but as magisterial as Marder’s volumes are the fact remains they are all now 
between fifty and seventy years old.
14
 
However, there is one bright spot in this historiography – the specialized study of 
what became known as the ‘new navalism.’  There are a mere handful of works on the 
Royal Navy’s impact on British popular culture – and vice versa – but they are all of 
superior quality and usefulness to a scholar of the period.  Unfortunately, two of the 
most valuable are difficult to obtain.  W. Mark Hamilton’s The Nation and the Navy, an 
excellent survey of how British popular organizations used the Royal Navy for their own 
purposes in the Edwardian period, is only available as a reprinted doctoral thesis.
15
  
Marianne Czisnik’s superb Admiral Nelson: Image and Icon was never published at all.  
This doctoral thesis formed the basis for her Horatio Nelson: A Controversial Hero, but 
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the original Image and Icon thesis focuses more heavily on Nelson’s legacy in the 
Victorian and Edwardian eras.
16
 
Three more recent works also emphasize the development of both the Royal 
Navy and its public followers in the years prior to the First World War.  Andrew 
Gordon’s 1996 The Rules of the Game focuses specifically on the ossification of the 
British command hierarchy in the 1880s and 1890s.
17
  Jan Rüger’s The Great Naval 
Game deals instead with how the Royal Navy purposefully included the British public in 
its rituals as its structure changed in the 1890s and beyond; Mary Conley’s From Jack 
Tar to Union Jack examines the same phenomenon in reverse, discussing how British 
sailors were shaped by their environment.
18
  A sixth work, an edited collection on the 
public’s response to the development of the dreadnought, was released too recently for 
inclusion in this thesis.
19
 
It remains to be seen how the divergent historical threads of Horatio Nelson and 
the Edwardian Royal Navy will be connected.  As previously stated, popular interest in 
Nelson and his times has remained strong in Britain for two centuries.  Nelson was a 
national hero in 1805 when he was killed at the height of his greatest battle.  Two 
hundred years later in 2005, the bicentennial of his death saw a new outpouring of 
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scholarship of all stripes on Nelson’s life and times as well as how Nelson was 
remembered in the twenty-first century.  But what of the Trafalgar centennial?  One 
hundred years after Nelson’s death the Royal Navy was in the midst of new 
developments in naval technology that would revolutionize warfare at sea, but the 
service and its landlocked admirers remained firmly in the Nelsonian age when it came 
to tactics, strategies and theories of war.  Jan Rüger has dated the ‘cult of Nelson,’ when 
Nelson’s memory among both public and professional Britons was strongest, from 
between 1887 and 1914.
20
  Yet histories of Nelson conclude in 1805 or 2005, and 
histories of the First World War begin in 1904 or 1914.  Few works cover both wars; one 
that does is John Keegan’s The Price of Admiralty, but it only deals with both conflicts 
in brief.
21
 
In his history of Horatio Nelson’s early career, John Sugden notes that 
“mythology, in fact, is the continual bane of the Nelson student.  It steals insidiously into 
our sources at every turn, and is difficult to expunge because it was being created by 
contemporaries.”22  This thesis aims to transform the mythos surrounding Nelson’s 
career from a historian’s nuisance into a valuable source on the Royal Navy of a century 
later.  Doing so will require the synthesis of many works; histories of Nelson, of British 
warship development during the nineteenth century, of the Admiralty, of the great 
technological changes of the early twentieth century and their associated naval reformer 
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Sir John Fisher, of the Edwardian navalist public, of the First World War.  The threads 
of historical and cultural memory running through these topics, when connected, 
demonstrate how and why the world’s most powerful navy went to war in 1914 with the 
confident belief that it would be refighting a battle from 1805. 
The second chapter, ‘Nelson’s Glories, 1797-1805,’ provides a brief overview of 
Horatio Nelson’s naval career up to and including his death at the Battle of Trafalgar.  
As hundreds of books have demonstrated, Nelson was famous for a reason; his new 
tactical ideas of the nautical melee and the battle of annihilation at sea led to spectacular 
successes.  The chapter also deals with Nelson’s growing popularity among both his 
naval colleagues and the British public before his death and his near-instantaneous 
deification after Trafalgar as an explanatory foundation for the image of Nelson that 
would persist throughout the next century. 
‘The Navy’s Nelson in the Nineteenth Century’ traces the Royal Navy’s 
conception of what Nelson’s legacy meant to the Senior Service from Trafalgar through 
the early 1880s.  As technology changed rapidly, leaving many of the Admiralty’s 
leading lights at a loss for how to deal with the changing face of war at sea, they turned 
for ideological comfort to the memory of Nelson.  However, as aging admirals clung to 
their view of a Nelsonian navy the innovations Nelson himself introduced began to slip 
away; by the 1880s the Royal Navy was a moribund institution dedicated more to the 
past and the school of ‘spit and polish’ than to any continued innovation. 
‘The Popular Nelson and the Navalist Era, 1880-1906’ picks up the thread of the 
British public’s interest in the Royal Navy, an interest that waned but was never fully 
9 
 
extinguished during the darkest days of the 1860s and 1870s.  The chapter focuses on the 
period from the mid-1880s through 1905, when a series of naval scares thrust the 
Admiralty back into the public spotlight.  This chapter examines the heart of the navalist 
era, when naval leagues, fleet reviews, and centenary celebrations made the man in the 
street believe that a second Trafalgar was just around the corner. 
‘Nelson’s Britain Reborn, 1904-1914’ recombines the related aspects of the 
Admiralty’s views towards the public and the public’s views towards the Admiralty.  
Covering the years from 1904 to 1914, this chapter examines the effect that Sir John 
Fisher’s tenure as the professional head of the Admiralty had both on his subordinates 
and on his popular supporters.  The Edwardian era saw the ultimate expression of the 
current navy’s faith in its own past, both in the historically and heroically minded Fisher 
and in his naval and press disciples that eagerly spread his word.  By the end of the 
chapter the true price of placing one’s hopes firmly in the previous century will become 
apparent, as the Royal Navy enters the First World War with a modern navy 
handicapped by a tradition that relied more on its own self-created rules of warfare than 
anything Nelson had ever believed. 
Historians by the dozen have claimed, and with good reason, that the Royal Navy 
was mentally and doctrinally unprepared to fight the First World War.  This thesis will 
demonstrate just why that was the case, and how the Admiralty and the navalist British 
public supported each other’s grand delusions through a whirlwind thirty years up 
through the year 1914.  The groundwork will also be laid for a future project that takes 
the Nelson legend through and past its inevitable disappointing conclusion at Jutland in 
10 
 
1916.  Jan Rüger has written of the modern naval history field that “naval historians still 
study sea power in [a] limited sense.  The vast majority of them focus on naval battles, 
strategy, administration and technology. […] Should there not be a fifth factor, namely 
the cultural elements of sea power?”23  This thesis aims to develop a shared military-
cultural history that sheds new light on the uses and misuses of Britain’s naval might, 
both aboard ship and at home, in a century spent comfortably asleep beneath the shadow 
of a giant. 
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CHAPTER II 
 “BEHOLD THE COUNTRY WHICH HE SAVED” – NELSON’S 
GLORIES, 1797-1805
1
 
Great Britain was no stranger to the value of naval power in the late eighteenth 
century.  Horatio Nelson did not arise in a nautical vacuum; he was raised in a society 
that already celebrated the naval exploits of famous ancestors such as Drake, Blake, and 
Monck in popular prose and verse.  When Nelson was born in 1758 at Burnham Thorpe 
rectory in Norfolk, Great Britain was embroiled in the Seven Years’ War; the year after 
his birth Admirals Hawke and Howe would add their names to the rolls of British 
maritime supremacy at Quiberon Bay.  The young Nelson may have been the child of a 
clergyman, but his extended household bore the same familial and cultural connection to 
the sea that underlay many British subjects.  A contemporary of Nelson and fellow 
sailor, William Cobbett, remembered that as a child in the 1770s he “had heard talk of 
all the glorious deeds of our admirals and sailors [which] good and true Englishmen 
never fail to relate to their children about a hundred times a year.”2 Nelson likely heard 
many of these same tales, particularly as his uncle Maurice Suckling was a captain in the 
Royal Navy. 
 By 1771 Britain was again embroiled in an international dispute, this time with 
Spain, and twelve-year-old Nelson first went to sea as a midshipman aboard Maurice 
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Suckling’s ship the Raisonnable.  The war scare soon abated, but Nelson had found a 
calling, and the coming of the American and French Revolutions ensured that the Royal 
Navy would be in demand throughout the majority of his working life.  Nelson’s early 
naval career was notable more for his personal dedication than any standout 
performances.  Like many young prospective officers in the sailing Royal Navy, Nelson 
traveled astonishing distances while moving up the ranks – to the Arctic, India, and 
Nicaragua in his first decade of service.  Invalided home with malaria in 1776, Nelson 
reflected on his career to that point: as he recalled later, “a sudden glow of patriotism 
was kindled within me and presented my King and Country as my patron.  ‘Well then,’ I 
exclaimed, ‘I will be a hero and, confiding in Providence, I will brave every danger.’”3  
This self-confidence and faith in his own heroism would serve the young Nelson 
throughout his professional service.  Nelson soon returned to duty, this time in the 
Caribbean, where in 1787 he married the young widow Fanny Nisbet in Nevis. 
 The following few years of Nelson’s career were quiet and spent mostly at home.  
His next chance for action came when Britain declared war on revolutionary France in 
1793, and he was now deemed worthy of being sent to the more active Mediterranean 
theater.  Nelson was sent to the Kingdom of Naples, where he was introduced to British 
ambassador William Hamilton.  It was a prophetic meeting.  Hamilton wrote of Nelson 
that “this man […] will become the greatest man that ever England produced.  I know it, 
from the few words of conversation I have already had with him.  I pronounce, that he 
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will one day astonish the world.”4 Nelson certainly had an effect on Hamilton’s wife 
Emma, and their meeting in 1793 would eventually kindle a relationship that would play 
a major role in the young captain’s future.  But the present remained full of frustrations, 
and Nelson sustained his first major injury in the line of duty; in July of the same year he 
lost the sight in his right eye after being wounded in a land engagement on Corsica. 
 This injury did not slow Nelson, and two years later he was finally able to 
participate in his first fleet action against the French off Genoa.  Nelson made the most 
of his opportunity, taking on the French line-of-battle ship Ҫa Ira with his much smaller 
Agamemnon and fighting her and the French Censeur to surrender.  These acts of 
seamanship put Nelson for the first time solidly into the British public eye.  He wrote to 
his wife Fanny in August 1796 on the subject of his growing fame: “A person sent me a 
letter, and directed as follows.  ‘Horatio Nelson, Genoa.’  On being asked how he could 
direct in such a manner, his answer, in a large party, was, ‘Sir, there is but one Horatio 
Nelson in the world.’”  Nelson self-assuredly concluded that “I am known throughout 
Italy; not a Kingdom, or State, where my name will be forgotten.  This is my Gazette.”5  
By this time Nelson was beginning to demonstrate two of the strongest elements present 
in his personal and official life.  The first was his simple but strong-willed conception of 
tactics, devoted to smashing the enemy fleet rather than wider but less impressive 
strategic victories.  Nelson itched for a fight – in 1796 he wrote to John Trevor, British 
minister at Turin, that “our Fleet, thank God, is perfect, and if the enemy will give us an 
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opportunity, the ancient glory of the British navy will be kept up.”6  The second was his 
love of the recognition that annihilating victories at sea could bring.  The same year he 
wrote that his defeat of a Spanish ship was the kind of success “I know the English like 
in a Gazette.”7 
 Nelson would soon find his personal fame raised to a new level.  In February 
1797 he took part in another major fleet action, this time against the Spanish.  In the 
Battle of Cape St. Vincent Nelson purposely veered his ship the Captain out of the 
British battle line to engage three Spanish ships.  He captured the San Nicolas, then 
stormed across her deck to capture the San Josef as well.  For his part in the victory he 
was granted a knighthood; promotion according to seniority to Rear-Admiral soon 
followed. 
 Yet public adulation moved with a swifter current than the internal workings of 
the Admiralty.  Genoa had brought Nelson to Britain’s attention; St. Vincent brought his 
name to the lips of the man in the street.  Nelson encouraged popular sentiment by 
massaging his dispatches from the battle to point towards his own heroism; as he wrote 
to his commander at the battle, Sir John Jervis (now Earl St. Vincent), “we know, from 
experience, that more depends upon opinion than the facts themselves.”8  His tactics 
worked, and his name rapidly permeated every stratum of British society.  Nelson’s 
sailors already understood his appeal.  G.S. Parsons, a naval sailor and contemporary of 
Nelson, wrote later of the battle that “had the daring and heroic soul of Nelson been 
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infused into the breast of every British commander on that glorious day, every one of 
their gorgeous ensigns would have bowed to the Jack of England, and Sir John Jervis 
would have been created a duke instead of Earl St. Vincent.”9  Now his fame had spread 
to the British aristocracy.  Sir Gilbert Elliot, Earl Minto, wrote to his wife that the battle 
had made “Nelson a hero beyond Homer’s or any other possible inventions,” and it was 
“impossible to give you a notion of his exploits in a breath.”10  Perhaps more importantly 
from his point of view, the general public also began championing Nelson’s name.  His 
father wrote to tell him that “the name and services of Nelson have sounded throughout 
the City of Bath, from the common ballad singer to the public theatre;”11 the same could 
be said of London.  When word reached the mainland later in 1797 that the gallant 
Nelson had been seriously wounded in a land assault on Tenerife, losing his arm in the 
service of the crown, his fame only increased. 
 Although minus a limb, Nelson was now deemed worthy of more naval 
authority.  After recuperating at home, he rejoined Earl St. Vincent in the Mediterranean 
the following spring; St. Vincent then sent him at the head of a detached command to 
search the area for a French invasion fleet headed by the revolutionary republic’s most 
prominent general, Napoleon Bonaparte.  After a fruitless search to the east, news 
reached Nelson by the end of July that he had been correct in Napoleon’s object but had 
not managed to catch him; in fact, Napoleon’s army had already landed in Egypt and 
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won a battle against local Ottoman forces.  Fortunately, the French fleet that had 
shepherded Napoleon’s men across the Mediterranean was now lying at anchor in 
Aboukir Bay near Alexandria.  Nelson’s twin loves of simplicity in battle and glory at 
home were again suddenly at the forefront of his resulting plan.  He had written that “all 
or none, is my motto,”12 and to his wife that “glory is my object and that alone.”13  
Accordingly, when Nelson saw the French fleet lying at anchor he immediately attacked 
their thirteen ships of the line with his equal number. 
Nelson was willing to risk a night engagement – for the battle did not commence 
until 6:30 in the afternoon on August 1
st
 – because he had again decided on an audacious 
plan.  The French were at anchor, but farther out in the bay than they had intended due to 
a lack of correct charts.  Nelson could thus double his fleet’s attacking power by entering 
the bay on both sides of the stationary French ships, catching them in a deadly crossfire.  
Nelson took his ship the Vanguard to the outside of the French, but five British men of 
war braved the interior route; one British ship did run aground on the shoals off the 
Egyptian coast, giving the French a numeric advantage, but it mattered little.  Nelson’s 
daring plan put the French in an indefensible position – many of the ships being attacked 
on both sides could not even fire back, having put some of their men ashore on forage 
parties – and within the first hour of the battle the British had severely damaged the first 
eight ships in the French line. 
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The British continued apace.  Concern spread on Nelson’s flagship when the 
vice-admiral was wounded above the eye by a splinter from a French shot, but even as 
Nelson was taken below to be attended to his fleet continued in independent command.  
The fiercest stage of the conflict that would become known as the Battle of the Nile 
came to an end around 10 p.m. with the destruction by fire of the French flagship 
l’Orient.  When the next day dawned the true scope of the British victory became 
apparent.  Of the thirteen French ships, the flagship had been destroyed, four had been 
beached and six had surrendered to the British; only two French ships of the line 
escaped.  As Terry Coleman has written, the Nile was “an annihilation new to naval 
warfare.”  Nelson noted that “victory is not a strong enough name for such a scene as I 
have passed,” but regretfully told Earl Howe that if he had “not been wounded and stone 
blind” he would have captured every French ship.14  Nevertheless, Nelson had achieved 
his object.  Napoleon would remain in Egypt for another year and his army for another 
three, but without naval support they were at the mercy of British forces; more 
importantly, they were no longer able to return to France. 
In Britain, Nelson’s already prodigious celebrity exploded overnight.  The 
official governmental response was to create him Baron Nelson of the Nile, but this was 
a lesser award than Nelson had expected due to the fact that he had technically been 
under St. Vincent’s command.  However, public enthusiasm made up for what he 
considered a political snub.  The victory of the Nile led to an outpouring of poetry 
commemorating the battle, first dominating newspapers and later being collected into 
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several printed volumes.
15
  They often combined Nelson’s name with Egyptian imagery, 
such as this ode from Gentleman’s Magazine: “As long as Egypt’s pyramids shall stand, 
/ Long as the Nile shall fertilize her land, / So long the voice of never-dying Fame / Shall 
add to England’s glory Nelson’s name!”16 
Nelson also received broader accolades.  The London Chronicle labeled the Nile 
“one of the most glorious and comprehensive victories ever achieved even by British 
valour.”17  Busts of Nelson began appearing for purchase in London stores,18 along with 
ribbons, fans, mugs, snuffboxes, and various accoutrements for fashionable Londoners.
19
  
Lavinia Spencer, wife of First Lord of the Admiralty Earl Spencer, wrote to Nelson that 
“every Briton feels his obligations to you weighing him down.”20  A buoyant Nelson 
wrote that his wife should expect his arrival home: “Nelson comes, the invincible 
Nelson.”21 
The Admiralty soon began to take greater notice of how Nelson fought his 
battles.  British naval battles in the eighteenth century had been carefully-planned 
affairs, with opposing fleets attacking in converging lines until one was able to 
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overpower the other – more often than not this became a difficult proposition, and battles 
were frequently inconclusive.  Nelson severely weakened the perceived effectiveness of 
this tactical conception with his turn out of line at Cape St. Vincent and destroyed it with 
his risky night melee at the Nile.  Joseph Callo has written that when news of the Nile 
reached Britain it was the beginning of “a school of naval warfare that embraced the 
concept of total destruction of the enemy’s fleet; that school’s inspiration was Horatio 
Nelson.”22   
Nelson was not shy about explaining both his tactics and his motivations.  He 
wrote to First Lord Spencer that his guiding principle was “to assist in driving the French 
to the Devil, and in restoring peace and happiness to mankind.”23  To further this end, he 
informed his captains to “always keep in mind how much the service requires active, not 
passive service,”24 reminding them that “victories cannot be obtained without blood.”25  
This concept of decisive battle dovetailed easily with Nelson’s liberal attitude towards 
orders.  Nelson was thankful that specific orders had not been followed at the Nile, 
realizing the value of independent action.
26
  He wrote to Spencer explaining his policy in 
1799: “Much as I approve of strict obedience to orders […] to say that an Officer is 
                                                          
22
 Callo, Legacy of Leadership, 88. 
 
23
 Callo, Nelson Speaks, 7. 
 
24
 Ibid., 53.  From a March 1799 letter to Captain Darby of the Bellerophon. 
 
25
 Ibid., 23.  From a June 1799 letter to Captain Foote of the Seahorse. 
 
26
 Nicholas Tracy, Nelson’s Battles: The Triumph of British Seapower (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 1996; revised edition, 2008), 135. 
 
20 
 
never, for any object, to alter his orders, is what I cannot comprehend.”27  Nelson was 
more forthcoming in a series of letters written to the Duke of Clarence that same year.  
He conceded that “to obey orders is all perfection” – but to Nelson “to serve my king 
and destroy the French, I consider as the great order of all, from which little ones spring; 
and if one of these little ones militate against it […] I go back to obey the great order and 
object, and down, down with the damned French villains.”28  He acknowledged being 
“well aware of the consequences of disobeying my orders,” but believed that “although a 
Military tribunal may think me criminal, the world will approve my conduct.”29 
This belief in a decisive battle combined with and following from a broad 
interpretation of orders would be demonstrated even more strongly in Nelson’s next 
major naval engagement.  The Nile had stranded an army in Egypt, but the French were 
steadily assembling a continental coalition of defeated or cowed former enemies against 
Britain.  In December of 1800, the Baltic nations of Russia, Prussia, Sweden and 
Denmark formed a League of Armed Neutrality against Britain.  As these powers 
supplied many essential shipbuilding supplies, Britain’s first step was to send Nelson to 
the Baltic under Sir Hyde Parker to present an ultimatum to the Danes, the closest 
member of the League. 
Nelson was as always eager for a fight, and was agitated when delays at home 
postponed the start of the expedition until March of 1801.  He wrote to his friend 
Captain Edward Berry hoping to “be able as usual to get so close to our Enemies that our 
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shot cannot miss their object, and that we shall again give our Northern Enemies that 
hail-storm of bullets…which gives our dear Country the Dominion of the Seas.  We have 
it, and all the Devils in hell cannot take it from us, if our Wooden walls have fair play.”30  
Nelson pushed his superior Admiral Parker for an attack similar to that of the Nile on the 
anchored Danish fleet outside Copenhagen; “the measure may be thought bold, but I am 
of opinion the boldest measures are the safest.”31  Accordingly, Nelson’s detachment 
attacked the anchored Danish fleet and forts of Copenhagen on April 2, 1801. 
The Battle of Copenhagen provided an unusual challenge for a naval conflict.  
Nelson had with him only 12 ships of the line, the smallest in the fleet so as to navigate 
the shallow harbor; the largest British ships stayed out of range with Parker.  Facing him 
were a variety of Danish line-of-battle ships, anchored hulks, and forts.  It was a hard-
fought conflict.  There could be no tactical victory or maneuver when fighting against 
anchored warships; the only solution was simply to batter the Danes into submission, a 
reality complicated further by the fact that many of the floating batteries were being 
supplied with replacement men from the city throughout the day.  This was the sort of 
fight Nelson lived for, but the more cautious Parker grew alarmed; powder smoke 
obscured the scene, and all he could see from his flagship were three of Nelson’s ships 
that had run aground on the shoals and were flying distress signals.  Accordingly, Parker 
signaled for Nelson to discontinue action and withdraw. 
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Of Nelson’s ships, only one – the Amazon – heeded the order to withdraw, but 
not before her captain despairingly enquired “what will Nelson think of us?”32  Nelson 
himself instead chose to undertake the most famous act of willful insubordination of his 
career.  He acknowledged Parker’s signal, but kept his own – ‘Engage the Enemy More 
Closely’ – flying from his flagship Elephant.33  The battle, which had begun at 10:00 
a.m., continued until mid-afternoon when Nelson, seeing that both sides had received 
severe punishment, again took an unprecedented step.  On his own authority, he sent a 
flag of truce to the Danish crown, bluntly stating that “if the firing is continued on the 
part of Denmark Lord Nelson will be obliged to set on fire all the batteries he has 
taken.”34  Nelson had not actually taken any batteries, but the threat combined with the 
explosion of the Danish flagship convinced Danish officials to agree to a cease-fire. 
Nelson was aware that the battle had been a close-run ordeal, but still found time 
to be self-congratulatory.  He went ashore in Copenhagen to discuss the terms of the 
cease-fire, and later wrote to his friend and agent Alexander Davidson: “I was received 
in the most flattering manner by all ranks, and the crowd was, as is usual, with me.  No 
wonder I am spoilt.”35  He also distributed prints of himself; a supply of these was 
always aboard Nelson’s flagship for such occasions.  Ten days after the battle Nelson 
sent Hans Sneedorff, the Commandant of the Danish Naval Academy, “a Short account 
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of my life it cannot do harm to youth & may do good, as it will show that Perseverance 
and good conduct will raise a person to the very highest honors and rewards.”36  For his 
part, Admiral Parker sent to London for orders; when these arrived, they instructed him 
to return home and turn his command over to Nelson, who was also created a viscount. 
Copenhagen was an important victory for the British; their naval victory 
combined with the death of Tsar Paul of Russia broke up the League of Armed 
Neutrality.  But it was not the public relations coup that Nelson was used to – there was 
no denying the fact that he and Admiral Parker had executed a preemptive strike on what 
was technically a neutral power.  Accordingly, there was no great new outpouring of 
poems or personal items dedicated to Nelson’s name.  The little Vice-Admiral remained 
extremely influential among the British populace; in the year of Copenhagen 
Gentlemen’s Magazine devoted a five-page spread to how Nelson had celebrated 
Christmas in England, assigning him “the brilliant qualities of a hero.”37  But 
Copenhagen had provided no great new glories, and from Nelson’s perspective matters 
grew worse when in March of 1802 Great Britain entered into the Peace of Amiens with 
France; for the first time in a decade, there were no battles for Nelson. 
The year-long Peace of Amiens brought out some of the more scandalous 
elements in Nelson’s character.  His marriage to Fanny had been tottering throughout 
their years apart, and Nelson had become attracted to Emma Lady Hamilton, the wife of 
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Sir William Hamilton, British Envoy to the Kingdom of Naples.  By 1800 this 
relationship had blossomed into a not particularly well-hidden affair.  Nelson cut off 
contact with Fanny that year, and when William Hamilton was recalled to England he, 
Emma, and Nelson chose to live together at Merton, near London; in 1801 Horatia, 
Nelson and Emma’s daughter, was born.  Now, with peace upon them, Nelson embarked 
in 1802 upon what was essentially a publicity tour of Britain, with the Hamiltons in 
tow.
38
 
This unlikely grand tour demonstrated that despite Nelson’s personal life, the 
majority of Britons still eagerly supported their fighting admiral.  Nelson’s niece 
Charlotte Nelson recalled watching him progress through London in a carriage, writing 
that “all the ladies had their handkerchiefs out of the windows when my uncle passed, 
they and the people calling Nelson for ever.”39  Charles Macready saw Nelson at the 
theater: “When with Lady Hamilton […] he entered the box, the uproar of the house was 
deafening, and seemed as it would know no end…the crowded house was frantic in its 
applause.”40  Yet Nelson could not live out his life in a theater box.  It must have come 
as a something of a relief when the Peace of Amiens collapsed in May 1803.  Nelson 
was soon summoned back to sea amidst spreading fears that Napoleon planned to launch 
an amphibious assault on Britain. 
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Although the Peace of Amiens ostensibly came to an end due to Anglo-French 
squabbling over the fate of Malta, Napoleon took the opportunity to re-launch his earlier 
strategy of a naval assault on England.  Beginning in the summer of 1803, thousands of 
French troops began gathering at Channel ports in France and allied Holland.  Although 
Britain mobilized the entire Regular Army of 139,000 men for home defense,
41
 by the 
end of the year there were 200,000 French infantry at Boulogne alone.  With it obvious 
that the British could not stand up to the French from a manpower standpoint, and with 
Napoleon claiming that he could conquer England if only he could control the Channel 
for six hours, Britain’s lifeline was now more than ever her navy.  Paradoxically, the two 
years when Britain was most directly threated with amphibious assault – 1803 through 
1805 – were the least eventful of Nelson’s career, at least until the climactic engagement 
at Trafalgar.  By the summer of 1803 he was installed in his new flagship Victory 
blockading the French at Toulon, a post he would not leave for nearly two years. 
Interminable waiting outside of Toulon took its toll on the British fleet, and 
Nelson in particular spent these months hoping for any French movement that would 
lead to a fleet action.  As Napoleon’s armies ground their way across the Continent, 
Nelson remained convinced that “it is on the sea that we hope to realize the expectations 
of our country,”42 and “in Sea affairs, nothing is impossible, and nothing improbable.”43  
He spent his time explaining the finer points of naval campaigns to those around him, 
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imparting such lessons as “a wish to imitate successful battles is the sure road by 
exertion to surpass them”44 and “we must all in our several stations exert ourselves to the 
utmost […] if the King’s service clearly marks what ought to be done.”45 
Still, the situation continued to deteriorate throughout the long blockade.  By 
January 1805 the Spanish had joined the war on the side of the French, adding more 
enemy ships of the line and more enemy ports to watch over.  Worse still, word had 
reached Britain that Napoleon had added 1500 small boats to his burgeoning Channel 
army, ready to transport hundreds of thousands of French soldiers to London and points 
west.
46
  Now all the French had to do was control the Channel for the fabled six hours – 
but to do so, they needed to get the fleet sheltering in Toulon past Nelson.  Even the 
excitable Vice-Admiral was beginning to show the strain; he wrote to Lord Melville, 
First Lord of the Admiralty, that “a half man as I am, cannot expect to be a Hercules.”47  
Yet Nelson still held out hope for a climactic battle, for his own benefit as well as 
Britain’s: “I hope I am duly thankful for the past; but one cannot help, being at sea, 
longing for a little more.”48    As March of 1805 drew to a close, he had his first real 
chance – word reached the distant blockading British that the French Toulon fleet, under 
Admiral Charles Pierre Villeneuve, had left port. 
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Nelson scrambled to follow the French fleet, but the ensuing three-month chase 
across the Atlantic ended disappointingly for both sides.  Villeneuve bolstered his fleet 
with the addition of Spanish ships from Cadiz, but upon arrival in Martinique after an 
arduous Atlantic crossing he found that the object of his escape had been foiled; the 
second major French fleet was bottled up under British observation in Brest, and 
Villeneuve alone did not have the ships to sweep the Channel.  Disappointed, and 
hearing that Nelson had arrived in the West Indies in pursuit, Villeneuve chose to return 
to Toulon rather than wait for the trapped Brest fleet.  For Nelson’s part, he discovered 
upon reaching Martinique that he had missed the French by a mere five days and 
immediately set off on his own return journey. 
British nautical training told on the twin returns, and Nelson arrived back in 
Europe ahead of the French.  Villeneuve almost did not return at all, and he never made 
it to Toulon.  On July 22
nd
 he encountered part of the British Channel Fleet under 
Admiral Sir Robert Calder off the western coast of Spain.  The resulting Battle of Cape 
Finisterre was inconclusive; fifteen British ships met twenty of the French and Spanish 
Combined Fleet and captured two, but neither admiral was willing to press matters to 
any further conclusion.
49
  It was the type of engagement that would have been greeted 
with joy in Britain two decades earlier – but Nelson’s way of battle had already firmly 
infiltrated the Admiralty and the British public.  Calder expected a hero’s welcome and 
got a court-martial.
50
  Calder never understood why the public had turned against him; at 
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his court-martial he pointed out the dangers he had foreseen “if I had madly and rashly 
done what John Bull seems to have wished me to have done.”51  Nelson expressed 
surprise at Calder’s disappointment, writing – sincerely or not – “it most sincerely 
grieves me, that in any of the papers it should be insinuated, that Lord Nelson could have 
done better.”52 
Through no great achievement of his own, Calder had actually changed the 
course of the war.  The entry of Spain into the conflict on the side of France had drawn 
Austria and Russia back into open breach with Napoleon.  Calder had then turned 
Villeneuve away from Brest and any rendezvous with the rest of the French fleet; 
Villeneuve instead sailed to Cadiz, where he was blockaded by yet another British fleet 
under Vice Admiral Cuthbert Collingwood.  It was now clear to Napoleon that he would 
not see the fabled six hours necessary for an invasion of England, and in August 1805 
his vast invading army marched off to the east.  That same army would soon win 
Napoleon further glories at Ulm, but they would never march on London as Napoleon 
had for so long hoped. 
Nelson and his ships and men were exhausted after their fruitless chase across the 
Atlantic.  One of his captains wrote that the fleet was “all half-starved, and otherwise 
inconvenienced […] but our full recompense is that we are with Nelson.”53  But Nelson 
was frustrated at his failure to catch Villeneuve, and requested shore leave after nearly 
two years on blockade and patrol duties.  In mid-August 1805 he returned home to 
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London and then to Merton to be with Emma, as William Hamilton had died in 1803.  It 
was Nelson’s last trip home, and it was his triumph. 
During Nelson’s final weeks in Britain, the full effect that his victories had had 
on the general British populace and his resultant fame were readily apparent.  By 1805 
there were nearly one hundred popular songs and ballads involving the little vice 
admiral, and his praises were sung in taverns throughout the country.
54
  An admirer 
informed Nelson that he had named his newborn grandson Horatio; Nelson 
congratulated the man, replying that he “trust[ed] that the name of Nelson will remain 
with credit to our country for many ages.”55 
Nelson’s reputation also spread throughout Britain’s upper classes.  There was a 
separate push for official efforts to honor Nelson, although they met with more 
resistance; the statesman Warren Hastings asked Walter Scott to compose a poem with 
“our gallant Nelson the Subject of it,” but Scott declined on the grounds that he was not 
qualified.
56
  Lady Elizabeth Foster recalled the effect Nelson had when he appeared in 
public: “Whenever he appears, he electrifies the cold English character.  Rapture and 
applause follow all his steps.  Sometimes a poor woman asks to touch his coat.  The very 
children learn to bless him as he passes, and doors and windows are crowded.”57 
                                                          
54
 Mark Philp, “Politics and Memory: Nelson and Trafalgar in Popular Song,” in David Cannadine, ed., 
Trafalgar in History: A Battle and its Afterlife (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 99. 
 
55
 Coleman, The Nelson Touch, 269. 
 
56
 Bainbridge, British Poetry and the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 126. 
 
57
 Nicholas Best, Trafalgar: The Untold Story of the Greatest Sea Battle in History, (London: Weidenfeld 
& Nicolson, 2005), 153. 
30 
 
Sir Gilbert Elliot, Lord Minto, met Nelson “in a mob in Piccadilly, and got hold 
of his arm, so that I was mobbed too.  It is really quite affecting to see the wonder and 
admiration and love and respect of the whole world; and the general expression of all 
these sentiments at once, from gentle and simple, the moment he is seen.  It is beyond 
anything represented in a play or poem of fame.”58  Minto himself was swept up by 
Nelson’s image, recording how “there was a sort of heroic cast about Nelson that I never 
saw in any other man, and which seems wanting to the achievement of impossible things 
which became easy to him.”59  Hugh Elliot, Lord Minto’s brother, concurrently noted 
that Nelson’s fame was due to his achievements at sea, “an effort such as never was 
realised in former times, nor, I doubt, will ever again be repeated by any other 
admiral.”60  Benjamin Silliman was a professor at Yale, in London on business; from 
this outside perspective he wrote how “Lord Nelson cannot appear in the streets without 
immediately collecting a retinue, which augments as he proceeds, and when he enters a 
shop the door is thronged till he comes out, when the air rings with huzzas and the dark 
cloud of the populace again moves on and hangs upon his skirts.”  Like Lord Minto, 
Silliman was struck by Nelson’s ability to be “a great favourite with all descriptions of 
people.”61 
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However, Nelson was beginning to worry about the amount of adulation being 
heaped upon his shoulders.  Lady Foster wrote that while at dinner with Emma, Nelson 
voiced his concerns: “popular applause is very acceptable and grateful to me, but no 
Man ought to be too much elated by it; it is too precarious to be depended upon, and it 
may be my turn to feel the tide set as strong against me as ever it did for me.”62  He also 
confessed his burgeoning apprehensions to Captain Richard Keats of the Superb, a 
fellow naval man on leave, stating how “I am now set up for a Conjuror, and God knows 
they will very soon find out I am far from being one […] for if I make one wrong guess 
the charm will be broken.”63 
To guard against future wrong guesses, Nelson spent part of his time in Britain 
refining and strengthening his conception of what a decisive naval battle should entail.  
He had already made it certain that he believed “the business of an English Commander-
in-Chief is first to bring the Enemy’s fleet to battle on the most advantageous terms to 
himself […] and secondly to continue them there without separating until the business is 
decided,” goals which could be achieved by “laying his ships well on board the Enemy 
as expeditiously as possible.”64  While at home, he solidified these concepts in a 
conversation with the previously-mentioned Captain Keats.  Keats recorded Nelson’s 
new ideas at length: 
One day, walking with Lord Nelson in the grounds at Merton, talking on naval 
matters, he said to me: ‘No day can be long enough to arrange a couple of fleets 
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and fight a decisive battle, according to the old system.  When we meet them (I 
was to have been with him), for meet them we shall, I’ll tell you how I shall fight 
them.  I shall form the Fleet into three Divisions in three Lines.  One Division shall 
be composed of twelve or fourteen of the fastest two-decked ships, which I shall 
always keep to windward, or in a situation of advantage; and I shall put them 
under an Officer who, I am sure, will employ them in the manner I wish, if 
possible.  I consider it will always be in my power to throw them into Battle in any 
part I may choose; but if circumstances prevent their being carried against the 
Enemy where I desire, I shall feel certain he will employ them effectually, and 
perhaps in a more advantageous manner than if he could have followed my orders. 
With the remaining part of the Fleet formed in two lines, I shall go at them at 
once, if I can, about one-third of their line from their leading Ship.’  He then said, 
‘What do you think of it?’  Such a question I felt required consideration.  I paused.  
Seeing it, he said: ‘But I’ll tell you what I think of it.  I think it will surprise and 
confound the Enemy.  They won’t know what I am about.  It will bring forward a 
pell-mell Battle, and that is what I want.
65
 
  
 This short garden speech was the beginning of what came to be known as the 
Nelson Touch – a rejection of the line of battle, drive for decisive victory with its 
associated risks, and trust in one’s subordinates that characterized all of Nelson’s major 
fleet actions.  Having thus solidified his plans, Nelson once again became eager for a 
fight.  He wrote to his friend Alexander Davison in September 1805 that “my health, or 
even my life must not come into consideration at this important crisis […] it never shall 
be said that I have been neglectful of my duty, or spared myself;” he added that in any 
coming engagement “half a victory would but half content me.”66  Nelson’s great 
opportunity arrived only a month after his leave began.  On the 13
th
 of September an 
Admiralty carriage arrived at Merton late at night with news that Nelson was to take 
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over command of the fleet blockading Villeneuve at Cadiz; the vice admiral left for 
London immediately and was aboard the Victory by the morning of the 15
th
. 
 Nelson’s final departure from London rapidly became a public spectacle.  
Benjamin Silliman, still in London, recorded his impressions: “some hundreds of people 
had collected in [Nelson’s] train, pressing all around and pushing to get a little before 
him to obtain a sight of his face. […] As the barge in which he embarked pushed away 
from the shore, the people gave him three cheers, which his lordship returned by waving 
his hat.”67  One near-contemporary account provides an excellent picture of what the 
atmosphere must have been on that final day.  Robert Southey did not write his account 
of Nelson’s life until 1813, but it became an instant best-seller and helped to keep 
Nelson’s fame alive throughout the following century.  Any of the multitudes who read 
Southey’s biography would encounter a magisterial description of Nelson’s departure, 
wherein “a crowd collected in his train, pressing forward to obtain a sight of his face; - 
many were in tears, and many knelt down before him, and blessed him as he passed.”  
Southey noted that “England has had many heroes, but never one who so entirely 
possessed the love of his fellow-countrymen as Nelson. […] they loved him as truly and 
as fervently as he loved England.”68  Nelson seems to have agreed; as his barge pulled 
away towards the Victory, he turned towards his friend Thomas Masterman Hardy and 
stated: “I had their huzzas before, I have their hearts now!”69 
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 As Nelson was being celebrated in London, the British fleet off Cadiz was 
struggling with the tedium of a blockade.  Vice Admiral Collingwood was an able and 
efficient commander, but in Nelson’s navy quiet competence was no longer seen as 
enough.  Various captains pled for Nelson’s return.  Thomas Louis of the Canopus 
“hope[d] Lord Nelson will come out as he is the life and Soul of the Squadron he serves 
with.”70  Captain Codrington of the Orion was blunter, writing to the Admiralty and 
inquiring “for Charity’s sake send us Lord Nelson, ye men of power!”71 
 When Nelson arrived off Cadiz on the 28
th
 of September, the change in morale 
was apparent.  Captain Duff of the Mars found Nelson “so good and pleasant that we all 
wish to do what he likes, without any kind of orders.”72  The lower decks were also 
enthused.  Able Seaman James Martin of the Neptune believed it “Imposeble to Discribe 
the Heartfelt Satifaction of the whole fleet upon this Occasion and the Confidance of 
Success with wich we ware Inspired.”73  On the Bellerophon, Henry Walker wrote to his 
mother how Nelson’s appearance “could not but inspire every individual in the fleet with 
additional confidence.  Everyone felt himself more than a match for any enemy.”74  As 
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Captain William Hotham noted, “[Nelson] was perhaps more generally beloved by all 
ranks of people under him than any Officer in the Service.”75 
 Nelson easily noticed the fleet’s attitude towards his arrival.  He wrote to Emma: 
“I believe my arrival was most welcome not only to the commander of the fleet but also 
to every individual in it.”76  He explained to Alexander Davison that his worries had 
gone, and he was now focusing all of his attention on a singular purpose: “my mind is 
calm, and I have only to think of destroying our inveterate foe…we all hope for a 
meeting with the Enemy.”77  To further this goal, he released a memorandum to the 
entire British fleet on the 9
th
 of October detailing plans for any future engagement.  He 
had already discussed the matter with the fleet’s captains; the memorandum was simply 
a codification.  Both the meeting of the captains and the memorandum were 
continuations of the conversation Nelson had had with Keats at Merton, with some 
additional details – namely, “in case Signals can neither be seen or perfectly understood, 
no Captain can do very wrong, if he places his Ship alongside that of an Enemy.”78 
 The majority of the Trafalgar captains had not previously served with Nelson, 
and the change from the Navy of Calder and Parker was more than welcome to a fleet 
tired of blockade.  Nelson wrote to Emma how “when I came to explain to them the 
Nelson touch it was like an electric shock, some shed tears all approved, it was new, it 
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was singular, it was simple and from admirals downwards it was repeated it must 
succeed if ever they will allow us to get at them.”79 
 Nelson was now prepared for anything the Franco-Spanish Combined Fleet could 
muster.  He corresponded with George Rose, an acquaintance of Prime Minister William 
Pitt, on October 6
th: “it is…annihilation that the Country wants, and not merely a 
splendid Victory […] I have not the very smallest doubt but that a very few days, almost 
hours, will put us in Battle…and I want for the sake of our Country that it should be 
done so effectually as to have nothing to wish for.”80  To his second-in-command 
Collingwood on the 9
th, Nelson repeated that “we have only one great object in view, - 
that of annihilating our enemies, and getting a glorious peace for our Country.”81  
Everything now depended on the enemy; as an officer wrote, “if the enemy venture out, 
we are sure of a victory over them.  If they continue in port, we may expect the 
continuance of [Nelson’s] victory over himself, the hardest victory of all!  For a high 
heart like his, to endure a destiny where there is nothing to display but the melancholy 
miracles of passive valour!”82 
 Unfortunately for Nelson, Villeneuve was perfectly content to remain in Cadiz, 
much to the distaste of some of his fellow officers.  General Lauriston, commander of 
the French troops aboard, complained how “the fear of Nelson has got the upper hand of 
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[Villeneuve] […] we sail like a fleet of merchantmen who fear the attack of 4 or 5 of the 
line and it is a single man who is the cause of all this.”83  Still, Villeneuve had his pride, 
and when word reached him that Napoleon was sending Vice Admiral François Rosily to 
Cadiz as his replacement, Villeneuve decided that it was time to act to preserve his 
professional reputation.  On October 19
th
, 1805, thirty-three French and Spanish 
warships cleared Cadiz and made for open water. 
 A mere twenty-seven British ships opposed the Combined Fleet, and 17,000 
British seamen and troops stood against 30,000 French and Spanish.  Yet few on the 
British side feared this imbalance of numbers.  Captain Henry Blackwood of the frigate 
Euryalus did express concern in a letter to his wife, over whether Nelson could still 
maintain the advantage necessary for a crushing victory: “not that he has not enough to 
bring them to close action; but I want him to have so many as to make this the most 
decisive battle that was ever fought.”84  Much of the lower deck simply enjoyed their 
respite from the years of blockade duty.  Hercules Robinson, also of the Euryalus, 
recorded “the delight of us all at the idea of a wearisome blockade about to terminate 
with a fair stand up fight, of which we well knew the result.”85  Able Seaman James 
Martin composed a brief poem for the occasion: “The British Hearts did Lift for Joy / the 
Sight for to Behold / We Sone prepaird to fight them / for Honnor and for Gold.”86 
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 However, it was not quite time for battle to be joined.  The Combined Fleet’s 
seamanship had suffered during their long days in harbor, and Villeneuve’s hand was 
forced by his fleet’s clumsy sailing; he was attempting to avoid the British fleet until 
circumstances dictated a fight.  Nelson had received word of Villeneuve’s departure on 
the morning of the 20
th
, but the entire day was spent with both fleets jockeying for 
position in a near calm.  As night fell, it was apparent to the men on either side that the 
great battle would take place the next day; the morning of the 21
st
 dawned with the two 
fleets in visual contact and prepared to take the offensive. 
 Captains and commanders of British men of war spent the day exhorting their 
crews and each other to glorious deeds, although encouragement was not often needed; 
an officer aboard the Bellerophon noticed that his men had chalked ‘Victory or Death’ 
on their cannons,
87
 while Surgeon William Beatty on the Victory recorded how among 
the sailors “the sentiment generally expressed to each other was that they would prove to 
their Country that day how well British Seamen could ‘do their duty’ when led to battle 
by their revered Admiral.”88 
 There was scant time remaining for morale-boosting addresses, which were in no 
short supply.  The captain of the Minotaur informed his men that “this day, or tomorrow, 
will prove the most glorious our country ever saw.”89  Tonnant’s captain boasted of how 
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“we shall have one apiece before night,”90 while Captain Moorsum of the Revenge 
pledged to “act as Lord Nelson had always done, lay his ship alongside the largest he 
came near and would leave the rest to his men.”91  Even the highest ranks displayed 
visible excitement.  Vice-Admiral Collingwood spoke to his staff: “now, gentlemen, let 
us do something today which the world will talk of hereafter.”92  Even Nelson made a 
brief speech, which Seaman John Brown of the Victory recorded: “My noble lads, this 
will be a glorious day for England who ever lives to see it.  I shan’t be satisfied with 12 
ships this day as I took at the Nile.”93  Around 11:45 on the morning of the 21st, Nelson 
sent his last messages to the British fleet.  One was the famous flag signal, ‘England 
Expects That Every Man Will Do His Duty’.  The other was the same signal he had 
flown at the Nile and at Copenhagen: ‘Engage the Enemy More Closely.’94  The two 
sides fired their first shots at noon, and by the end of the day both of Nelson’s signals 
would have achieved a fame that would last for a century. 
 The actual Battle of Trafalgar has been studied in immense detail, and there is no 
need to once again dissect its particulars.  It will suffice to say that Nelson achieved his 
every object.  The British went into battle with a six-ship disadvantage, yet at the 
conclusion of hostilities they had captured twenty-two enemy vessels while giving up 
none of their own.  The years of tortuous blockade had honed British seamanship; they 
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outmaneuvered their French and Spanish rivals at every turn, and fired their cannons at a 
faster rate.  Exact numbers are difficult to come by, but when the final totals were 
calculated the British had lost 449 dead and 1241 wounded against approximately 4400 
dead and 2500 wounded in the Combined Fleet.
95
  Yet there was no great celebration in 
the British fleet.  Their hero Nelson lay dead, killed by a chance shot from a French 
musketeer on the Redoubtable just after one o’clock in the afternoon. 
 The high drama of Nelson’s final hours, the famous phrases and emotional 
outbursts, were confined to a handful of men on Victory’s dark orlop deck.  The first the 
vast majority of the British fleet knew of their leader’s mortal wound was when night 
fell and Collingwood’s Royal Sovereign flew the lantern of the fleet’s commanding 
admiral.  Captain Hargood of the Belleisle recorded the mood as his men heard the news: 
“The melancholy tidings spread through the ship in an instant, and its paralysing effect 
was wonderful. […] ‘Lord Nelson is no more!’ was repeated with such despondency and 
heartfelt sorrow that every one seemed to mourn a parent.”96  Midshipman Joseph 
Woolnough, aboard Agamemnon, recalled how “a stranger might have supposed from 
the gloom that spread among us that we had been beaten instead of being the 
conquerors.”97  On Nelson’s Victory, emotions ran even higher.  A boatswain’s mate 
“wouldn’t have cared if it had been my old father, brother or sisters if there were fifty 
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more of them – but I can’t think of parting with Nelson.”98  Gunner William Rivers 
composed a short epitaph: “Which of you all Would not have freely died, / To Save 
Brave Nelson There [sic] Dear Country’s Pride.”99 
 Yet intermingled with expressions of grief were the first stirrings of an 
apotheosis.  An officer aboard the Britannia, although distraught over “our greatest loss, 
the brave, the amiable Lord Nelson, the idol of the profession, the armament and defence 
of his country, the greatest warrior of his age,” took heart: “Nelson’s merits are indelibly 
engraved on every British breast, his memory will be immortal.”100  And Seaman James 
Martin, apparently a budding artist, penned another short poem: “What Better End can 
Best of Heros Claim / Children yet unborn will lisp the Heros Name / And Age to Age 
Record thy Matchless Fame.”101 
 This early hero-worship permeated two of Vice-Admiral Collingwood’s official 
statements in his new capacity as leader of the British fleet.  The first was a General 
Order of thanks to the fleet, sent the day after the battle, mourning “the ever to be 
lamented death of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson,” who fell “, covered with glory, 
whose memory will be ever dear to the British Navy and the British Nation [and] will 
ever be held up as a shining example for a British seaman.”102  The second was 
Collingwood’s official dispatch to his superiors at the Admiralty.  It followed the same 
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basic format as the General Order; Collingwood had reason to “lament, in common with 
the British Navy, and the British Nation […] the loss of a Hero whose name will be 
immortal, and his memory ever dear to his Country.”103  Other captains’ letters went 
with the dispatch vessel, bringing the first news of the combined victory and loss to 
mainland Britain.  Captain Henry Blackwood of the Euryalus sounded a note of discord 
that would continue to resonate in the Royal Navy for the next century, writing to his 
wife that “I hope it is not injustice to the Second in Command [Collingwood] […] to say 
that the Fleet under any other, never would have performed what they did under Lord 
N.”104  Other revelations were more personal in nature.  Thirteen year old Norwich Duff, 
a midshipman on the Mars, wrote to his mother that his father, Captain George Duff, had 
been killed in the battle – but at least he and his shipmates “had fought like young 
Nelsons.”105 
 Collingwood’s report on the battle reached Britain on November 4th, and after a 
hurried journey from Portsmouth Collingwood’s dispatch was delivered to the Admiralty 
early on the morning of the 6
th.  The first to learn of Nelson’s death were his old 
compatriots in the Admiralty; St. Vincent remarked that he was “prepared for anything 
great from Nelson, but not for his loss.”106  News of Trafalgar broke in special editions 
across Britain.  The Times downplayed any celebratory aspects, writing that “the 
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triumph, great and glorious as it is, has been dearly bought;” instead, the newspaper 
followed the path chosen by the majority of Londoners, who “mourned with all the 
sincerity and poignancy of domestic grief their HERO slain….If ever there was a man 
who deserved to be ‘praised, wept and honoured’ by his Country, it is Lord Nelson.”107  
The Morning Chronicle rather obtusely portrayed Trafalgar as a victory for Napoleon, 
who could now rest secure in the knowledge that “the only rival of my greatness is no 
more!”108 
 Other newspapers immediately launched into the hagiographic style that would 
characterize much of the public’s reaction to Nelson’s death.  The Morning Post 
reflected that although Nelson was gone, Britons now had “the consolation to reflect that 
he has closed his career of glory by a work which will place his name so high in the 
tablets of Immortality, that succeeding patriots can only gaze with enthusiasm, scarcely 
hoping to reach the envied elevation, which a Nation’s tears, to the latest period of time, 
will drop like so many bright gems upon the page of history, that records the fall of the 
Illustrious Hero.”109  Trewman’s Exeter Flying Post stole a march on its larger 
competitors with an even more sensationalistic header, backdated to the 6
th
 of 
November: Nelson will “live forever in the hearts of his countrymen,” and “altho’ we 
cannot suppress the tear which the loss of this hero has drawn from us, we feel confident 
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that our navy will convince our enemies that tho’ NELSON is dead, the same invincible 
courage he possessed still lives in the breast of every True British Tar.”110 
 Aristocratic members of British society quickly busied themselves with releasing 
official statements on Trafalgar, with many also privately recorded their thoughts on the 
occasion.  King George III publicly expressed his thanks for Nelson’s “transcendent and 
heroic services…will prove a lasting source of strength, security and glory to my 
Kingdom,” while the Prince of Wales recalled how “Nelson and Victory were one and 
the same to us, and it carried dismay and terror to the hearts of our enemies.” 111  Many 
high-society chroniclers recorded their own reactions to Trafalgar.  Lady Castlereagh 
saw it as the beginning of Nelson’s “immortal career, having nothing to achieve on earth 
and bequeathing to the English fleet a legacy which they alone are able to improve;”112 
Lady Londonderry philosophically opined that “in such a death there is no sting, and in 
such a grave everlasting victory.”113  Others took a less optimistic approach.  Lady 
Wenlock was a girl of seven in 1805, but recalled her thoughts of that November sixty 
years later: “Child as I was, I burst into tears; one had been taught to think that nothing 
could go on without [Nelson]!”114  Lord Minto feared for the continued war effort: “We 
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shall want more victories yet, and to whom can we look for them?”115  The essayist 
Charles Lamb felt similarly, writing that after Trafalgar “nobody is left of any name at 
all.”116 
 Many aristocratic accounts also display admiration and surprise at the reaction of 
Britain’s middle and working classes.  Lady Elizabeth Herney noted the reaction of a 
gate guard who inquired if her companion had “heard the bad news?  We have taken 
twenty ships from the enemy, but Lord Nelson is killed!”117  Lord Malmesbury “never 
saw so little public joy,” with “every common person in the streets speaking first of their 
sorrow for him and then of the victory.”118  Lady Elizabeth Foster believed “Nelson was 
the only person I ever saw who excited real enthusiasm in the English,”119 while Lady 
Bessborough concernedly reported that “amongst quite the lowest class the discontent is 
so great that it was fear’d there would be a riot.”120  Nelson was mourned internationally 
as well.  Samuel Taylor Coleridge was in Naples, where “numbers stopped and shook 
hands with me, because they had seen the tears on my cheek, and conjectured that I was 
an Englishman; and some, as they held my hand, burst, themselves, into tears.”121 
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 Nelson’s death did not escape the attention of the clergy.  A Bristol clergyman 
attempted to soothe his flock by assuring them that Nelson’s death did not mean the 
Royal Navy was now incapable of victory.
122
  Reverend H. Draper placed Nelson’s 
death in the context of eternity, preaching that “though removed from us, he still lives: 
yea, and he will live while Britain exists, and her sons are grateful!”123  Reverend 
Thomas Brown Simpson was more rhetorical, asking: “was not Nelson more to us than 
the God who made him?”124 
 The aristocracy and the clergy memorialized and sympathized, but it was among 
the adoring general public that Nelson’s death had the most immediate impact.  Towns 
erected public memorials almost overnight.  In Portsmouth, where naval and public grief 
mingled, “the town was wonderfully illuminated,” with affluent households displaying 
pictures of Nelson and Britannia on their walls.
125
  The atmosphere in London was quite 
literally electric.  Thousands of people milled about the streets wearing mourning 
armbands and cockades decorated with Nelson’s name, while shop windows were 
draped in black.  The Admiralty, Treasury, Bank of England and other public buildings 
were lit in celebration of the victory and in honor of Nelson.  The Drury Lane theater 
placed an illuminated anchor with the letters ‘LN’ underneath on its roof, while the 
German theater erected a large transparency of Britannia and a lion holding Nelson’s 
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portrait with the legend ‘Victorious Nelson, I will avenge thy death.’  Not to be outdone, 
Covent Garden Theatre decorated its roof with a large ‘N’ and anchor, and ended their 
daily show with an impromptu rendition of Rule Britannia featuring edited lyrics that 
promised to ‘avenge the God-like hero slain.’126 
 Just days after carrying the news of Trafalgar to the people, British newspapers 
began to fill with adulatory poems and stories submitted by readers.  Often these spoke 
of Nelson’s continuing presence, or his effect on future generations.  Poems reassured 
Britons that there would be more Nelsons to continue the fight: ‘you still have more 
Nelsons in store,’ ‘may there rise from his ashes a Nelson again,’ even a declarative 
‘EVERY BRITON WILL A NELSON RISE.’127  Prose accounts followed the same 
theme in greater detail.  Trafalgar was “a victory which will probably be more valued, in 
its effects, by future ages, than by the present,” and in these “future ages, when the 
Stranger who may visit our Island, shall enquire for the Monument of Nelson, the 
answer will be ‘Behold the Country which he saved.’”128  An anonymous account is 
worth quoting at length, as it demonstrates the hold that the memory of Nelson already 
had among the British public: 
His fame survives! bounded only by the limits of the earth, and by the extent of the 
human mind. He survives in our hearts, in the growing knowledge of our children, 
in the affection of the good throughout the world; and when our monuments shall 
be done away; when nations now existing shall be no more; when our far 
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spreading empire shall have perished: still will our Nelson's glory unfaded shine, 
and die not, until love of virtue cease on earth, or earth itself sinks into chaos.
129
 
 
 The sailors of the Victory insisted on bringing Nelson’s remains home 
themselves, and the ship arrived in England -- with Nelson’s body preserved aboard in a 
cask of brandy -- on December 22
nd, 1805.  Nelson’s body lay in state in Greenwich 
from January 5
th
 through 7
th
 in preparation for a great funeral.  Admittance to the funeral 
procession would be strictly controlled, so the three days in which the body lay in state 
were the last chance many ordinary Londoners would have to pay their respects.  
Nicholas Best provides one account of the chaos that ensued: “A written notice was 
posted up, that the public would be admitted at 11 a.m. by which time many thousands 
were assembled […] and though express orders had been given that only a limited 
number should be admitted at once, yet the mob was so great as to bear down everything 
in its way.  Nothing could be heard but shrieks and groans, as several persons were 
trodden under foot and greatly hurt.”130  30,000 mourners gained entrance to Greenwich 
Hospital, but from the 20,000 additional Londoners turned away due to overcrowding 
the business-minded vergers of St. Paul’s made over £300 by charging visitors a shilling 
to view Nelson’s catafalque.131 
 More upper-class members of society could hold out hope for a glimpse of the 
actual funeral procession, which was held on the 9
th
 of January.  London newspapers ran 
advertisements leading up to the funeral to make “families of distinction” aware they 
                                                          
129
 Ibid., 162-163. 
 
130
 Best, Trafalgar: The Untold Story, 325. 
 
131
 Coleman, The Nelson Touch, 334.  A catafalque is a raised platform used to support a coffin in a 
memorial service. 
49 
 
could rent rooms along the procession’s route.132  On the day of the event, all traffic was 
stopped on the Thames as Nelson’s funeral car proceeded, first by water and then via 
land, to St. Paul’s.  Accompanying Nelson’s ornate casket – carved from the wood of 
l’Orient – were all seven of the King’s sons, thirty-six admirals, 20,000 volunteer 
infantry and cavalrymen, and 8,000 regular soldiers.
133
  However, most of interest to the 
crowd were the forty-eight members of the Victory’s crew chosen for the occasion.134 
 Nelson’s casket eventually arrived at St. Paul’s, where it became the centerpiece 
of the last full heraldic funeral ever held in Great Britain.
135
  This ornate ceremony lasted 
three hours, ending only when Sir Isaac Heard, the Garter King of Arms, broke Nelson’s 
staves of office and threw them into his tomb; Heard then added a personal touch to the 
prescribed dialogue, inserting a final reference to Nelson as “the Hero who in the 
moment of Victory fell covered with Immortal glory.” 136   The tattered ensign of the 
Victory was to have followed, but Nelson’s sailors chose instead to spontaneously tear 
the ensign to pieces for use as personal mementoes.
 
 
It took three hours to clear the crowds from St. Paul’s, and by the time the last 
dignitary departed into the winter evening Nelson had passed firmly into the realm of a 
venerated icon.  The very next day curious crowds in Temple Bar could see a re-
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enactment of Nelson’s body lying in state for just a shilling.137  Nelson’s unrivalled 
career had come to a close, leaving the remains of three nations’ navies in its wake.  The 
next decade would see an alarming list of French victories on the Continent; news of 
Ulm and Austerlitz had already broken in London since Trafalgar had been fought.  But 
none of these major victories would be at sea.  When the White Ensign next undertook a 
major naval campaign, nearly half a century had passed.  Britain would on the side of 
France then, and her wooden walls would be powered by steam.  But the Royal Navy 
would still be guided by the principles laid down by Nelson and the confidence 
engendered through his victories.  And, for better or for worse, the British public would 
still demand annihilating victories as their inalienable right.  There could be no more 
Robert Calders after 1805; for a nation grown accustomed to triumph, there could be 
only Nelsons to come. 
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CHAPTER III 
 “PARSIMONY IN COAL AND EXTRAVAGANCE IN GOLD 
LEAF” – THE NAVY’S NELSON IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
 
 Nelson’s grand funeral did not mark the end of public commemorations of 
Trafalgar and the Vice-Admiral’s storied career.  The London public that had flocked to 
Nelson’s funeral procession could now spend their free time attending a naval show, as 
there were at least three London theaters – the Surrey, Astley’s, and Sadler’s Wells -  
that specialized in naval productions such as recreations of the Nile and Trafalgar.
1
  
Those of a more spiritual mindset could view a wax figure of Nelson erected in 
Westminster Abbey, although the more secular motive behind the wax rendition was to 
compete with Nelson’s actual tomb in St. Paul’s for visitors’ currency.2  The market for 
Nelson souvenirs and collectables remained strong; even French prisoners of Trafalgar 
made extra money by selling carved domino boxes with Nelson’s portrait while waiting 
for repatriation.
3
 
 Yet the Nelson mythos had already begun to evolve.  In life, Nelson had been a 
beacon of strength for contemporary Englishmen; in death, he would become a mighty 
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exemplar for their children.  The London printsellers Boydell and Company advertised a 
500 guinea reward soon after Trafalgar for the best painting commemorating the death of 
Nelson.
4
  One of the most popular Trafalgar paintings was Benjamin West’s 1806 The 
Death of Nelson, an idealized version of the battle featuring Nelson dying on the 
Victory’s quarterdeck surrounded by admirers.  West was asked why he had 
romanticized the battle, and replied that “there was no other way of representing the 
death of a Hero but by an Epic representation of it.  It must exhibit the event in a way to 
excite awe & veneration.”  To West, Nelson could never be “be represented dying in the 
gloomy hold of a ship, like a sick man in a Prison Hole;” instead, popular depictions of 
the vice admiral’s death “should be a spectacle presented to raise & warm the mind, & 
all shd. [sic] be proportioned to the highest idea conceived of the Hero.”  Strikingly, 
West also connected his idealistic portrayal to the education of future naval generations.  
“No Boy,” said West, “would be animated by a representation of Nelson dying like an 
ordinary man, His feelings must be roused & His mind enflamed by a scene great & 
extraordinary.  A mere matter of fact will never produce this effect.”5 
 Memorial items intended for public consumption often bore the same theme of 
Nelson’s enduring legacy.  Besides portraits there were monuments, like the one 
installed in the London Guildhall around 1810 that bore the legend ‘The period to 
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Nelson’s fame can only be the end of time.’6  There were also celebratory poems, 
published in newspapers and as standalone pieces; Jonathan Odell’s 1806 Song To The 
Memory of Lord Nelson, to take one example, included the line ‘Each tar shall inherit / A 
share of his spirit, / And all prove invincible Lords of the Main!’7 However, the rush of 
commemorative biographies and hagiographies of Nelson that flooded the market 
following Trafalgar had the most lasting effect.  Chief among these was Robert 
Southey’s previously-mentioned 1813 work The Life of Nelson.  Southey, the poet 
laureate of Great Britain, put his rhetorical skills to the test with his biography, with his 
conclusion again demonstrating how Nelson’s contemporaries believed the vice admiral 
would be remembered: “He has left us, not indeed his mantle of inspiration, but a name 
and an example, which are at this hour inspiring hundreds of the youth of England: a 
name which is our pride, and an example which will continue to be our shield and our 
strength.  Thus it is that the spirits of the great and the wise continue to live and to act 
after them.”8 
 But Nelson’s influence remained even stronger in his professional home, the 
Royal Navy.  There was still a war on, and although Nelson had smashed the French and 
Spanish fleets and word had reached London that Napoleon’s grand invasion plan had 
been scuttled there were naval battles ahead to be fought and presumably won.  Even 
before Nelson’s funeral brought thousands of mourners to St. Paul’s, there were naval 
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plans for permanent monuments to the departed hero.  As early as November 10
th
, 1805 
– just days after news of Trafalgar had reached London – 1200 members of the Sea 
Fencibles spontaneously raised a 20-foot triumphal arch to Nelson in Ireland.
9
  Before 
Nelson’s battered fleet had even reached home, crews were preparing memorials.  The 
men of the Conqueror received permission to replace their ship’s damaged figurehead 
with a bust of Nelson,
 10
 while the crew of the Orion voted that £2,000 out of any prize 
money they received upon their return would go towards a Nelson monument in 
Portsmouth.
11
  Other early memorials under discussion by December of 1805 included a 
sailors’ asylum and a column where local youths would be encouraged to learn of 
Nelson’s heroism;12 Lord Castlereagh, the Secretary of State for War, simply wanted to 
ensure that any future monuments would ensure Nelson’s use to the Navy as a “model 
for his profession to study.”13 
 Although there were no naval battles of Trafalgar’s scale between 1805 and the 
end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, there were a variety of small-scale clashes at sea.  
Many of these proved valuable as morale boosters to a navy still spending most of its 
time on blockade and patrol duty, and captains and crews often made reference to 
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Nelson in these engagements.  In a clash with the French in 1806 Captain Richard Keats, 
to whom Nelson had explained his ‘Nelson Touch’ at Merton less than a year earlier, 
hung a portrait of Nelson on his mainmast and entered battle with his ship’s band 
playing the commemorative song ‘Nelson of the Nile.’14  After a naval victory by 
Richard Strachan, his sailors composed a song for the occasion: ‘Though with tears we 
lament our great Nelson’s demise, / Let the nation rejoice that more Nelsons arise.’15 
 Half a decade after Nelson’s death, his naval supporters were no less 
enthusiastic.  Admiral William Hoste flew a ‘remember Nelson’ signal from his flagship 
before engaging French frigates at the 1811 Battle of Lissa.
16
  That same year, Private 
William Wheeler took passage on the ship of the line Revenge to Lisbon, destined for 
service in the Peninsular War.  A naval outsider, he recorded how the ship’s crew spent 
their free time: “again is to be found a select party immortalizing the heroes of gone by 
days by singing songs to the memory of Duncan, Howe, Vincent, and the immortal 
Nelson.”17 
 Even Southey’s Life of Nelson, intended to stir heroic deeds in all young 
Englishmen, was becoming a staple of the Royal Navy.  Although Southey’s conclusion 
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called for an appreciation of Nelson among all ages and classes, his introduction was 
directed more specifically towards his goal of penning a “manual for the young sailor, 
which he may carry about with him, till he has treasured up the example in his memory 
and in his heart.”18  Southey also informed a friend that he hoped to create “such a life of 
Nelson as shall be put into the hands of every youth destined for the navy;” Southey’s 
acquaintance later believed that the completed work “ought to be in the chest of every 
seaman, from the admiral to the cabin boy.”19 
 Yet as Nelson’s influence continued apace in naval circles, it began to fluctuate 
among the general British public, a situation intensified by the end of the Napoleonic 
Wars in 1815.  Monuments and memorials to the great hero were now interspersed with 
public bewailing of his lack of influence.  Although 1830 rumors that the Victory was to 
be broken up led to a public outcry, Nelson’s ornate funeral carriage was dismantled 
around the same time.
20
  Nelson theoretically remained a shining exemplar of Britain’s 
naval prowess.  J.M.W. Turner composed an 1830 painting, ‘Yarmouth Sands,’ that 
featured women and boys looking on as sailors arranged ship models in battle formation 
underneath the Yarmouth Nelson monument.
21
  But by that same year, the Nelson 
monument in Edinburgh had proven so unprofitable that its base had been rented out as a 
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soup stall.
22
  Trafalgar’s cultural imprint had been overshadowed first by ten years of 
land war – with the Duke of Wellington ascending to nearly as lofty a peak of public 
admiration as Nelson – and then by a long-awaited peace.  As Lord Byron wrote in his 
epic Don Juan in the years following Waterloo: “Nelson was Britannia’s god of war, / 
And still should be so, but the tide is turn’d; / There’s no more to be said of Trafalgar, / 
‘Tis with our hero quietly inurn’d; / Because the army’s grown more popular, / At which 
the naval people are concern’d.”23 
 The Congress of Vienna may have been a welcome relief to an exhausted Britain, 
but it severely hampered the Royal Navy.  The service had added thousands of necessary 
personnel to see it through more than twenty years of continuous patrols and battles; 
now, in a period that came to be known as the Slump, the navy quickly and forcefully 
reverted to its peacetime personnel requirements.  Every aspect of the professional sea 
service saw severe contractions in the years following the war.  In 1813 the Royal Navy 
used 4,873 commissioned officers to man its 685 ships.  By the beginning of the next 
decade, naval personnel had risen to 5,664 active officers – but due to the peace, there 
were now only 134 ships for them to serve upon.  In 1818 a staggering ninety-one 
percent of flag officers, ninety-four percent of commanders, and eighty-nine percent of 
lieutenants were shore-bound on half pay.
24
  And those that remained employed were 
being drawn from a smaller segment of British society.  By the 1830s nearly half of the 
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Navy’s commissioned officers were from the peerage or the landed gentry.  By contrast, 
a survey of officers’ parentage conducted in the 1840s found that since 1815 men whose 
families were involved in business fell from 3.9 percent to 0.4 percent of the officers’ 
ranks, while those with ‘working class’ parentage fell from nearly seven percent to a flat 
zero – not a single middle-class officer could now be found.25 
 There was one refuge for the middle-class sailor who dreamed of career 
advancement, tucked away in a specialty originally deemed so unimportant by the 
Admiralty that it did not appear on the officers’ lists.  This was the new branch of 
engineering, and by thirty years after Trafalgar it would be well on its way towards 
revolutionizing the Navy.  The possibilities that technological advancement held for 
naval warfare was evident to the Admiralty even during Nelson’s lifetime.  Steam-
powered cranes appeared in the Portsmouth dockyard as early as the 1790s,
26
 and in 
1805 the Admiralty deigned to test a primitive torpedo and submarine by the inventor 
Robert Fulton.  However, the powers that be were not impressed – St. Vincent believed 
the adoption of the submarine as a weapon of war would “lay […] the foundation for 
doing away with the Navy, on which depended the strength and prestige of Great 
Britain” – and Fulton was told to look for business elsewhere.27  In the year Nelson died 
steamships were of use only in protected waters, as mail steamers and similar vessels, 
but before the Napoleonic Wars came to a close steam-powered vessels were capable of 
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open-ocean voyages.
28
  For naval constructors and strategists, the uses of steam power 
began to rapidly develop. 
 In what was to be a common theme throughout the century, the Admiralty was 
initially against experiments in steam propulsion, even to the point of self-contradiction.  
In 1827 the Lord High Admiral the Duke of Clarence included steam ships on the Navy 
List of official Admiralty vessels for the first time;
29
 however, the very next year the 
Admiralty, now under the direction of Lord Melville, stated that “Their Lordships…feel 
it their bounden duty to discourage to the utmost of their ability the employment of 
steam vessels, as they consider that the introduction of steam is calculated to strike a 
fatal blow at the Naval Supremacy of the Empire.”30  But the advantages of steamships 
were readily apparent.  By 1830 the Royal Navy possessed both a small armada of steam 
tow vessels for maneuvering and dockyard purposes and the first steam-powered 
warship to mount heavy guns, the Caledonia.
31
 
 These early steamers were innovative, but their use as line of battle ships was 
severely limited.  Until the 1840s the vast majority of steam warships were paddle-
driven, with motive power coming from side paddlewheels rather than the later 
centerline screw propeller.  The very name assigned to most of these vessels, paddle 
frigates, reveals their vulnerabilities.  Their side paddlewheels and clunky machinery 
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were extraordinarily vulnerable, and the ships would have been of little use in a 
Trafalgar-style melee; furthermore, the amount of space both interior and exterior 
devoted to propulsion meant that paddle frigates could carry only a handful of the guns 
mounted by first rates.
32
  The Royal Navy of the 1830s and 1840s was excellent at its 
chosen role as the world’s policeman.  Small steam vessels and paddle frigates explored 
the Arctic, chased slave ships in the Atlantic, and made exploratory forays into Chinese 
and African rivers.
33
  What it did not do was fight major naval battles. 
 The 1830s and 1840s saw the beginning of this disconnect that would 
characterize the Royal Navy for the next sixty years.  The midshipmen and junior 
officers were gaining sea service around the Empire, learning to deal with the emerging 
technologies of modern warfare.  Their aristocratic commanders, nearly all of whom had 
served with Nelson or his contemporaries, were growing elderly in command of vessels 
designed to fight a type of war that no longer existed.  High-ranking British officers 
tended to look down upon subordinates who rose through the service’s engineering 
branch, who were “not of the status of a gentleman;”34 Admiral of the Fleet Sir George 
Cockburn complained that “since the introduction of steam vessel[s] I have never seen a 
clean deck, or a Captain who, when he calls upon me, did not look like a sweep.”35  
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Engineering officers were not even allowed into the wardroom until 1847, and when 
they arrived they were still forbidden to wear swords or live in their own cabins.
36
 
 So the Admiralty did not put much stock in technological advances or the 
innovations of junior officers.  Instead, the brain trust of the Royal Navy put their faith 
in the spirit of Nelson while phasing out his methods.  The Admiralty’s revised fighting 
instructions, released only a year after the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1816, 
prescribed a return to the line-ahead battle tactics Nelson abhorred.
37
  This tactical 
regression would theoretically be overcome by the energies of British sailors and 
captains steeped in the Nelson mythos.  Indeed, by the 1830s any deficiencies in the 
Navy could be overlooked as proud remembrances of Nelson’s day. 
 Some examples of this phenomenon can be found in the works of Frederick 
Chamier, a naval writer and memoirist in the 1820s and 1830s.  In his 1832 
autobiography Life of a Sailor Chamier detailed the daily routine of elderly low-level 
officers trapped in their positions by the Slump, writing of “how often have I seen a 
midshipman of forty-five years of age and a lieutenant of sixty” wiling away their time 
by “fight[ing] the battles of the Nile and Trafalgar on the oak table.”38  Chamier saw this 
surplus of aging midshipmen with no hope of promotion as preferable to any 
environment that could be created via the introduction of new, better-trained technical 
officers: “let them be educated, say some.  I say no, you’ll make them worse.  Instead of 
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talking of the good old times, spinning a yarn about the Nile, rubbing up one’s memory 
about Nelson, and such like, they would all be squatting about the decks like a set of 
Turks.”39 
 This tacit acceptance of the idea that training and innovation could only be 
negative developments also appeared in omnipresent naval biographies on Nelson.  
Southey’s Life remained the principal sailors’ account of Nelson, distributed aboard ship 
alongside bibles.
40
  But there were always new works on Nelson for naval markets, even 
after the general public’s appetite for Nelsonian products began to wane in the 1820s.  A 
Life of Nelson published in 1836 under the pseudonym ‘The Old Sailor’ abandoned all 
pretense at a mass market, claiming to be oriented towards providing “a splendid 
example” for young officers, who would read of Nelson’s deeds “unmatched in the 
history of any nation [which] have rendered him a model for his profession in all future 
ages.”41  A similar 1843 biography by a G. Thompson went one further.  Nelson should 
still remain a model for all naval men, but to Thompson it was clear that “no one has 
equalled Nelson, and no one can ever go beyond him.”42  The shift of Nelson from an 
encouragement towards tactical innovation to a barrier to the same was in full swing by 
midcentury.  In the 1850s a naval officer by the name of George Charles Smith wrote in 
Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Magazine how Nelson was received in the Royal Navy fifty years 
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after his great battles: “Nelson was considered our Saviour and our God….We 
gloried…that we followed in the wake of Nelson, as the only Jesus Christ or Saviour we 
acknowledge in the fleet.”43 
 If the Royal Navy’s progress had continued unchecked, the 1850s would have 
been a decade of great uncertainty.  The value of steam power had finally become 
indisputable with the development of screw propellers during the previous decade, as the 
greatest of line-of-battle ships now resembled larger versions of Nelson’s flagships and 
mounted dozens of guns as opposed to the precious few weapons of paddle frigates; the 
Admiralty built its last solely sail-powered warship in 1848.
44
  Yet there was no 
corresponding increase in tactical thought. Admiral William Parker wrote in the 1830s 
that the inactivity of the main British fleet led only to “gallivanting and picnics, instead 
of sea-practice;” the next decade, the elderly admiral complained how many captains 
seemed to be “avoiding […] things that will disturb paintwork, or dirty their white 
decks.”45  The main units of the British fleet badly needed an opportunity to prove their 
worth.  They would receive their long-awaited chance in 1853 with the outbreak of the 
Crimean War. 
 From a naval perspective, the war against Russia in the Crimea quickly became 
an opportunity to return to the glorious Nelsonian tradition.  First Lord of the Admiralty 
James Graham believed the utilization of commanders who had served in the Napoleonic 
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Wars would be preparation enough against the Russian fleet.  Accordingly, command of 
the two largest British fleets went to senior fleet commanders with decades of service to 
the crown – sixty-seven year old Admiral Charles Napier commanded the Baltic Fleet, 
while sixty-three year old Admiral Edmund Lyons commanded the Black Sea Fleet.
46
   
Napier had an easy time crewing his fleet, as British sailors and the general 
public expected great battles from the Baltic Fleet.
47
  And he took his duties to heart, 
encouraging his sailors to “sharpen your cutlasses, and the day is your own.”48  First 
Lord Graham encouraged Napier in the press, offering the Russian fleet a grim warning: 
“I hope, even still, that the ‘Nelson Touch’, will not be necessary: but if unhappily it 
should be so, Charley Napier is the boy to administer it.”49  The British press happily 
took up Napier’s cause.  The Times ran a column detailing how British involvement in 
the Baltic was sure to turn out: “Sir C. Napier is sent out to do all the harm he can to the 
Russians, and a dozen or two ships of the line and a few fortresses battered to pieces, and 
several thousands killed or wounded will be the probable, and indeed the wished for 
result.”50  Lyons found it more difficult to recruit sailors, as action in the Black Sea was 
presumed to be less intense and thus less suitable for Nelsonian glories.  Nevertheless, 
Lyons also became popular with The Times and the British public, and consciously 
patterned himself after Nelson to the point of keeping a biography of Nelson with him at 
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all times and believing that he personally resembled the bygone vice admiral; an 
impressed Times article called him “just another Nelson, full of energy and activity.”51 
However, the public’s expectations for the Royal Navy – and the Navy’s 
expectations for itself – proved difficult to fulfill in the Crimean conflict.  The Russian 
fleet chose not to fight a traditional fleet battle, and many of their largest vessels were 
sunk as breakwaters during the siege of Sevastopol.  Realistically, this proved a British 
victory.  Many of the British ships were old and underpowered, needing to be towed into 
place by vulnerable steam tugs, and in the Black Sea in particular there was also the 
difficulty of effective cooperation with the allied French fleet.  Exactly how a second 
Trafalgar commanded by the dusty remains of Nelson’s midshipmen would have played 
out can only be left to speculation, but the results could not have been particularly 
admirable.  Nevertheless public disappointment in the Navy began with the first 
campaign season of 1854, after which Napier was replaced by Richard Dundas, a 
veritable youth at fifty-two.  Although First Naval Lord Maurice Berkeley had attempted 
to shield Napier from “a public who expect impossibilities [and] who would hang us if 
we fail in anything we undertake,”52 Napier spent the last two years of the war in 
retirement.  Lyons accomplished little of a glorious nature in the Black Sea, and the 
appointment of Dundas did not manufacture a great clash in the Baltic.  The Crimean 
War ended in 1856 with a British victory, although not one that could easily be placed in 
                                                          
51
 Andrew Lambert, “The Magic of Trafalgar: The Nineteenth-Century Legacy,” in David Cannadine, ed., 
Trafalgar in History: A Battle and its Afterlife (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 164-165. 
 
52
 Lambert, The Crimean War, 172.  Maurice Berkeley served as First Naval Lord, the professional head 
of the Admiralty, concurrently with the previously mentioned James Graham’s term as the civilian head of 
the Admiralty, First Lord of the Admiralty. 
66 
 
the annals along Trafalgar and Waterloo.  The land campaign was noteworthy more for 
the deficiencies it revealed in British war planning than for any great clashes.  The naval 
campaign revealed almost nothing at all.  The Crimea had briefly rekindled the general 
public’s enthusiasm for the Navy, dormant since the early 1820s.  But naval 
disappointment again drove the British populace away from anything more than a 
general appreciation of the Navy, a state that would continue for nearly three more 
decades.  However, the Admiralty found itself rapidly involved in more pressing matters, 
for only two years after the Royal Navy returned home it found itself rendered nearly 
obsolete by a new warship from France. 
The Crimean War had been a naval disappointment for the British; they had 
achieved their strategic objectives, but there had been no great decisive victory.  But 
where Britain saw an unsettling new type of sea warfare that did not conform to any 
expectations, their allied French counterparts saw opportunity.  Both the British and the 
French had utilized armor-plated floating batteries during the conflict.  After the war the 
French, always on the lookout for a stolen march in their naval arms race with the 
British, transferred armor plate to a seaworthy battleship frame.  La Gloire, laid down in 
1858 and launched the following year, took a standard battleship hull and covered it with 
4.7-inch iron plates.  In one way La Gloire was a return to a problem inherent with 
paddle frigates – the ship mounted only 36 guns at a time when wooden screw 
battleships carried 120.  Yet this was no weakly-armored steam prototype.  With its 
armor, La Gloire was essentially invulnerable against any ship afloat.  France followed 
67 
 
La Gloire with orders for six more armor-plated battleships, touching off renewed naval 
anxiety in Britain.
53
 
New British naval developments soon quelled public anxiety.  Where La Gloire 
had been evolutionary, a battleship with iron armor, Britain’s response would be truly 
revolutionary.  HMS Warrior, laid down in 1859 and launched in 1860, was constructed 
entirely of iron.  The British answer to France’s challenge was larger, faster and heavier 
than La Gloire – and while the French ironclad was intended to stand in the line of 
battle, Warrior had been designed as a large frigate with an eye towards independent 
operations.
54
  Britain had responded admirably to the challenge of the French ironclad in 
the best Victorian tradition; the Crown struck second, but it struck a knockout blow. 
However, the Warrior led to more uncomfortable realizations in the Admiralty 
offices at Whitehall.  The Royal Navy may not have performed up to expectations in the 
Crimea, but the wave of naval volunteers and increased naval activity had at long last 
brought an end to the Slump; although eighty percent of flag officers were still 
unemployed ten years after the war – many of them quite elderly – lieutenant 
unemployment had dropped to eighteen percent.
55
  Now the ironclad warship threatened 
to undermine everything Nelson’s navy stood for.  Common professional sentiment held 
that there could be no heroics in a war of iron; Charles Cooper Penrose Fitzgerald, who 
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joined the Royal Navy in 1854 and eventually became a vice-admiral, recalled when his 
service began that “there was a very strong and universal feeling that it was 
unseamanlike to use steam, except perhaps in a flat calm, and that a Captain who could 
not take his ship in or out of harbour under sail with a commanding breeze was ‘no 
seaman’.”56 
Fitzgerald’s view was no outlier.  Lord Charles Beresford joined the Navy in 
1859 and recalled his sailing youth in his memoirs: “the order to raise steam cast a 
gloom over the entire ship.  The chief engineer laboured under considerable difficulties.  
He was constantly summoned on deck to be forcibly condemned for ‘making too much 
smoke.”57  Steam warships were seen as dirty and undisciplined, iron warships as 
ungainly and unattractive; the thought of a fleet of Warriors was too much to bear for 
some young sailors.  An 1859 seamanship manual purposely excluded steam power, 
claiming it was not beneficial for a sailor’s education.58  Charles Beresford was 
transferred from a screw line-of-battle ship to the Defence, a sister ship of the Warrior.  
He bemoaned in his memoirs that he had been “condemned to a slovenly, unhandy, tin 
kettle which could not sail without steam,” and “wrote to my father asking him to 
remove me from the Navy.”59  In the early 1860s the Admiralty wrote of iron warships 
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that “no prudent man would at present consider it safe to risk upon ships of this novel 
character the naval superiority of Great Britain.”60 
Admiralty hand-wringing aside, the British fleet had been transformed a decade 
after the Crimean War.  New British warships were universally steam-powered and 
constructed of iron, mounting broadside shell-firing guns for armament.
61
  Britain had 
dealt with the French naval challenge in the best Victorian manner, rapidly developing 
and launching ships that outclassed the French threat.  Now the Royal Navy faced a 
more insidious issue, one that would resonate through the next decades.  Instead of a 
fleet of elderly ships crewed by elderly men, the ironclad navy was composed of new, 
untested ships commanded by the same aging flag officers.  And to call the Navy’s 
guiding hands aging is perhaps too generous, as some were nearing decrepitude.  British 
policy was still career advancement in a straight line once a certain rank had been 
reached.  If an officer reached the rank of post-captain he would eventually, as those 
ahead of him retired or – more likely – passed away, reach the very top of the service.  
These were men who had survived the Slump, men who had survived most everything 
by the 1860s and 1870s.  Edward Ratsey had become a frigate captain in 1806; despite 
holding no command after 1807, he rose by seniority to Admiral in the 1860s.  Provo 
Wallis, promoted to commander in 1813, waited until 1877 to become Admiral of the 
Fleet, the most senior post in the navy.
62
  These high officers who had served under 
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Nelson and his contemporaries were asked to command a Royal Navy unlike anything 
Nelson could have dreamt of. 
British ships were also undergoing a period of great uncertainty.  The early 
steam-power debate of paddle frigates versus screw frigates had been rather easily 
solved in favor of screw frigates.  In the 1860s and 1870s, however, every new 
technology had to be separately tested before use.  Broadside battleships – similar to 
Warrior in construction – were pitted against the new technology of turret battleships, 
muzzle-loading guns against new breech-loading weapon technologies.  Again the innate 
conservatism of the Admiralty, while understandable in a nation as dependent on sea 
power as Great Britain, often put British ships at a disadvantage; a training accident with 
breech-loading guns in the early 1860s convinced the Admiralty to stick with obsolete 
muzzle-loading guns for nearly two more decades, long after the French had upgraded to 
the new weapons.
63
  The ship design controversy damaged more than reputations, as the 
poorly-designed early turret ship HMS Captain sank in 1870 with the loss of nearly 500 
lives.  Another issue the Admiralty struggled to grapple with was building time.  Large 
ironclad battleships took an average of seven years to build, resulting in many ships 
being outclassed before their launch.  Extended building times also spelled a temporary 
end to large classes of warships; early experimental ironclads were constructed in ones 
and twos as a hedge against becoming obsolete, destroying and possibility of a main 
fleet that could undertake successful combined operations.
64
  One contemporary naval 
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historian has called these tumultuous decades the result of “a state of anarchy in the 
ideas of naval architecture.”65 
The confused state of naval construction throughout the mid-Victorian decades 
led to a backlash within naval circles.  The professional journal Naval and Military 
Gazette was particularly hard on the Admiralty, dedicating most of February 1868 to 
criticisms of naval policy.  The Gazette considered it “almost hopeless to expect that we 
shall ever be able to get our money’s worth out of the Admiralty,” and called for “an 
administrator at the Admiralty with strength of mind sufficient to kick this old 
humbugging spirit out of doors, and to install there in its place the fertile genius of the 
present day.”  Until this ‘humbugging spirit’ was removed, the Admiralty could only be 
compared to “a benighted traveler wandering along ill-defined and intricate bye-paths 
[…] not knowing which would take him to his journey’s end.”66  Even The Times, so 
supportive of the Navy during the Crimean conflict, was concerned that “we do not 
know what to build because we do not know how we shall fight our future naval 
battles.”67 
The Admiralty was unprepared to deal with outside criticism and internal design 
questions at the same time, and many highly-placed naval officers responded by circling 
the wagons and placing the blame for confused shipbuilding choices on an insufficient 
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appreciation of naval heritage.  Reginald Bacon, who joined the Royal Navy in 1877, 
wrote in his memoirs that the “clingings to old ideas and doctrines” of top officers was 
not to be wondered at “considering that the senior officers, on whom rested the ordering 
and governing of the Navy, had from their earliest days been steeped in sailing-ship lore, 
and such lore in many cases constituted the bulk, if not the entirety, of their professional 
knowledge.”68   
This pervasive nautical lore affected how the Admiralty responded to its critics.  
Admiral H.J. Rous blamed the previously-mentioned Captain disaster on steam power, 
writing how “the boiler has emasculated seamanship.  No man can serve two masters; he 
will hold to the tea kettle and despise the canvas.”69  At a major crossroads in naval 
design, the men responsible for the navy’s future believed “constant steaming and 
useless expenditure of coal produces ignorance in the rising young officers of all ranks,” 
that the removal of sails from future battleships would prove “fatal to our maritime 
greatness,” and that all future naval battles would be fought at close range like the great 
naval conflicts of the past.
70
  The newest tactical conceptions of naval war were couched 
in the language of the past: Captain L.G. Heath wrote to the Admiralty’s Committee on 
Designs in 1871 that “Nelson’s maxim, slightly modified, should be instilled into the 
minds of all officers in command – ‘no captain can do very wrong who succeeds in 
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ramming an enemy’s ship.’”71  The transition from appreciation to near-fanatical 
devotion extended to the lower decks as well – Charles Beresford recalled in his 
memoirs that after suggesting a change in his ship’s rigging to improve efficiency he 
was soundly beaten by a ship’s mate appalled at “this youngster laying down the law as 
if he knew better than Nelson!”72  With Admiralty policymakers dragging their feet and 
wishing for a return to the ship of the line while presiding over a steadily-expanding fleet 
of one-off untested battleships, it comes as no surprise to find admirals concerned by the 
mid-1870s that any possible “outbreak of [war] will go far to ruin our naval 
reputation.”73 
The 1870s and early 1880s were uninspiring years for the Royal Navy.  Many 
later Edwardian naval figures who looked back at this period noted in retrospect the 
doldrums pervading the service.  Lewis Bayly joined the navy in 1870 and rose to serve 
on one of the Admiralty’s newest warships, 1882’s Colossus.  But innovation no longer 
equaled respect, and when Bayly visited the Mediterranean squadron in the 1880s he 
was “received coldly on arrival on the station; the older and senior officers had little use 
for a ship that had no yards or sails.”74  Charles Beresford wrote in his memoirs that in 
the Royal Navy of the 1880s “organisation for war was taken for granted.  We were 
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living on the Nelson tradition.”75  Tactical skill was no longer an asset; instead, 
‘promotion by paint’ was rampant, with Beresford complaining that the most favored 
officers captained ships that resembled “a lady’s boudoir.”76  C.C. Penrose Fitzgerald 
agreed, noting how “we were resting on our laurels, or rather on the laurels of our 
forefathers – a condition of affairs which is apt to make people sleepy and indifferent 
and over-confident.”77 
However, the contemporaries of Beresford, Bayly and Fitzgerald were perfectly 
comfortable with the directions the Admiralty was taking.  Naval thinkers were by now 
fully invested in the idea that the past could save the future; naval historian John Knox 
Laughton claimed in 1880 that which technology the British fleet chose was irrelevant: 
“in this very materialistic age we are too apt to overlook the force of sentiment and to 
measure the strength of a fleet by its iron or coal, or big guns.  It was none of these that 
brought past honour to our flag, and for myself, I believe they will play but a secondary 
part in upholding it.”78  Many naval men believed, as historian Richard Humble has 
written, that “once they built men of iron and ships of wood.  Now they build ships of 
iron and men of wood.”79  As long as Admiralty policy remained a strictly Admiralty 
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issue, innovation would be in short supply.  And here again it would be public and 
political intervention that would finally galvanize the navy into more directed action. 
Again it was the French, or rather fear of the French, that spurred Britain into 
action.  Renewed French ship-building initiatives in the early 1880s had begun to 
concern the establishment; the budding politician Hugh Oakley Arnold-Forster wrote in 
1883 that “the country was in danger of losing ‘not prestige merely’, but the very life-
blood of its national existence.”80  The issue burst into public focus on September 15, 
1884 with the appearance of an article in the Pall Mall Gazette entitled ‘The Truth about 
the Navy.’  The first in a series written by ‘One Who Knows the Facts’ under the 
direction of the Gazette’s editor, W.T. Stead, the article and its follow-ups alleged that 
Britain was spending less on her Navy than in the 1860s, that her docks and harbors 
were poorly defended, and that she was being rapidly outbuilt by the French.
81
  There 
was suddenly great public pressure for the Royal Navy to create a homogenous battle 
fleet, one that would be able to deal with any future continental aggressors. 
Luckily for naval public relations the Admiralty had in fact already started 
moving towards another new generation of warships, which the increased funds poured 
into construction budgets by an anxious government did nothing to hurt.  Fully-rigged 
warships had been done away with in 1881, and 1882’s Colossus-class ships were the 
first built entirely of steel and lit with electric power.  The Royal Navy could also point 
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proudly to the new Admiral-class battleships, with their steel construction, advanced 
armor, and breech-loading guns; the first of the class, HMS Collingwood, was laid down 
in 1880 and completed in 1887 at an excellent time to take advantage of pro-naval public 
sentiment.
 82
  For the first time, front-line warships were listed in the Navy Lists as 
‘battleships;’83 the age of the ship of the line had irrevocably passed. 
Yet the same issue faced by the Admiralty since the rise of steam power, the 
conflict of new designs and old tactical ideas, soon arose again.  Modern battleships 
could shoot further and steam faster than men of Nelson’s day could have imagined, but 
those in charge of British tactics often chose to disregard these facts.  For the Victorian 
Admiralty, the next great sea battle would always be another Trafalgar.  Admiral 
Geoffrey Phipps Hornby offered his thoughts on British tactics in 1885: “None has been 
prescribed: it is to be hoped that none will be prescribed.  To prescribe any would be 
exceedingly foolish and in a high degree presumptuous.  Foolish; for all our past history 
shows us the evil of having a prescribed formation for fighting in; it needed the genius of 
Nelson to disentangle us from the mess.”84  The only certainly was that a naval 
engagement would be a full-out offensive struggle; according to Captain William Henry 
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Hall in 1884, a defensive posture was “utterly at variance with the traditions of the 
British Navy, whose role has always been that of attack.”85 
To this end, the Royal Navy of the 1880s and 1890s devoted much of its time to 
preparing, not for the last war, but for the wars of a century prior; copies of Nelson’s 
Trafalgar Memorandum were distributed to British warships in the 1890s to encourage 
officers to prepare for the next war.
86
  These were the ‘spit and polish’ years of the 
Navy, where a gleaming ship counted for more than the efficiency of its crew.  New 
breech-loading guns were mounted in ships, but crews were not drilled in their use; 
Percy Scott, who entered the Navy in 1866, wrote that the guns were not even fired 
except for required practices, as the blast damaged the ship’s paintwork.87  As soon as a 
new ship was launched, its crew often removed the watertight doors and polished them 
to such a sheen that they were useless for their intended purpose.
88
  British ships had 
always re-used names, but now the quarterdecks of modern ships were decorated with 
the names of battles in which their forebears had participated.
89
 
This attitude towards display over substance proved popular among the naval-
supporting British public.  In 1893 the St. James’s Gazette praised the Royal Navy for its 
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“spirit of swagger; and its signs are a love of ostentation and of theatrical showing off, a 
mania for doing everything at a great pace in order to break the record and get one’s 
name mentioned as a smart officer, a passion for doing all work with a margin for safety 
cut to the quick.”90  Young officers and cadets who actually bore the brunt of these 
policies often thought differently.  K.G.B. Dewar joined the navy in 1893, and recalled 
that even at this late date cadets were often beaten to “suppress independence and 
initiative in our future naval officers.”91 
Early-career officers also expressed frustration with their superiors’ antiquated 
attitudes.  Sydney Fremantle, who joined the navy in 1881, sympathetically wrote as a 
junior lieutenant in 1888 that “it was difficult to please the Commodore, who was 
probably very weary of the effort to make a continuous succession of young officers and 
men, most of whose service had been in modern ships, into sailors of the old type.”92  
Others were less accepting of naval ossification.  Reginald Bacon remembered years 
later: “I always look on the year 1889 as marking the lowest level of efficiency of 
material that the British Navy had known since the middle of the eighteenth century.  
The officers and men were just as zealous, their love of the profession was just as great 
as it ever had been, or is now, but they were imbued with ideas that had not altered with 
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the times.”93  Ernle Chatfield became a cadet in 1886 and felt much the same, writing 
that “the ‘80s and early ‘90s were years in which the older officers were still embedded 
in sails and all the thought that pertained to them.  They hated engines and modern 
guns.”94  Reginald Tyrwhitt, naval cadet since 1885, quickly realized that “polo and 
pony racing were much more important than gun drill.”95 
A handful of forward-thinking officers did attempt to keep abreast of tactical 
developments.  Percy Scott had risen to second-in-command of the HMS Duke of 
Edinburgh by the mid-1880s, and chose to focus specifically on gunnery training.  The 
ship’s crew soon demonstrated exceptional gunnery skills, but for Scott it came at a 
price: 
The innovation was not liked – we were twenty years ahead of the times, 
and in the end we had to do as others were doing.  So we gave up instruction in 
gunnery, spent money on enamel paint, burnished up every bit of steel on board, 
and soon got the reputation of being a very smart ship.  She was certainly very nice 
in appearance.  The nuts of all the bolts on the aft deck were gilded, the magazine 
keys were electroplated, and statues of Mercury surmounted the revolver racks.
96
 
 
Another even more senior figure with the willingness to go against tradition was 
Vice Admiral George Tryon.  Despite his tactical heresies – he had declared in the 1880s 
that “an Admiral must make his general plans clear to all his Captains and must trust 
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chiefly to their loyalty and initiative”97 – Tryon had become commander of the navy’s 
Mediterranean Fleet, traditionally an extremely prestigious appointment, by 1891.  He 
devoted much of his energies to creating a new simplified version of the Admiralty 
signal book which would enable quicker command decisions.  Unfortunately, Tryon’s 
own command decisions led to his untimely death.  In June 1893, while on maneuvers in 
the Mediterranean, Tryon called for a turn that would put his flagship HMS Victoria on a 
collision course with another British battleship.  His calculations were obviously in 
error, but none of his subordinates were willing to question their admiral.  The two ships 
collided; Victoria quickly sank, taking with her over 350 people including Tryon.
98
 
Public outcry over the Victoria disaster led to an official Admiralty inquiry into 
the sinking.  Tryon had obviously erred, although the committee was loath to lay official 
culpability on an officer who had perished in the line of duty.  The Admiralty instead 
took the opportunity to clamp down on any further Tryon-esque innovations, essentially 
ruling the incident merely a blameless demonstration of the importance to be found in 
following orders; privately, many officers must have breathed a sigh of relief that 
Tryon’s uncomfortable meddling into the Senior Service’s traditions had come to an 
end.
99
  Tryon’s replacement, Admiral Sir Michael Culme-Seymour, recorded his 
thoughts on the sinking and its lessons: “If the doctrine that officers were supposed to 
think for themselves when a manoeuvre was ordered to be performed, instead of obeying 
it, were once laid down, it would strike a terrible blow at the efficiency of the 
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Service.”100  Admiral Geoffrey Phipps Hornby and now-Captain Charles Beresford 
released a statement that summed up the official verdict on the collision: “unconditional 
obedience, no matter at what cost, is, in brief, the only principle on which those in the 
Service must act.”101 
The Tryon inquiry marked yet another victory for the principles which had come 
to dominate the Royal Navy, obedience to the past and to one’s superiors.  Some press 
objections were raised; The New Review wrote that the contemporary naval officer 
“almost fails to realize, save in a dull and general way, that some day the storm of battle 
will again rage around him, and that he will be expected, by an unreasonable country, to 
repeat the triumphs of his ancestors.”102  But for the navy as a whole the entire dismal 
cycle was again repeated.  Innovation had been quashed.  There were more British 
battleships in 1900 than there had been two decades earlier, but they were still being 
designed on reactionary principles; not only France but the United States, Germany, 
Russia, Austria-Hungary and Italy had all introduced new shipbuilding improvements 
during the previous decade.
103
  Britain meanwhile was pursuing a quantitative strategy, 
launching forty-eight capital ships between 1891 and 1905.
104
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 Britain’s tactical ideas at the turn of the century were also still steeped in 
Nelsonian ideals, and any change was heavily frowned upon.  Percy Scott had already 
learned that it was unwise to try and improve naval gunnery; when Arthur Hungerford 
Pollen, a civilian inventor, submitted a proposal for an improved fire control system to 
the Admiralty in 1900 he was politely informed that the Royal Navy did not consider it 
possible to fire at ranges greater than 1500 yards.
105
  Reginald Bacon recorded the 
Admiralty’s thoughts on the range matter: “The case-hardened older generations 
immediately asked: ‘Why should ranges be increased?  We can hammer at the enemy at 
short range much the same as Nelson did, why not continue to do so?”106  Cecil Usborne, 
later to become a vice admiral, took the same dim view of the Admiralty.  “The tactics of 
1900, in so far as they existed, were Nelsonian.  The majority of our admirals intended to 
lay their ships within a mile of the enemy, and smother him with superior fire.”107 
The Admiralty did little to hide the fact that it was operating within a tactical 
framework very much out of date.  Any naval engagement would be fought with the 
direct aim of bringing about a direct, close-range battle of annihilation.  At the 1902 
Colonial Conference, the Admiralty let it be known that “the primary object of the 
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British Navy is not to defend anything, but to attack the fleets of the enemy.”108  That 
same year, an official ‘Memorandum on Sea-Power and the Principles Involved’ utilized 
the same phrasing before concluding with: “In the foregoing remarks the word defence 
does not appear.  It is omitted advisedly.”109 
And there were other naval policies more visibly obsolete than these.  Percy 
Scott returned from a six-year absence to the Mediterranean Fleet in 1896 only to 
discover to his dismay that “everything was just as it had been; no advance had been 
made in any way, except the housemaiding of the ships.  The state of the paintwork was 
the one and only idea.  To be the cleanest ship in the fleet was still the objective for 
every one; nothing else mattered.”110  Frederick Richards, First Naval Lord from 1893 to 
1899, objected to the discontinuation of cadets training on rigged warships, complaining 
that “you have got an established system and a time-honoured one, so why alter it?”111  
Sydney Fremantle’s ship was examined by Admiral Arthur Wilson in 1902; Wilson’s 
report of his tour concluded that “the ship takes first place in General Exercises oftener 
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than any other ship in the Squadron [but] [m]ore time should be devoted to the 
instruction of midshipmen in rifle and cutlass.”112 
Obviously the power players in the naval hierarchy were content with this state 
of affairs.  But as the twentieth century began, there was growing unsettlement among 
lower-ranking officers and, importantly for public pressure, naval journalists.  The Earl 
of Carnarvon spoke to the Committee for Imperial Defence early in the century: “We 
lavish on what is obsolete, save on what is essential, and always think our past good luck 
is a guarantee of future success.”113  The naval journalist Arnold White blasted 
Admiralty policies in his 1901 book Efficiency and Empire, writing that “Parsimony in 
coal and extravagance in gold-leaf, insufficient sea training of officers, […] the retention 
of muzzle-loading guns, neglected gunnery, and failure to attract the highest engineering 
skill at the Admiralty, are all counts in the indictment against our rulers.  If drift is their 
maritime policy, wreck is our inevitable fate.”  White accused the Admiralty of spending 
more time dictating how officers were to wear their socks than focusing on the issues 
essential to the Royal Navy’s future.114  Admiral Cyprian Bridge, a first-hand witness to 
the navy’s resistance to change, waxed poetic on the Admiralty in a later reminiscence: 
“as the formalism becomes more pronounced, so the unreality increases.”115  Earl 
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Rosebery, the former Liberal prime minister, was blunter in 1900: “unhappy is the nation 
that relies for its security on its past history.”116 
The Royal Navy in the first years of the twentieth century was again at a 
crossroads, as it had been for much of the previous century.  Technology had proceeded 
ever onward, from the Victory through monstrous 120-gun wooden battleships, paddle 
frigates, screw line-of-battle ships, ironclads, the unfortunate misshapen experiments of 
the 1860s and 1870s, ever-larger and more numerous battleships after the resurgence of 
popular interest in the Navy from the 1880s on, all the way to the contemporary Royal 
Sovereign class: 380 feet long, over 14,000 tons, and capable of steaming at 17 knots.
117
  
The Admiralty as an institution had persevered as well, having weathered all the storms 
of midcentury.  Some had been genuine crises, or had seemed like ones at the time – the 
Slump endured, the Crimean War won, La Gloire outclassed.   
But many of the Admiralty’s storms were self-inflicted.  The uppermost admirals 
and administrators always seemed behind the times, always looking to return to the days 
when wooden battleships offered a safe future.  The Admiralty would have gladly taken 
a dozen Trafalgars over another Sevastopol; a battle of annihilation could bring death or 
glory, while a siege or blockade could bring neither.  Mentally this was understandable 
in the 1830s and 1840s, when Nelson’s companions still commanded British fleets 
across the globe.  Technologically, it was understandable during the 1860s and 1870s, 
when there was no clear consensus on what the future of naval warfare would even be.  
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Yet the Admiralty never evolved.  Nelson’s commanders grew old and passed away, and 
their successors became even more entrenched in the mythos of the line of battle.  Men 
who joined the service in the 1850s and found themselves disgusted by the lack of 
innovation rose to become those who scoffed at gunnery reforms in the 1890s. 
Historians have devoted many a turn of phrase to the state of the late-Victorian 
navy.  Richard Humble penned one of the best: “The glorious traditions begun in the 
days of the old sail Navy did not act as an encouragement to better things; rather, they 
came to have an inhibiting, numbing effect.  The golden calf of ‘The System’ was raised 
on dusty altars.”118  But the Senior Service was never decrepit through and through, as is 
often assumed.  Throughout the nineteenth century frigates, sloops and later gunboats 
put the world under the white ensign under the command of thousands of eager young 
commanders and midshipmen.  It was the topmost ranks that became clogged with a 
steady procession of elderly admirals, each apparently living further in the past than the 
one before.  Precocious gunboat commanders would eventually make their way up the 
chain of command and realize once they arrived at the pinnacle that they had been taught 
nothing.  As Donald MacIntyre has written, “an officer up to Captain’s rank was not 
expected to meddle with tactics.  On reaching the Flag List, the spirit of Nelson 
mysteriously descended upon him and he at once became an expert.”119 
The Royal Navy of 1805 idolized Nelson; so did the Royal Navy of 1905, but 
time and apathy had condensed Nelson’s tactical ideas into a series of maxims of 
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questionable utility.  Nelson’s famous dictum, that all in war was chance, had been 
replaced with the supposed unerring exactitude of modern technological warfare.  His 
principle that delegation must be on as wide a scale as possible and orders should be 
interpreted as broadly as possible to ensure a successful engagement sank in the 
Mediterranean with George Tryon.  What remained from Trafalgar morning was an 
almost fanatical devotion to order and the offensive battle of annihilation.  This concept 
had not been tested for over a century; if it had been called upon in the 1860s or 1870s 
the result would have been almost certain disaster.  The Royal Navy from the youngest 
cadet to the most veteran admiral still considered Nelson ‘our Saviour and our God,’ but 
Nelson was now a mere talisman rather than an exemplar to be followed, rendered 
impotent by his very ubiquity; “tradition is a fine servant, but a poor master.”120 
The Admiralty had also experienced a tumultuous century when it came to public 
opinion.  The general British populace had supported the navy with open arms 
throughout the Napoleonic Wars and then fallen away in the decades of peace that 
followed.  The Crimean War brought the Royal Navy back into the public spotlight and 
just as rapidly out of it as the hoped-for devastating British naval victories failed to 
materialize.  The British public was spared the most excessive naval hand-wringing 
during the 1860s and 1870s, only to be thrust back into the Admiralty’s field of view 
with the naval scares of the 1880s. 
This was how the Admiralty had arrived at 1905.  Renewed public and 
governmental interest had increased naval coffers and led to dozens of new battleships, 
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but the apparent continued lack of progress within Whitehall itself was leading to ever 
more unpleasant questions.  Britain was in danger of losing faith in its navy, which 
seemed to sink deeper into the past with every passing generation.  The Royal Navy 
needed a revolutionary, one who could reform the service to the same degree as the 
ships.  It found one in the person of John Arbuthnot Fisher.  A paradoxical soul if ever 
one existed, Fisher took the love of the navy’s past – and Nelson in particular – to a 
degree never seen before.  Yet he was committed to reform, first to bringing Admiralty 
bureaucracy to the same level of modernization as its technology and then with a second 
effort putting British warship design again at the forefront of the world.  Fisher also tied 
the popular press irrevocably to naval policy.  For good or ill there would be no more 
discussions on the future of naval warfare held in darkened rooms; minutes were leaked, 
proclamations were made, and the Senior Service was paraded around London on 
sandwich boards.  The Royal Navy of 1905 had been back in the public eye for twenty 
years; with Sir John Fisher at its helm, it would begin to feel the full weight of an 
anxious nation’s fears of war. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 “A GREAT ERA CONCRETE IN A SINGLE MAN” – THE 
POPULAR NELSON AND THE NAVALIST ERA, 1880-1906 
 
 The naval disappointments of the Crimean War faded into the past throughout 
the 1860s and 1870s.  For most of Britain, they took any first-hand conception of Nelson 
and British naval history with them.  There had been no great Trafalgar below the walls 
of Sevastopol.  Worse yet for the Royal Navy’s public image, it soon became apparent 
that the Crimea had marked the end of the famous ‘wooden walls’ which dominated 
popular imagination.  A decade after the conflict, the great timber steamers and ships of 
the line were being steadily replaced by iron behemoths that bore little relation to the 
fleet that had made Great Britain a force at sea.   
As these ships disappeared, their famous captains also began to disappear from 
the public eye; it seemed that Drake and St. Vincent and Collingwood and their heroic 
brethren could be of no further use except as examples of past glories, Caesars of the sea 
who should be emulated in word but not deed.   The historian J. C. Wylie wrote that 
“during the century of peace of the Pax Britannica […] their memories were bright and 
the pub signs were beyond counting, but their lore had been lost.”1  Nelson himself 
remained popular, but the general public view of him slowly began to blur around the 
edges into an ideal rather than an individual.  While the Royal Navy bombarded 
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Alexandria in 1882, the members of the British public who idly thumbed past news of 
the latest colonial dust-up in the local press had no idea of the force with which Nelson 
and his Navy would return to the popular consciousness – in everything from novels to 
mass advertisements - over the next quarter century. 
The major scholarly naval history resource of the post-Crimea decades was still 
Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas’s The Dispatches and Letters of Lord Nelson, published in 
the 1840s.  Nicolas aimed to ensure that Nelson’s fame would endure, writing that 
Britain owed to the great admiral “a Name synonymous with Victory, which, with 
almost talismanic power inspires her Sons in the day of battle with a confidence that 
ensures success; and She is indebted to him for an Example to ages yet unborn, of the 
most ardent loyalty, the most genuine patriotism, the most conscientious sense of duty to 
his Sovereign and his Country.”2  However, his letters also made indisputably public 
Nelson’s illegitimate child and adulterous relationship with Emma, Lady Hamilton.  This 
was an unpardonable sin to the Victorian social mores of Nicolas’ readers, and 
commentators explained away Nelson’s ‘shameful’ private life by claiming that he had 
sought death at Trafalgar to expunge his sins;
3
 even so, Nelson’s public reputation was 
badly shaken and his value as an ethical example called into question.  A nephew of 
Nelson wrote to The Times in 1861 calling for a new conception of the Admiral’s life 
that would focus merely on his deeds at sea: “The glory of Great Britain depends as 
much on the heroes she has produced, as on her wealth, her influence, and her 
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possessions; and the true patriot and honourable man, if he cannot add to their lustre, 
will at least refrain from any premeditated act which may dim their fame.”4  Nelson 
could best serve his country by being remembered as a symbol, not as an individual – his 
affair and illegitimate child proved all too human for his dutifully moral admirers. 
During these dim naval days of the 1860s and 1870s, the British view of Nelson 
took on a new character.  He had remained a ‘living’ legend while those who served 
under and with him were still on active duty admirals, fleet commanders, and the 
public’s link to the Admiralty.  As the elderly naval leaders of the 1850s retired, even 
their inconsistently applied Nelsonian tactical and strategic ideas faded away.  They 
were replaced in the public eye with what the naval historian Andrew Lambert has called 
the ‘Mythic Trafalgar:’ “Trafalgar was not a fit subject for careful investigation – it was 
best left as the sublime example of naval power.”5  Nelson slowly became an exemplar 
rather than a historical individual, and in his new much broader guise could be useful 
both to the Royal Navy in his original role as professional model and to the general 
British public as a heroic exemplar of duty and patriotism.
6
  With the underlying 
strategic conception of Nelson’s victories stripped away in all but the most technical of 
publications, Trafalgar in particular became both more and less relevant. When mid-
Victorian writers spoke of Trafalgar the battle appeared as a parody of itself -- all fire 
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and heroics without any broader look at the underlying strategic or tactical concerns, 
viewed as one of the most significant events in English history without any further detail 
necessary.
7
  Yet Nelson’s memory as an example of past and present glories was alive 
and well among Britain’s youth.  Winston Churchill wrote of the high Victorian era: 
“Children were taught of the Great War against Napoleon as the culminating effort in the 
history of the British peoples, and they looked on Waterloo and Trafalgar as the supreme 
achievements of British arms by land and sea.  These prodigious victories, eclipsing all 
that had gone before, seemed the fit and predestined ending to the long drama of our 
island race.”8 
This mid-Victorian recasting of Trafalgar as a semi-mystical exemplar of British 
naval superiority was connected with and partially subsumed under the broader and 
older concept of Britain’s special relationship with the sea, an idea stretching back to the 
Tudor period.  In 1878, Robert Louis Stevenson pushed for the sea as Great Britain’s 
national symbol, as opposed to the lion: “The sea is our approach and bulwark; it has 
been the scene of our greatest triumphs and dangers, and we are accustomed in lyrical 
strains to claim it as our own.”9  The general public accepted this view; for example, a 
Victorian children’s history claimed that “the love of the restless ocean implanted in the 
hearts of our fierce piratical ancestors has never quite left the British boy.”10  And there 
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could be no doubt as to the Navy’s patron saint, who rose atop the ancient seafaring 
tradition to become the symbol of Britain’s wooden walls:  as historian W. Mark 
Hamilton has stated, “the triumph of Admiral Lord Nelson at the Battle of Trafalgar 
sustained Great Britain’s naval pride for a century as her naval tradition, smartness, and 
‘Spirit of Nelson’ struck fear into the hearts of her potential enemies.”11 
So Nelson’s popularity remained, and although it waned from time to time, it was 
never in danger of being extinguished.  His example was particularly used to encourage 
future generations; the author Esther Meynell recalled how she first became interested in 
the topic of naval history while growing up with a portrait of Nelson on her nursery 
wall.
12
  However, the average adult’s conception of the Admiralty beyond famous names 
and battles was weaker.  For many, the fact that Britain’s navy remained paramount 
went without saying – it was merely assumed that the Royal Navy was an ever-dominant 
service.
13
  Naval historian Arthur Marder penned an in-depth explanation for this state of 
affairs during these peaceful decades: “Everything in regard to the navy was regarded as 
recondite, uninteresting, and a matter for experts.  The silence of the press reflected the 
apathy of the man in the street.”  Yet apathy did not imply any belief that the Royal 
Navy was useless - rather “the command of the sea, so far as this concept was 
understood, was regarded by Englishmen as their birthright and something which it was 
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impossible to lose.”14  For contemporary writers in the 1870s and 1880s, the reasoning 
was simpler.  Robert Louis Stevenson wrote in 1878 that “to suppose yourself endowed 
with natural parts for the sea because you are the countryman of Blake and mighty 
Nelson, is perhaps just as unwarrantable as to imagine Scotch extraction a sufficient 
guarantee that you will look well in a kilt.  But the feeling is there, and seated beyond 
the reach of argument.”15  This feeling of naval superiority had always existed below the 
surface among Britons, especially those of the middle and upper classes. But an 
explosive series of popular journal articles would soon thrust the Admiralty out of its 
doldrums  back into the public eye and spread a fascination with naval development and 
a fear of naval usurpation throughout the nation as a whole. 
On September 15, 1884, an article appeared in the Pall Mall Gazette entitled 
‘The Truth about the Navy.’16  As previously discussed in the third chapter, this article 
and those that followed provided an impetus for the Royal Navy to devote more funds to 
modern warships.  However, the series of fearmongering articles also triggered a naval 
panic among the general populace.  Newspapers and magazines from The Times 
downward debated the effectiveness of the Royal Navy; in addition to regaining the lead 
over France, it soon became accepted wisdom that the Royal Navy must also establish 
naval supremacy over Russia – currently the world’s third-largest navy – or any other 
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nation that would take the Tsar’s place.17  Naval issues rapidly became so relevant to the 
British public that even Lord Tennyson, the honored poet laureate, became involved: in 
April 1885 he published a poem titled ‘The Fleet’ in The Times that warned the 
Admiralty: “You, you, if you shall fail to understand / What England is, and what her 
all-in-all, / On you will come the curse of all the land / Should this old England fall / 
Which Nelson left so great.”18  The journalistic and political uproar over the navy’s 
supposed obsolescence eventually became so great that Prime Minister William 
Gladstone agreed to allocate an extra £3.5 million to the naval budget, a significant 
increase to the usual funds of around £11 million.
19
 
Yet naval scares continued, and even the replacement of Gladstone with Lord 
Salisbury, who as a Conservative would ostensibly be a more vocal supporter of the 
navy, as Prime Minister in 1886 failed to quiet the crowds.  Eventually more drastic 
measures became necessary, in the form of the 1889 Naval Defence Act.  It set aside a 
mammoth £21.5 million for eight first-class battleships (what would become the Royal 
Sovereign class), two second-class battleships, nine large cruisers, 29 additional cruisers, 
and various smaller ships.
20
  It also made official for the first time the long-followed de 
facto two-power standard: from 1889 onward, it was Admiralty policy to possess more 
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warships than the next two most powerful rival navies combined.
21
  This vast growth in 
naval budgets marked the onset of what historians have generally termed the ‘navalist 
age.’22  By the early 1890s, as W. Mark Hamilton has noted, “the British Navy [was] 
almost as sacred as the Crown, and just as popular.”23  And although this surge in 
popularity focused heavily on the importance of remembering Nelson and Trafalgar, as 
could be expected, it also brought the Admiralty itself back into the public good graces 
for the first time since the Napoleonic War.  The ships had changed, but the British 
public increasingly wanted reassurance that the men behind them still maintained a 
connection to the glory days of old. 
The rapid increase in naval prestige during the last decade of the nineteenth 
century led to a concurrent rapid increase in literature concerned with the Royal Navy 
and Nelson in particular.  Until the 1890s, the most popular work on Nelson was still 
Robert Southey’s 1813 biography;24 between 1885 and 1905, however, there were at 
least ten major new biographies published on his life and works intended for various 
audiences.
 25
  They could take the form of reissued stories from Nelson’s day such as 
G.S. Parsons’ Nelsonian Reminiscences, originally compiled as a contemporary 
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remembrance of Nelson’s navy but republished as a series of magazine articles in 
1905.
26
  More often they were new works, mainly consisting of the same general life 
story but peppered with details revealing exactly how their authors viewed Nelson’s 
relevance to middle and working-class audiences nearly a century after his death. 
One of these works is W. Clark Russell’s Horatio Nelson and the Naval 
Supremacy of England.  Released in 1890 as part of a ‘Heroes of the Nations’ series, 
Russell claimed to have written the first new life of Nelson since Nicolas’s dispatches 
nearly half a century earlier.
27
  Much of the book’s material is typical hagiography 
intended for a mass-market audience; Nelson is referred to as ‘The Hero’ throughout.  In 
Russell’s words Nelson’s career continues apace until the day of Trafalgar, where “the 
greatest sea victory that the world had ever known was won,” which “fixed the destinies 
of Britain” with the help of sailors who were “the children of a nation whose offspring 
were the finest breed of sailors the world had ever produced.”28  Yet the end of Russell’s 
account offered a new wrinkle.  He connected Nelson’s legacy with the performance of 
the contemporary Royal Navy, stating that “so long as the English sailor preserves 
[Nelson’s] qualities, the name of Nelson must prove a note of magic.  It will be these 
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qualities which will, in turn, preserve the place of Britain.”29  Nelson’s fighting qualities 
could, Russell argued, also be applied to the warship of the 1890s and its crew, as 
contemporary “scientific inventions and intricate mechanical instruments call for as 
much coolness and vigilance and nerve, if our commanders are ever to approach the 
records of the mastersailor [sic.] whose history we have striven to narrate.”30   
Most intriguingly, Russell also set out exactly how Nelson would remain relevant 
to the contemporary steam navy.  Although “it is eighty-five years since he died; yet still 
is his name the one of all earthly names to work most magically in the thoughts of 
Englishmen.”  Russell admitted that Nelson’s “example as a strategist is of no use now,” 
but he believed that if Nelson’s views on warfare were obsolete, his genius was not: “his 
example as an English sailor must, whilst there remains a British keel afloat, be as potent 
in all seafaring aspirations and resolutions as ever it was at any moment in his devoted 
and glorious life.”31  Russell closed his account with an engraving of one of the Royal 
Navy’s latest warships, HMS Trafalgar (1887) -- a fitting bridge between the two eras of 
Admiralty glory he described in the text. 
 Russell’s account may have been the first in the navalist era, but it was certainly 
not the most hagiographic.  Authors raced to grab a share of the new market for naval 
literature by painting the Royal Navy’s past heroes in the most glowing terms as they 
could muster.  Charles Rathbone Low’s Her Majesty’s Navy (1892) explained to its 
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eager readers that “Nelson was one of those great spirits to whom the world concedes an 
undisputed preeminence.  As Shakespeare stands at the head of poets and Napoleon at 
the head of soldiers, so the immortal Nelson remains peerless among sailors […] and no 
voice has yet been raised to deny him the pride of place in his profession.”32  By the end 
of the decade, the new flow of naval interest was beginning to become a two-way street.  
Naval scares and public agitation for larger fleets had made the Royal Navy more 
relevant to the man in the street than it had been in decades; some members of the Navy 
now attempted to make the fervor permanent by reminding the average Briton just what 
he owed to the fleet.  Admiral Lord Charles Beresford was by this period an influential 
figure in the Royal Navy; he was the epitome of the post-Crimean War naval hero, 
having won fame ashore in Egypt and Khartoum in the 1880s.  Yet his 1898 Nelson and 
His Times, written with H.W. Wilson, was intended for a different audience who favored 
earlier role models: 
This Work is, in fact, addressed to the millions of the great British 
democracy, for whose prosperity and freedom, as for that of generations 
yet unborn, Nelson fought and died. [...] To-day the descendants of the 
people, to whom Nelson was the popular hero, are a gigantic force in the 
land. [...] It is important, therefore, that the masses who now hold the 
power, should realise what Nelson’s victories really meant for our 
country.
33
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 An essential component of Beresford’s writing was ensuring the general public 
knew that Nelson was and remained “the pattern and patron saint of our seamen.”34  
Exactly why this should be so was of no interest – but it was essential that “the millions 
of the great British democracy” knew  “as the years recede and the permanency of his 
work more and more appears, that he was great with a colossal greatness.”35  By the 
1890s Beresford was a rear-admiral in the RN, a member of Parliament and a firm 
believer in the value of a broader public conception of Nelson’s legacy; he wrote that 
Nelson’s “memory lives ever fresh in the heart of a free nation, whose children of to-day 
have learnt from the lips of their fathers and their fathers’ fathers his deeds of splendid 
and unselfish heroism.  It will be handed down radiantly bright from generation to 
generation – the greatest, perhaps, of all Britain’s glories.”   
And if an increased interest in Trafalgar Day led to more agitation for naval bills 
that Beresford could harness in the professional and political arenas, that was acceptable 
as well: “The objects of the book will have been fully realised if it helps the great mass 
of our fellow-countrymen to truly appreciate the vital issues which depend on the 
maintenance of our naval superiority – the preservation intact of the heritage of 
Nelson.”36  Beresford concluded his work with an ominous warning of the dangers that 
would follow if Britons once again lapsed in their devotion: “The years pass, and danger 
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again threatens England. [...] But now, as of old, if we are true to ourselves, we need 
have no fears.  Nelson’s example remains to all time to inspire us with lofty devotion.”37 
 Influential as these new works on Nelson were, they were generally single-
volume biographical lives or simply parts of larger series on the Royal Navy.  The 1890s 
also saw the rise of navalist authors who devoted large portions of their careers to 
demonstrating the importance of Nelson and the Royal Navy in an increasingly 
technological world.  Two of the most influential were J.K. Laughton and Alfred Thayer 
Mahan.  Laughton, a naval historian and lecturer at the Royal Naval College, had for 
years been calling for an increased appreciation of Nelson; as early as 1874 he delivered 
a lecture on how “the name of Nelson is almost a synonym for England’s greatness.”38 
Laughton’s first major published work on Nelson was a new edition of the Letters and 
Despatches of Horatio, Viscount Nelson in 1886.  After this scholarly tome he wrote two 
shorter works intended for popular audiences, Nelson (1889) for the ‘English Men of 
Action’ series and the illustrated The Nelson Memorial: Nelson and His Companions 
(1896).  These smaller editions were intended for a mass audience and written to order 
for publishers who saw which Nelson’s increased popularity as a path to profit -- both 
were cheaply reprinted and became Laughton’s most popular, if not best remembered, 
publications.
39
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Laughton owed these successes to the increased public interest in naval affairs.  
His naval supporters encouraged him to write these further works on Nelson; after 
reading Laughton’s Despatches, Rear Admiral Sir Francis Leopold McClintock wrote to 
the author in 1887 relating a conversation with a friend about “his great regret that no-
one had written a vindication of Lord Nelson […] If England has for nearly a century so 
deeply wronged the memory of Nelson, it is only just, to make what reparation we can 
even now.”40  The high Victorian dismissal of Nelson as a flawed hero was being 
papered over to cash in on the Navy’s newfound popularity, and Laughton in particular 
was teaching his version of the heroic Nelson to his professional naval students and the 
general public at the same time. 
Laughton’s vindications included much of the language already familiar from 
Russell and Low.  He was of the opinion that “sailors differ from their countrymen 
mainly in being finer specimens of the race,”41 but cautioned his countrymen that “these 
qualities do not grow spontaneously: they require cultivation and development; they are 
the product of obedience, labor, and forethought, of unceasing energy, zeal, and 
devotion.” He was quick to point out that “the encouragement to all these lies in the 
glorious and ever-living memory of TRAFALGAR.”42   However, Laughton would 
have a more lasting impact on navalism than these easily-affordable popular lives.  In 
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1893, taking an opportunity to further the cause of naval history,
43
 he became a driving 
force behind the organization of the Navy Records Society (NRS).  The NRS’s goal was 
the education of naval officers in the history of their craft
44
  by the collection and 
printing of naval primary documents.  The series began with volumes on the Spanish 
Armada of 1588, but by 1901 the Society and Laughton were hard at work on volumes 
intended “to put Nelson’s fame beyond future challenge.”45  Yet their intended audience 
was shifting.  A fellow naval historian wrote to Laughton in 1893: “I am disappointed at 
seeing from the list sent to me […] that less than half of them are naval men.  Although 
it is perhaps really better that they should be readier to make history than read it.”46  
Instead, the Society began to generate interest among an upper-class popular market of 
antiquarians and history enthusiasts.  Even as the NRS’s market changed, its goal 
remained the same.  Laughton declared to an audience in 1896 that “those of you who 
are here fifty years hence may say to your grandson or great-grandson that what they 
know of the art of naval war, and of the glories of our country, they owe to the Navy 
Records Society.”47 
J.K. Laughton was a respected and popular name in the field of navalist writing.  
Alfred Thayer Mahan was something more, perhaps the first worldwide naval sensation.  
A captain in the United States Navy, he had wondered as early as 1886 that with “all the 
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changed conditions of naval warfare of what use is the knowledge of these bygone 
days?”48  Setting out to demonstrate that the naval past still held value, he published the 
first volume of his The Influences of Sea Power Upon History in 1890; a second 
followed in 1892.  Mahan wrote to increase knowledge of naval matters among his U.S. 
contemporaries, and “the success of the book in Britain was incidental to its purpose.”49  
Be that as it may, the book used the Royal Navy as a case study of naval power and 
prestige, and this was enough to earn it a wave of publicity in Britain.  Professional 
naval writers in particular proved enthusiastic -- Lord Beresford wrote to Mahan in 1891 
to assert “if I had the power I would order your book to be placed on the table of every 
House in Britain and Her Colonies and teach our people how our magnificent Empire 
first obtained its basis, by its Sea Power resolutely fought for.”50  Another naval author, 
Philip Colomb, wrote to Mahan the same year that “I think all our Naval men regarded it 
as the naval book of the age, and it has had a great effect in getting people to understand 
what they never understood before.”51  Even J.K. Laughton was fulsome in his praise, 
telling an audience in 1893 he would “only say to any of you who may not yet have read 
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Captain Mahan’s books, read them: to those who have read them, read them again; read 
them a third time.”52 
As popular as Mahan’s early works were, it was still mainly a professional naval 
audience who read them for a second and third time, albeit a much broader readership 
than had been previously reached.  When Mahan visited Britain in the early 1890s, the 
British navalists who entertained him had an idea of how he could reach even more 
people to teach them the value of naval power.  Many encouraged him to write a work 
specifically about Nelson, and they provided him with documentary assistance through 
Laughton – who, thanks to his involvement with the NRS, had access to many of 
Nelson’s papers -- and other British scholars.53  Mahan’s two-volume The Life of Nelson 
was published in 1897.   
In terms of ‘scholarly’ work on Nelson, this work represents the culmination of 
the new navalist perception that had been coalescing for the previous fifteen years.  
Mahan’s stated goal was to “present a study, from his own point of view, of the one man 
[…] for who [sic.] genius and opportunity worked together, to make him the 
personification of the Navy of Great Britain.”54  Nelson appears again as “this first of 
British seamen, whom the gifts of Nature and the course of History have united to make, 
in his victories and in their results, the representative figure of the greatest sea-power 
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that the world has known.”55  He became to Mahan and his readers “not merely a 
personality or a career, but a great force or a great era concrete in a single man, who is 
its standard-bearer before the nations.”56  Nelson’s true value to turn-of-the-century 
Britain is best summed up in Mahan’s magisterial conclusion: 
Wars may cease, but the need for heroism shall not depart from the earth, 
while man remains man and evil exists to be redressed.  Wherever danger 
has to be faced or duty to be done, at cost to self, men will draw 
inspiration from the name and deeds of Nelson […] The coincidence of 
his death with the moment of completed success has impressed upon that 
superb battle a stamp of finality, an immortality of fame, which even its 
own grandeur scarcely could have insured.  He needed, and he left, no 
successor.
57
 
 
The Life of Nelson became a best-seller and led to a great deal of further public 
interest in the Navy.  It was released in Britain during another of the decade’s many 
press furors over the condition of the navy, and its glowing accounts of Nelson’s life and 
achievements added a popular dimension to contemporary calls for a further appreciation 
of British sea power.
58
  Nelson’s resurgence as the arbiter of all British power had made 
the leap from bridges and mess-decks to drawing rooms and clubs across Britain thanks 
to upper-class organizations like the NRS and popular authors like Laughton and Mahan.  
But there remained a wider gap yet to bridge.  As The Times noted in 1897, “Captain 
Mahan has made Nelson live again for the student, but ‘the man in the street’ needs a 
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shorter and sharper reminder.”59  Britain’s popular press had fallen under a disapproving 
eye from many upper-class citizens during its shift towards jingoism in the 1860s and 
1870s.  Now, inspired by Laughton and Mahan and their naval admirers, the burgeoning 
popular press of the late Victorian era began to swing into action to disseminate the 
navalist Nelson back downwards towards the working classes who had most loved him 
so long ago. 
 The rise of the popular press had long annoyed many of Britain’s moral 
crusaders, but their influence steadily expanded throughout the second half of the 
nineteenth century.  By the early 1880s publications specifically for the youngest Britons 
made up nearly twenty percent of the books published in a given year.  Many of these 
works were the cheap adventure stories known as ‘penny dreadfuls;’ an 1881 article in 
the Contemporary Review worried that “never before was there so little prospect of those 
given to such reading being driven to more wholesome mental food by a limited supply 
of garbage.” 60  It was easy to find the source of these works; an 1887 Edinburgh Review 
noted how “the fountain head of the poisonous stream is in great towns and cities, 
especially in London itself; and it is with that we now have to deal.  Here the readers are 
to be numbered by hundreds of thousands, and the supply exceeds the wildest 
demand.”61  But the mid-1880s brought a new understanding of the power these little 
                                                          
59
 Marianne Czisnik, “Commemorating Trafalgar: Public Celebration and National Identity,” in David 
Cannadine, ed., Trafalgar in History: A Battle and its Afterlife (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 
145. 
 
60
 Joseph Bristow, Empire Boys: Adventures in a Man’s World (London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991), 
15, 10.  The author of the article was Thomas Wright. 
 
61
 Ibid., 12.  The author of the article was B.G. Johns. 
108 
 
books and magazines held.  An 1886 article in the Nineteenth Century wrote of their 
young audience: “These are the future electors who will exercise so much influence on 
the world’s destiny.  The constituents of an imperial race, they ought to be educated with 
a view to the power they will wield.”62  From this point on some would try to work with 
children’s literature instead of against it, making sure the stories told were proper moral 
tales – and many of these ethical lessons included the Navy. 
 Sales of children’s literature continuously increased during the navalist age; the 
Boys’ Own Paper eventually sold one million copies per issue.63  They printed historic 
fiction where children met Nelson,
64
 and spread pithy maxims from his life to Britain’s 
youth; Boys of England reported that doing one’s duty, as Nelson urged, was “the cause 
of England’s moral as well as physical supremacy over the other nations of the earth.”65  
The versions of Nelson created by some authors specifically encouraged their child 
readers to join the navy; F.H. Winder described his protagonist’s “initiation into the 
terrors and the grandeur of naval warfare” as the young boy’s “accession of manhood.”66  
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This naval spirit soon spread to the schoolroom, where boys recited ‘The Death of 
Nelson’ as soon as they could comprehend the words.67   
Even the very young, aided by their families, became involved.  In 1887 The 
Lady’s World magazine noted: “a boy before he rises to the dignity of trousers and 
jackets is never so happy as in a Middy suit or a Jack Tar; and these suits are now selling 
in thousands.”68  Eventually the Amalgamated Press reporting service was able to report 
that boys’ magazines had “done more to provide recruits for our Navy and Army and to 
keep up the esteem of the sister services than anything else.”69  One example of the role 
these boys’ magazines played in the lives of middle-class children can be found in the 
memoir of James Cox, who joined the Royal Navy in 1900.  He recorded his reasoning 
for making such a commitment: “And of course I used to read the Boys’ Friend, Boy’s 
Own Paper, Union Jack and Chums and all those very romantic boys’ books which were 
sold in those days for a halfpenny or a penny…I wanted to lead a life of adventure.”70  
He was not alone. 
 However, the spread of popular Victorian literature entailed more than just 
children’s books.  Nelson and the navy made a dramatic reappearance the lives of 
middle-class Britons of all ages during this period.  The Royal Navy and its sailors were 
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used in advertisements for everything from Cadbury’s cocoa to polishing cloths.71  
Nelson himself was an even more valuable marketing tool -- broadsheets trumpeted that 
‘Nelson the Hero of Trafalgar and Pears Soap Have Become the Most Familiar Names in 
the English Language’ and ‘England expects that every man this day will do his duty and 
take Beecham’s Pills.’72  There were revivals of older works focusing on the Navy, some 
dating back to the era of Nelson’s original surge in popularity.  Black Ey’d Susan, a play 
involving Nelson originally written in the late 1820s, returned to the stage in the 1890s; 
the poster rather bizarrely featured a dying Nelson surrounded by chorus girls.
73
  The 
historian Peter Padfield has written: “The strain was taken up by the press and the 
public, interested as never before in their Navy; Admirals were subject to the popularity 
and public scrutiny reserved today for stars of sport and entertainment.  Music Halls 
echoed to popular pride of Navy and Empire; versifiers exhorted the people to reckon up 
their battleships [….] naval memoirs and naval history enjoyed a wider readership than 
ever before.”74   
 The Navy had originally reappeared on the public scene in large-circulation 
newspapers such as The Times and the Pall Mall Gazette with the ‘Truth About the 
Navy’ series.  Although the Westminster Review claimed that “The newspapers…are the 
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best and surest civilisers of a country,”75 they initially seemed better suited to sowing 
panic.  Besides the naval scare in 1884 associated with the original ‘Truth About the 
Navy’ articles, there were further newspaper-driven popular panics in 1885 (war with 
Russia), 1888, 1893 (more Russian antagonism in the Mediterranean), 1894 (fears of 
Spain retaking Gibraltar), 1898 (the German Navy Bill and the Fashoda crisis), and 1900 
(the Boer War combined with a French invasion scare).
76
   
But every scare, however brief, seemed to increase the general public’s desire to 
become more involved with the Navy.  In 1897, the Morning Post editorialized that 
“when, at some future period, the history of this country during the nineteenth century 
comes to be written, one of the features that will present itself most prominently to the 
mind of the historian will be the manner in which, in the last twenty years of this period, 
the nation awakened once again to the dominating influence of sea-power as the real 
source of British security and greatness.”77  By the time of the Fashoda incident with the 
French over colonial possessions in September 1898, any sense of naval panic had been 
replaced by a vague but omnipresent feeling that future wars or naval actions would only 
lead to the second Trafalgar Britain had been denied in the 1850s.
78
  Although the new 
battleships of the Naval Defence Act were in no way comparable to Nelson’s 74-gun 
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ships of the line, most Britons seemed to believe with an often boisterous confidence that 
the result of any combat on the high seas would be the same. 
 Besides the daily press, cheaply-priced paperbacks for adults also became a 
middle-class staple during this period.  The navalist era was the golden age of ‘invasion 
literature,’ popular tales of Britain heroically defending herself against foreign 
aggressors ranging from the French to Martians.  The genre first appeared in 1871 with 
General Sir George Tomkyns Chesney’s The Battle of Dorking, in which a surprise 
invasion of mysterious but German-speaking troops defeated Britain.  The British fleet 
in Chesney’s work pompously declared that “the issue of a contest between British ships 
and those of any other country, under anything like equal odds, can never be doubtful.  
England awaits with calm confidence the issue of the impending action.”79  Hubris gets 
the better of them, and the entire fleet is sunk in a crushing defeat.
80
 
 Later naval works of literature were more jingoistic in character.  They varied in 
subject – some, such as Horace Gordon Hutchinson’s 1902 A Friend of Nelson, were 
historical novels set during the Napoleonic wars.  This was a tale designed solely to 
entertain, as Hutchinson’s narrator would not have endeared himself to the Royal Navy 
of 1805 or 1900; he purposely grounds a naval vessel to bring news to Nelson faster, 
scoffs at court-martial because he believes Nelson will protect him, and receives an 
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invitation to dinner from Nelson “like a boy that has just received his first letter from his 
mistress.”81  The narrator eventually discovers a plot to assassinate Nelson but declines 
to inform him, knowing that the great admiral would not reschedule dinner for anything 
as simple as attempted murder.  Instead, the narrator dresses as Nelson and tackles the 
criminals himself; as his romantic interest concludes, “that is what it is to be an 
Englishman!”82  By 1900, a cheap costume Nelson was just as effective in selling books 
as the original. 
 More popular were writings that brought Nelsonian personas and heroism into 
the contemporary Royal Navy.  Many of these also dealt with foreign invasions, usually 
the French in the 1880s and after the turn of the century generally the Germans.  In 
1891’s The Last Great Naval War, the British admiral reminds his men before a 
climactic battle how “remembering the noble traditions of the British Navy, we shall so 
acquit ourselves that this day will rank in history with that of Trafalgar.”83  Rudyard 
Kipling urged his readers in 1899’s A Fleet in Being to remember that “under the shell of 
the new Navy beats the heart of the old.  All Marryat’s immortals are there, better fed, 
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better tended, better educated, but at heart unchanged.”84  Henry Newbolt’s collection of 
naval poetry Admirals All was published in October 1897; by September 1898 it was in 
its twenty-first printing.
85
 
 These navalist works eventually seemed to compete with themselves, outdoing 
each other in their tales of Nelsonic glories at sea.  In 1901’s The Raid of Le Vengeur, 
the narrator has to sink a French submarine in order to win his love’s hand.86  W. Laird 
Clowes declared in his 1892 The Captain of the ‘Mary Rose’ that “the naval policy of 
Great Britain has simply been to seek the enemy’s Fleet and to endeavour to sink, burn, 
or take it,” and his hero conveniently loses an eye and an arm against the French doing 
just that.
87
  Fred T. Jane did Clowes one better in his 1895 Blake of the ‘Rattlesnake.’  
His eponymous protagonist attacks a French cruiser in a tiny destroyer; “it appeared little 
less than suicidal for us to attack her; but the traditions of the British Navy demanded 
that we should do so.”88  Blake is of course killed, but manages to hoist one last signal in 
the Nelsonic tradition: “England expects that every man will die like a true Briton.  No 
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surrender.”89  Jane stated in his introduction that he dared “venture to hope that this 
attempt to depict modern warfare from the Service point of view will convince the 
present and the rising generation that scientific advance has not yet eliminated the 
romance that, let peace-faddists say what they will, clings, and ever has clung around 
war.”90  Blake of the ‘Rattlesnake’ represents the view, held by many upper-class navy-
supporting individuals, that the best way to retain the pro-Royal Navy popular 
sentiments of the 1890s permanently among the general population was to locate the 
heart of the Navy in the golden age best represented by Nelson rather than swiftly-
moving contemporary technological warfare. 
 Other authors were also at pains to successfully blend the new scientific navy 
with the traditions of Nelson’s day.  Hugh Oakley Arnold-Forster’s 1898 In a Conning 
Tower believed that “every Englishman who is worth his salt knows something of the 
glorious naval annals of his country.  The names of Rodney, Howe and Nelson are 
happily and rightly household words among us; we honour and revere those splendid 
masters of their art. […] All that their country demanded of them they did.”  Yet he 
begged the reader to “compare for a moment the position of any one of those great 
officers in the action, and that which the fearful ingenuity of modern science has 
imposed on their successors.”  Arnold-Forster waxed rhapsodic on the deadly 
responsibilities all modern Nelsons faced: “Such power was never till the world began 
concentrated under the direction of man, and all that power, the judgement to direct it, 
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the will to apply it, the knowledge to utilize it, is placed in the hands of one man, and 
one only.  What is this power?  Talk of Jove with his thunderbolts, of Nasmyth with his 
hammer!  The fables of mythology and the facts of latter-day science!  Where has there 
ever been anything to compare to it?” 91  He offered a warning to his navalist readers to 
guard their heritage well -- “the door must needs be strong, for the treasure it has to keep 
behind it is the honour of the flag.”92 
 One of the most intriguing period accounts is again by W. Laird Clowes, 1905’s 
Trafalgar Refought.  This is a work that cuts to the heart of the navalist position.  There 
are no explanations of how the Nelsonian spirit is present in the Edwardian Navy; rather, 
Clowes removed the middleman and Nelson himself returns to fight a second Trafalgar a 
century after the first.  The story is not unique, being a nearly blow-by-blow retelling of 
Trafalgar fought with modern ships.  This leads to some inconsistencies, such as Nelson 
being dramatically felled by a splinter rather than a sniper’s bullet.  Yet in the end the 
British prevail, being “full of the prestige gained in ancient times against the same 
enemies.”93  And Nelson passes away a second time at the moment of victory, revealing 
once again how his “glorious death shines high above the turmoil, as some 
inextinguishable beacon crowning the summit of the pyramid of the world’s battles.”94 
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 The end result of this literary flood was a British middle class that was becoming 
ever more involved with the Admiralty’s daily business as an increased knowledge of 
naval matters among all Britons became commonplace during the 1890s.
95
  Invasion 
scares created navalist agitation among middle and working-class advocates, leading to 
persistent demands for a larger Royal Navy.  The Admiralty was more than willing to 
reciprocate and demonstrate support for its newest fans – after all, public pressure had 
led to the Naval Defence Act a decade previously.  One way the Navy gave back was 
through fleet reviews, where the general public could observe modern warships close up.  
This was not a new phenomenon – fleet reviews dated back a century, and since the 
1870s there had been open ‘visitor’s days’ on certain ships.96  There had been eight 
reviews between 1815 and 1870, eight more from 1870 to 1901, and a further five before 
1910.
97
  In addition, the Royal Navy in the 1880s and 1890s began participating in 
‘hurrah trips:’ goodwill voyages in which naval ships traveled up and down the coast in 
attempts to mobilize popular support for the Navy and recruit new sailors from local 
populations.
98
 
 A major fleet review took place in 1897 as part of Queen Victoria’s Diamond 
Jubilee.  The public was deeply involved; visitors to British warships could purchase 
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drinks, snacks, and souvenir programs onboard.
99
  Popular newspapers appreciated the 
effort.  Vanity Fair claimed that “the pride of the seas is ours now as it has been for 
centuries, and regarding Saturday’s evidence of the fact few Englishmen can have felt 
unready to attack by sea any combination that could possibly be formed for the lowering 
of the Union Jack.”100  The Illustrated London News reported how the review 
“represents, firstly, the results of the nation’s complete awakening to the real value of 
sea power and of all that it entails to an Empire such as ours.”101  These fleet 
appearances eventually developed into something resembling a holiday weekend.  By 
1902, the Daily Express wrote of a review at Portsmouth: “The town is as gay as a 
Hindoo [sic] bazaar with bunting and devices, and you are haunted by a sense of 
holiday-making from the appearance of the crowds in the streets, go where you will […] 
from a very early hour of the day an immense procession of excursion trains” flooded 
into the city.
102
  By 1904 a naval officer was in charge of preparing the Victory for the 
influx of tourists she received each summer, even when there was no official review 
scheduled.
103
  The Admiralty had become a source of entertainment for the common 
man.  The majority of the speeches and programs distributed at these events, including 
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some developed specifically for children, referenced Nelson and Trafalgar as arbiters of 
Britain’s glorious naval past.104 
 Britain’s government sometimes coordinated even larger events.  One such 
festival was the 1891 Royal Naval Exhibition, a gala event dedicated to the Navy in all 
its forms.  When the project was under consideration it was taken up enthusiastically by 
the Prince of Wales, who noted how “in his opinion, it was the duty of every Englishman 
to do his utmost to increase the popularity of the Navy, an object which he considered 
the proposed exhibition was well calculated to fulfill.”105  It was expected that the 
Exhibition would intrigue its middle-class visitors: “when they visited the Galleries in 
which so many of our great sea fights were so graphically illustrated, and viewed the 
relics and trophies of former wars, they would be reminded in what stormy times, and 
through what stirring scenes of strife and daring, the liberty and security they now 
quietly enjoy were won for them; and each one would feel a personal interest in 
maintaining the supremacy of the country on the seas.”106   
The exhibition proved a massive success.  Over the 151 days it was open, 
2,300,000 people attended the Chelsea spectacular.  Inscribed over the entrance to every 
exhibit hall was the Exhibition’s motto, ‘IT IS ON THE NAVY UNDER THE GOOD 
PROVIDENCE OF GOD, THAT OUR WEALTH, PROSPERITY, AND PEACE 
DEPEND.’  Visitors could examine the largest collection of Nelson memorabilia ever 
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assembled and tour a full-size replica of the Victory’s deck where Nelson fell; they took 
home with them 300,000 programs, 4,000 copies of F.H. Miller’s History of the 
‘Victory,’ and 70,000 official memorabilia catalogues authored by Nelson scholar J.K. 
Laughton.
107
  A contemporary author, Charles Napier Robinson, recalled in 1909 how 
“the story of the Navy […] has never been shown to better advantage than at the great 
Naval Exhibition at Chelsea in 1891.”108 
Great exhibitions drew crowds, but they were sporadic affairs.  The most active 
navalists believed more needed to be done to keep the Royal Navy in the public eye at 
all times, and they accomplished this through the formation and expansion of patriotic 
leagues.  The first public association that specifically used Trafalgar as part of its 
message was the Primrose League, founded as a Conservative organization in 1883.  
However, the Primrose League went about spreading their message in a rather stuffy 
Victorian fashion; their events included evening entertainments featuring songs on 
Nelson, magic lantern shows with images of Nelson and the Victory, and ‘Question 
Paper set[s] for Juveniles’ that required frustrated youths to discourse on the value of 
Trafalgar.
109
  Still, the Primrose League considered Trafalgar-related imagery as only a 
portion of its overall message. 
A much more powerful navalist organization was the Navy League, begun at the 
end of 1894.  It was spearheaded by Harry Cust, Unionist M.P. and editor of the Pall 
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Mall Gazette, and started life with two essential legs up: royal patronage (Victoria, 
Edward VII, and George V were all supporters) and a picture of Nelson in its crest.
110
  
The League operated on the principle that it would be the organization to deliver naval 
news personally to every British man, woman, and child.  League members, often 
politicians, newspapermen and upper-middle or upper-class naval enthusiasts, 
understood the power of public interest.  Naval journalist William White wrote in 1895:  
“The force of public opinion, to which, as I have shown, we are entirely indebted for 
such sufficiency of naval defence as we have so far attained, has so far been only 
periodically and intermittently applied.  This is surely wasteful, precarious, uncertain, 
and unscientific method of applying the force required [sic].”  He then presented a 
solution which would increase public interest in naval matters, writing “the only way to 
secure continuity and sufficiency in our naval policy […] is to apply the force required 
steadily, persistently, and uniformly.
111
 
The League would apply this pressure by any means necessary because, as the 
journalist and editor of the Navy League Journal, H.W. Wilson, stated: “our end is to 
strengthen that England which has made us what we are: to retain the inheritance of 
greatness which our fathers bequeathed to us: to confirm that proud national position 
without which many of us feel that life in this smoky island would be intolerable; and to 
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do this by making the Navy strong.  For by the Navy we stand or fall.”112  Admiral Lord 
Charles Beresford believed that the League could “surely ventilate the necessities for 
undoubted command of the sea and interest people who otherwise never hear of the 
fleet.”113 
 But the League intended to go beyond simple interest – its goal remained the 
creation of a permanent British popular calling for new ships and increased naval 
budgets.  Its navalist members possessed myriad ways of spreading issues related to the 
navy’s strength.  They wrote to colonial officials and commercial heads in 1895, 
pointing out that “the purpose of the League is to fix public attention in all lands under 
the British flag […] to the inexpressible and fundamental importance to them all of 
increasing the strength of the British navy.”114  They promoted extreme jingoism; Arnold 
White mounted a press campaign against Sir Arthur Conan Doyle after Doyle suggested 
changing ‘Trafalgar Day’ to ‘Nelson Day’ to avoid antagonizing the French.115  Like 
previous penny dreadful authors, League members found eager fans among Britain’s 
middle-class youth in schools.  League associate P.J. Hannon noted: “Nelson’s life and 
death, it was foreseen, might be utilised to personify British Sea Power to the children, if 
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not the veterans, of British democracy throughout the world.”116  Members lectured on 
Trafalgar in schools and led children in singing ‘The Death of Nelson.’117   
Most importantly, the League felt bound to spread their views to the world at 
large.  The first issue of the Navy League Journal in 1895 laid out the organization’s 
mission statement: “(the working man) is only half convinced of the value of our 
Empire, and but a lukewarm supporter of large Naval Budgets.  We must be at him and 
teach him.  It is the duty of the better-educated amongst us to go down into the market 
place and refute the sophistries of the blind leaders of the blind.  The lower classes can 
be led, but they want leaders…men with devotion to the great ideals at which this nation 
should aim.”118  These leading men would be expected to hound those who would not 
otherwise listen.  In 1896 the Navy League Journal recommended “where our members 
can, let them hold small meetings and put the facts before their audience.  Where they 
cannot hold meetings, let them attack the workingman in the train or on the omnibus.”119  
The renewed prestige and power of the Royal Navy would, if the League had its way, 
become literally inescapable. 
Perhaps the League’s greatest achievement was the popularization of Trafalgar 
Day.  Less antagonistic than many of their other schemes, the League began pushing in 
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1895 for larger celebrations on the day of Nelson’s death in,120 realizing that the nearly 
century-old tradition had lost a great deal of its public impact by the 1850s.  By the next 
year, their ceremonies were gaining empire-wide recognition; the Toronto Mail reported 
that “among the organizations of recent date in Great Britain, there are perhaps none 
which are likely more favourably to commend themselves to public notice than the Navy 
League.”121  The Navy League Journal crowed triumphantly:  
It was as if the people had arisen to answer those who say: ‘They do not 
care…’  The hundreds of thousands who for six days from morning till 
night defiled before the column have shown the unsuspected strength of 
feeling latent in British hearts.  They have shown that Britons do care, 
that they have not forgotten, that they are still capable of devotion and 
self-sacrifice.  Trafalgar – the very name, with its stirring associations, is 
a trumpet-call to the nation to do its duty. 
 
The Journal had high hopes for the future of the new Trafalgar Day, noting how of the 
spectators “some, of course, came only to look.  But the great mass of the people in the 
eponymous square were pilgrims, rather than mere spectators.  And those who were 
mere spectators must have learned much from their gazings.  They would realize that the 
British Navy still regards Nelson as its chosen hero.
122
  The populace could be thus 
reassured that the naval establishment shared their views on the importance of Britain’s 
naval past. 
By 1898, The Standard noted that “the anniversary of Lord Nelson’s greatest 
victory was commemorated yesterday with unabated enthusiasm.  The celebration is due 
to the Navy League, and it is to that association that the honour belongs of reviving the 
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national interest in the greatest seaman of the century.”123  According to The Referee, 
“there cannot be a greater incentive to young Englishmen to join the navy than the 
celebration of Nelson’s Day at Trafalgar Square.”124  The yearly wreaths in Trafalgar 
Square were developing a deep-set connection with the Admiralty’s yearly budget – in 
the hands of the League, Trafalgar Day was moving from a solemn remembrance of 
Nelson’s life to a public celebration of Nelson’s afterlife. 
 Nelson’s navy still retained its powerful pull as the Trafalgar centenary 
approached, to the point where parliamentary campaigns could be run on the program of 
an ‘invincible Navy.’125  The Times remained convinced that “the memory of Trafalgar 
can never fade so long as England remains a nation, nor even so long as the English 
tongue is spoken or the history of England is remembered in any part of the world,”126 
and the British museum published a catalogue of its Nelson engravings for the 
occasion.
127
   
However, by 1905 the League had less of a hold over Nelson’s public memory 
and had squandered much of its working-class goodwill – badgering workers on 
streetcars had its drawbacks.  The Manchester Guardian agreed that “a little more 
ancestor worship would do us as a nation no harm,” but “regretted that the public Nelson 
celebrations should have depended so much on an organization identified in the public 
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mind with indiscreet and often unintelligent advocacy of increased naval expenditure 
[the League].”128  At the other end of the political spectrum, naval writer F.T. Jane 
penned an appeal for ships instead of celebratory wreaths: “Too much Nelson cannot aid 
us against our future enemies; our own arms alone can do that.  Therefore to that future 
we should give our thoughts, not to hysterical sentiment over the past – ever the 
hallmark of a declining race.”129  But Jane’s view of a Nelsonless Navy was an isolated 
one.  Across the Empire in Melbourne, “Fears were expressed of the war to come, and of 
the desperate need for another Nelson.”130  In 1905, Elliot Mills published a futurist 
pamphlet entitled The Decline and Fall of the British Empire; supposedly authored in 
2005, it cited a “growing tendency of the English throughout the Twentieth Century to 
forsake the sea” as one of the reasons behind Britain’s future decline.131  As the Empire 
celebrated one hundred years of its premiere naval hero, one could be forgiven for some 
uncertainty as to the question hidden behind the curtain: “Will the Empire which is 
celebrating one centenary of Trafalgar survive for the next?”132 
Even with concerns about the Navy’s future, the general public’s view and 
appreciation of the Royal Navy’s past and present was radically improved from those of 
a quarter-century earlier.  As far as many navalists were concerned, panics were better 
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than the general apathy which prevailed during the dimmest days of the 1860s and 
1870s.  After all, naval scares had led to the vastly increased Admiralty budgets that had 
put the Royal Navy back in the public eye.  Britain’s naval heritage was now cheaply 
and easily accessible to those in all walks of life.  Socially-minded businessmen, 
gentlemen and peers could now involve themselves in the Navy Records Society, 
contributing to the further spread of previously inaccessible naval documents while 
discussing the latest scholarly works of Mahan or Laughton.  The vast middle-class was 
even more saturated with the Navy’s fighting spirit.  They could read a pro-Navy 
diatribe in their morning paper, attend a League rally in the evening, and stock up on 
cheap Nelson fiction and biographies specially designed for ‘the common man;’ their 
impressionable children would learn enough naval history in school to satisfy them for 
the day.  Britain’s working-class citizens could take a holiday to a fleet review or 
exhibition – or find themselves badgered on their way to work by an overzealous League 
supporter.  
Many of these groups, however, conceptualized Nelson in their own ways.  
Upper-class navalists, the driving force behind the League, favored a conservative 
Nelson.  Nelson could serve as the link between the glorious Navy that had defeated 
Napoleon and the new technological Navy created by the Naval Defence Act and 
beyond.  The middle class, saturated with popular fiction and cheaply-printed histories 
of Nelson’s days, preferred the political Nelson.  Similar to the upper-class view but 
broader in scope, the political Nelson was oftentimes merely justification for all and any 
increases in naval budgets.  A powerful Navy would enable the fighting men of the fleet 
128 
 
to take on France, Russia, or Germany just as Nelson tackled Napoleon a century prior.  
It was working-class Britons who had kept Nelson’s memory alive in pubs and local 
memorials when it had faded in the 1860s and 1870s; and they retained the much older 
concept of the purely heroic Nelson – a role model for all Englishmen, from deckhand to 
admiral.  They approached the new uses of Nelson in the 1880s and 1890s from the 
opposite direction.  Rather than beginning with a modern Navy and adding Nelson to 
bolster its appeal, the working class began with a totemic Nelson and simply expanded 
his popular support into that of the Navy, helped along by fleet reviews and jubilees. 
Britain was by the turn of the century saturated in a century’s worth of Nelson’s 
reflected glory, although the average Englishman’s conception of what this actually 
entailed slowly became shaped more by banner headlines than by any in0depth 
knowledge of the issues.  It seemed as if the Admiralty had been overshadowed by its 
own creation, this mass of popular supporters that demanded bigger and better ships and 
threatened to vote out or agitate against any politician or naval official who did not 
agree.  But the elderly naval establishment was slowly churning away at its own reforms 
during these heady decades.  The Royal Navy had lagged behind its own supporters; for 
nearly all of the 1880s and 1890s they had been more concerned with spit and polish 
than any true improvements.  This changed rapidly in October 1904 with the ascension 
of Admiral Sir John Fisher to the post of First Sea Lord.  Fisher brought with him naval 
improvements that would save money and improve naval efficiency.  He brought with 
him a conception of how the Navy could work with the press, parliamentarians and 
popular naval leagues to create a fluid and easily-manipulated current of pro-Admiralty 
129 
 
public opinion.  He brought a view of Nelson as the conquering hero that had rarely been 
surpassed.  By 1906 he brought dreadnoughts.  The Royal Navy and the British public’s 
conception of its purpose, methods and history would be forever changed as a result.  
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CHAPTER V 
 “WE MUST WIN AT SEA OR PERISH AS A NATION” – 
NELSON’S BRITAIN REBORN, 1904-1914 
 
 As the Trafalgar centenary approached in the early years of the twentieth century 
the Royal Navy found itself more popular among the general British population than it 
had been in fifty years, likely more popular than it had been at any time since Trafalgar.  
Internally the Navy was still suffering from tactical paralysis and a dearth of innovative 
leadership.  Externally, however, it seemed as if the Navy was growing more powerful 
by the day.  By 1905 the Royal Navy included scouting cruisers, and torpedo boats; 
specific night fighting practice and the inclusion of wireless telegraphy on Admiralty 
vessels were on the horizon.
1
  Scattered naval vessels were beginning to steadily 
improve their gunnery; those captains influenced by Percy Scott in particular were 
practicing at ranges of up to 7000 yards by 1903.
2
  And although official Gunnery 
Manuals still included instructions for boarding parties, with sections for both cutlass 
and pistol actions, cadet training in the use of sails came to an end in 1903.
3
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 However, the navy’s celebration of a century of dominance was yet again 
besieged by internal policy criticisms.  Percy Scott’s personal gunnery crusade had borne 
some fruit, but when he suggested to his superiors that sailors on guard duty could be put 
to good use searching for enemy submarines – they were currently employed making 
sure their sister ships’ laundry was hung in the Admiralty-prescribed manner – he was 
informed “such an idea was considered very ridiculous; no departure could be made 
from the old and obsolete notions which obtained throughout the Service.  Our brains 
and energy were not used in training for war; housemaiding the ships was to remain as it 
had been the paramount consideration.”4   
Lord Hankey, covering naval issues for the Committee of Imperial Defence, felt 
the same; he did not disparage the navy’s enthusiasm, but felt “this keenness was often 
wasted on comparatively unworthy objects,” and “the topics and arguments of the 
officers’ messes…were mainly confined to such matters as the cleaning of paint and 
brasswork, the getting out of torpedo nets and anchors, and similar trivialities.”5  A 
young captain by the name of David Beatty, frustrated by a poor showing in official 
maneuvers, wrote to his wife that “I suppose it will all be the same a hundred years 
hence and so there is no use wearing myself out about it.”6  Another agitated officer 
groused that “we shall never get good firing and good gun crews for defending our 
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country until we have got rid of our out-of-date officers and ideas.”7  Even The Times 
agreed: “The Navy is a very conservative service, tenacious of tradition, deeply and 
rightly imbued with the sentiment of its glorious past, and very suspicious of any 
innovations which seem to ignore that tradition.”8 
These were the same arguments that had been raised against the Admiralty for 
years.  But the Admiralty was now firmly in the public eye, and with increased public 
interest came increased governmental attention.  The wave of new construction that had 
taken place over the previous two decades had produced technological marvels, but costs 
were beginning to spiral out of control.  Since 1889 the price of a battleship had doubled.  
By 1905 a new battleship cost £1.6 million, and the naval construction budget had 
increased thirty percent since 1900.
9
  With pressure to cut costs increasing, the 
Admiralty was forced to search for an economizer.  When First Naval Lord Walter Kerr 
announced his impending retirement in early 1904, they took the opportunity to look 
outside the usual parade of steady, imperturbable admirals.  The man they found would 
shake the Royal Navy to its very foundations. 
John Arbuthnot Fisher, known to his friends and the press as Jacky, was born in 
Ceylon in 1841.  Sent to England to live with relatives, he joined the Royal Navy in 
1854 due to the fortuitous circumstance that his godmother lived next to Admiral of the 
Fleet Sir William Parker.  Like nearly all British children, Fisher had already read 
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Southey’s Life of Nelson.10  But Parker was a tangible link to the past, the last of 
Nelson’s captains still on active duty.11  And as the elderly admiral’s personal cadet - for 
in the 1850s high-ranking officers could still enroll their own family or acquaintances 
directly into service – Fisher spent his first night in the navy at Parker’s home, being 
regaled by tales of Parker’s service with Nelson half a century prior.12  His first days in 
the Royal Navy were spent in the company of Nelsonian memories, and Fisher would 
carry a deep devotion to Nelson with him for the rest of his life.  As a young 
midshipman in 1880, Fisher wrote to his family that “all my spare moments for weeks 
past I have been reading Nicolas’s letters and despatches of Lord Nelson, and I hardly do 
anything else.”13 
But Jacky Fisher’s appreciation of Nelson was different.  While the Victorian 
Royal Navy willfully relived 1805 again and again, Fisher personally had entirely 
divorced his love of Nelson from any love of the current Navy.  He was a reformer 
through and through.  After reading another biography of Nelson during his early years 
in the navy, Fisher came to a personal conclusion: “we all seem such puny, insignificant 
people after reading of the Nelson times.  I quite despise myself.”14  He devoted his 
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naval career to becoming as significant as Nelson, and succeeded admirably.  Like many 
of his contemporaries, Fisher was unimpressed with certain aspects of the service that he 
had joined.  He later recalled that “the chief object in those days seemed to be not to 
keep your vessel efficient for fighting, but to keep the deck as white as snow and all the 
ropes taut.”15  In the early 1870s he wrote to another reformer, George Tryon, “I am 
getting horribly tired of being a sort of upper housemaid, devoting severe thought to the 
cleaning of paintwork.”16 
This was a common sentiment in the Victorian navy, and many eventually grew 
to accept naval torpor as a matter of course.  Fisher never accepted tranquility, and 
suffered for his dissent.  As early as 1871 he called for the abandonment of masts and 
sails on warships and lost a promotion as a result for being, as he recorded, a “d—d 
fellow who wanted to do away with masts and sails!  A d—d youngster.”17  Undeterred, 
Fisher decided to bring about a revolution by other means.  In the early 1880s, he slipped 
confidential naval technical reports to the journalist W.T. Stead; these would be used in 
the ‘Truth About the Navy’ campaign that rocked the navy and led to the Naval Defence 
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Act.
18
  Fisher had grasped the revolutionary concept that if one’s superiors were not 
willing, press support could easily sway their thinking. 
While the Admiralty underwent a wave of new technological reforms in the 
1880s and 1890s, Fisher stayed ashore in a variety of administrative posts.  He next 
appeared on the world stage as the Crown’s naval representative to the 1899 Hague 
peace conference.  At an event designed to demonstrate the Great Powers’ quest for 
peace, Fisher preached blood and thunder.  His speech to the assembled dignitaries on 
how the Royal Navy created a peaceful international atmosphere left many aghast: “If 
you rub it in, at home and abroad, that you are ready for instant war with every unit of 
your strength in the front line, and intend to be the first in, and hit your enemy in the 
belly, and kick him when he is down, and boil your prisoners in oil […] and torture his 
women and children, then people will keep clear of you.”19  W.T. Stead apologetically 
reported that this was nothing out of character for Fisher, as his “ideas as to war, and 
especially as to naval war, were all based upon those current in Nelson’s time.”20  Fisher 
himself saw nothing wrong with these comments, noting that “when I leave The Hague I 
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go to take command of the Mediterranean Fleet.  Suppose that war breaks out, and I am 
expecting to fight a new Trafalgar on the morrow.”21 
Sir John had indeed been recently appointed to the Mediterranean Fleet, a job he 
approached with his usual flair: he had Nelson’s Trafalgar signal ‘England Expects that 
Every Man Shall Do His Duty’ painted over the guns of his flagship HMS Renown.22  
He set about furthering the cause of reform via the particularly British method of 
advocating a return to the past.  Fisher sent Joseph Chamberlain a quote from a French 
admiral praising “the spirit which animates all English sailors;”23 to this end he believed 
that “more than ever Nelson must be the model for our Admirals.”24  Fisher expanded 
upon this view in a series of lectures to the Mediterranean Fleet between 1899 and 1902.  
To those who asked what the “vital principle of war” entailed, Fisher replied that it could 
be found in “Nelson at Cape St. Vincent, the Nile, and Trafalgar.”  Unlike many of his 
contemporaries Fisher believed that the key to naval victory was quick action, without 
waiting for orders: “far exceeding anything known to history does our future Trafalgar 
depend on promptitude and rapid decision, and on every eventuality having been 
foreseen by those in command.”  “The Admiral who hesitates is lost,” said Fisher to his 
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men, and as a counterexample noted “when Nelson went into battle the victory was half-
won before a shot was fired” due to his self-confidence in his command decisions.25 
This was an innovative tactical conception for the turn of the century Navy; it 
had not yet been a decade since the Tryon inquiry had set in stone the principle of order.  
But Fisher had even more far-reaching ideas for naval reform.  Many of his fellow 
officers complained about their superiors, and Fisher did the same; he wrote to Lord 
Rosebery in 1901 that “what we want is a more rigorous administration at the 
Admiralty.  That is the root of the whole matter.  They are lost to a sense of proportion: 
they can see a pin but they can’t see a mountain!”26  Yet instead of remaining content 
with complaints, Fisher decided to change the Royal Navy singlehandedly to the best of 
his ability.  By 1902 he had been again promoted, on this occasion to the post of Second 
Naval Lord.  He used his new authority to implement a series of reforms that 
modernized the training of naval cadets and broadened the pool from which future 
officers were chosen; “we are drawing our Nelsons from too narrow a class,” as Fisher 
put it.
27
  Perhaps it was this reforming spirit that inspired Fisher’s selection as First 
Naval Lord in 1904; perhaps, like so many admirals before him, he had simply reaped 
the benefits of being next in line.  Whatever the reason behind his appointment, the 
Admiralty would soon bear the full brunt of Fisher’s reforms. 
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Fisher was delighted at his selection as First Naval Lord.  Although the 
appointment was made in May of 1904 Fisher chose to officially take office on October 
21
st
, ninety-nine years to the day after Trafalgar; “nothing like a good omen,” he wrote 
to his friend Viscount Esher.
28
  He spent the intervening months preparing to “use a 
hundred brooms to sweep away the naval cobwebs of a century;”29 besides planning new 
reforms, he had three brief lives of Nelson made ready for immediate distribution among 
the British fleet.
30
  As October drew closer, Fisher apparently became anxious to take up 
his new position; Viscount Esher consoled him in August with the thought “till Trafalgar 
eve.”31  But Fisher could no longer stand the suspense, entering Whitehall a day early.32  
He could not wait past Trafalgar eve to become First Sea Lord.
33
 
The new First Sea Lord was known service-wide as a commanding officer who 
did not suffer fools lightly, and his personal list of fools was longer than most.  When 
commanding in the Mediterranean Fisher let it be known that if any captain under his 
watch demonstrated “the slightest deficiency in any one fighting requisite, however 
trivial […] he would know quite well that I would shoot him like a dog.”34  Now, as the 
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professional head of the service he so loved, Fisher vowed to “ruin anyone else who tries 
to stop me. […] I’d ruin my best friend if necessary for the Service.”35  He had a biblical 
sense of justice, believing “all those who get in my way come to a nasty end.  They all 
die of worms in the stomach or some other horrible complaint.”36  There was service-
wide alarm when Fisher distributed one of his first official memoranda: 
I propose a lecture to all the C-in-Cs and Admiral Superintendents whom I am 
going to have at the Admiralty for an amiable and conciliatory setting-forth of 
their damned stupidity, pessimism and effeteness, of which I have full and 
authenticated particulars, and which I shall read out to them and rub their noses in 
it.
37
 
 
Reginald Custance wrote to his fellow admiral Cyprian Bridge with apprehension: 
“Heaven only knows what Fisher may not attempt to run.”38 
 It became evident early in Fisher’s tenure that those who feared change were 
facing turbulent days ahead.  His first cost-cutting measure was the removal of the 
supply department responsible for providing training cutlasses, a blow to the 
Admiralty’s old guard.39  Fisher also continued to take an interest in the manning of the 
Navy.  By 1906 the naval college at Osborne, opened up to a wider class by Fisher’s 
1902 reforms, was operating at peak efficiency; naval cadets heard lectures in Nelson 
Hall, and the college’s gym was crowned with a portrait of Nelson bearing the legend 
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‘There is nothing the Navy cannot do.’40  Fisher also streamlined official pay scales in a 
cost-saving maneuver.
41
 
 However, these incremental reforms were nothing compared to the list of new 
programs that Fisher proudly called the Scheme.  This platform of revolutionary ideas 
most famously included the Dreadnought, which will be discussed in greater detail later.  
But before Fisher could build any new warships, he had to perform the serious budget 
cuts the government was searching for.  Fisher accomplished this in two ways.  First he 
centralized and simplified the British fleet’s overall divisions, particularly far-flung flag-
showing squadrons; this also led to the reorganization of the home-defense Channel 
Fleet into the Atlantic Fleet, an early bellwether that Fisher’s eye was shifting from 
France to Germany.  More shockingly, with a sweep of his pen Fisher called for the 
wholesale scrapping of over one hundred and fifty warships he classified as obsolete.  
Many of these ships were inevitably saved in official bargaining sessions, but ninety 
vessels were destined for the breakers before Fisher’s first year was out, with a resulting 
ten percent savings in the naval estimates.
42
 
 Fisher was well aware that many if not most of his contemporaries were 
uncomfortable with the scope of his reforms.  He chose to deal with the issue by 
sidestepping as many of his fellow admirals as he could with the help of his oldest ally, 
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the British press.  As previously mentioned, Fisher had been an official source behind 
the 1884 ‘Truth About the Navy’ scare; besides W.T. Stead, he had been acquainted with 
J.R. Thursfield, naval correspondent for The Times, and Arnold White of the Daily Mail 
since the early 1890s.
43
  Fisher believed the Admiralty was not working closely enough 
with its civilian supporters, and as early as 1900 he wrote that “we have dealt most 
unwisely with the Navy League (in my humble opinion), for instead of utilizing it and 
controlling it, the Admiralty have always considered the Navy League its natural 
enemy!”44   
He set out to change this, and made a habit of sending approved journalists 
internal memoranda and other private correspondence intended to strengthen the case for 
reform among the general population.
45
  An early Fisher biographer diplomatically 
recorded Fisher as being “the first of our Admirals to make an intelligent use of the Press 
for the benefit of the Navy.”46  But Fisher and his acquaintances could be heavy-handed 
with the papers.  In 1908 Viscount Esher wrote to The Times that their staff “should take 
the right line about naval affairs.  Why should any patriot wish to upset Jackie?”47  Still, 
those members of the press with whom Fisher developed working relationships 
supported him enthusiastically.  When he became First Naval Lord the Daily Mirror ran 
a cartoon that featured Nelson climbing down from his column in Trafalgar Square, 
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stating that “I was on my way down to lend them a hand myself, but if Jacky Fisher’s 
taking on the job there’s no need for me to be nervous.  I’ll get back on my pedestal.”48 
Sir John’s popularity with the press should come as no surprise.  He was a breath 
of fresh air to a journalistic establishment that enjoyed comparing Whitehall to a dusty 
catacomb.  Better yet, he preached reform while still remaining completely in thrall to 
Nelson’s legacy.  When Fisher defended his personnel reforms, he claimed that the 
loosening of naval entry requirements was necessary to find candidates with the ‘four 
attributes of Nelson,’ which Fisher described as self-reliance, fearlessness of 
responsibility, fertility of resource, and the power of initiative.
49
  He once wrote to 
Arnold White that every man’s life needed a great inspiration, a great cause, a great 
battle and a great victory, and suggested that these maxims would make a good manual 
for midshipmen.
50
   
Fisher consistently used his press and political connections to his advantage.  At 
various points in his career he asked former First Lord of the Admiralty George 
Hamilton, former prime minister Lord Rosebery, and his journalist friend Arnold White 
to write biographies of Nelson for the popular market; as he complained, “it is cruel how 
Nelson is forgotten!”51  Fisher’s outsized personality fit especially well with the 
Edwardian press.  He was jingoistic, believing that “ever since Cromwell it has always 
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been ‘the People’s Navy’ and ‘the Court Army’52 and that when British sailors were 
“heroic on their own element, the sea, we all thank God, as we should do, that Nelson, 
looking down on us in Trafalgar Square, feels his spirit is still with us.”53  He was 
hagiographic in his treatment of Nelson in particular, claiming to be “a humble, and I 
endeavoured to be an unostentatious, follower of our Immortal Hero;” he wrote of 
Moses, Elijah and Nelson as “that great and splendid Trio of Translation to Heaven at 
the very zenith of their powers.”54  To those both within and without the Admiralty who 
had been searching for decades for a way to combine the Royal Navy’s heroic past with 
a real desire for reform in the present Jacky Fisher was, in the words of the journalist 
L.J. Maxse, “the deus ex machina of the Admiralty.”55 
 Yet despite being a committed reformer, Sir John Fisher’s absolute dedication to 
the past created worrisome issues when it came to pinning down a defined tactical or 
strategic plan for the Royal Navy.  A commander who painted in broad strokes, Fisher 
viewed the Navy’s sole purpose simply: “our great object is to destroy [the enemy’s] 
ships.  The quickest and most certain way of doing so is by a second Trafalgar, a great 
fleet action, in which our superior strength in ships will assure us victory.”56  Speed was 
of the essence to Fisher; he wrote that “suddenness is the secret of success at sea […] 
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rashness may be the height of prudence.”57  He valued quick action over any in-depth 
tactical discussions, stating “the most damnable person for you to have any dealings with 
is a Naval Expert!  Sea fighting is pure common sense.”58  As early as 1902, when it had 
become apparent that Fisher was destined for high office, he had created a set of war 
plans – but they were uncomfortably brief, summed up by Fisher’s declaration “let us 
follow Nelson.”59 
 Fisher took the same historical approach to appointing those who would serve 
under him.  He consistently promoted innovators into technical positions,
60
 but when it 
came to the promotion of fleet commanders and admirals Fisher’s goal was to find “his 
own trusted and personally selected Nelson who commands the British Fleet.”61  
Confident that “the advent of Nelson in a fleet (this is a fact) made every common sailor 
in that fleet as sure of victory as he was breathing,”62 Fisher remained on the lookout for 
the next Nelson.  There had been a handful of false starts; he called Admiral Sir 
Geoffrey Phipps Hornby “our greatest Admiral since Nelson” in 1893 and Admiral Sir 
Arthur Knyvet Wilson Nelson “if there’s a chance” in 1902.63  He finally settled on an 
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up-and-coming young captain named John Rushworth Jellicoe, extolling his virtues as 
the next Nelson to the journalists Gerard Fiennes and J.A. Spender, his friend Viscount 
Esher, and the wife of First Lord of the Admiralty Reginald McKenna, among others.
64
 
 The search for a new Nelson was nothing new in the Royal Navy, although 
Fisher pursued this goal with a particular intensity.  What was new was Fisher’s greatest 
shipbuilding project.  He had been appointed to save money, which he had done; but 
Fisher was merely freeing up funds for his greatest project, a new battleship which 
would “stagger humanity.”65  Late-Victorian battleships generally possessed as many 
large-caliber guns as could be safely fit upon their superstructures, the idea being to 
blanket the enemy with fire.  But there was a new idea on the horizon.  The all-big-gun 
battleship, first proposed by the Italian Vittorio Cuniberti in a 1903 Jane’s Fighting 
Ships article, would do away with the concentration of fire in order to fit a much smaller 
number of the largest possible weapons.
66
  A big-gun battleship dealt in speed and long-
range fighting, both anathema to the Admiralty but not to Fisher.  And ships of similar 
construction were already on drawing boards in the United States, Japan, Germany and 
Russia by 1905.
67
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 Traditionally, Admiralty policy had been to wait until a new warship design had 
been proven effective in other navies before adopting it at home.  The professional 
journal The Engineer had reviewed Cuniberti’s proposal in 1904 and come to the 
following conclusion: “Some such vessel is bound to come in the end, but we hardly 
think that the day has yet arrived.  She would render obsolete too many other fine vessels 
for any nation to build her without very long and serious thought.”68  Fisher, however, 
was in no mood to wait.  If speed and firepower would lead to a second Trafalgar, the 
new all-big-gun battleship had to be built immediately.  Less than a year after he took 
office as First Sea Lord, on October 2
nd
, 1905, the battleship that would become HMS 
Dreadnought was laid down at Portsmouth.
69
 
 When Dreadnought was launched in early 1906, parted from the ways with a 
mallet made from the Victory’s timbers,70 the world landscape of naval power was 
changed overnight – every battleship built in the next ten years would be called a 
dreadnought.  The ship mounted ten 12-inch guns at a time when no other warship 
possessed more than four; perhaps more importantly, Dreadnought could steam at 21 
knots due to new turbine engines.
71
  Not content with one breakthrough, Fisher pressed 
onward.  Before Dreadnought was even launched the world’s first battlecruiser, HMS 
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Invincible, had been laid down.
72
  More revolutionary than the Dreadnought, Invincible 
and her battlecruiser sisters were longer and heavier than battleships and could steam at 
an astonishing 25 knots while retaining a dreadnought’s multiple heavy-gun 
emplacements.
73
  Battlecruisers managed these feats by having nearly no armor as 
compared to dreadnoughts.  This would haunt the Admiralty in future wars, but in the 
first years of Fisher’s reign only the ship’s positive aspects were emphasized. 
 Some at the Admiralty were concerned even at the time about the usefulness of 
Fisher’s new ships, battlecruisers in particular.  However, the majority of the British 
public enthusiastically supported Fisher’s furthest-reaching reform.  Appearing the year 
after the Trafalgar centenary, Fisher’s mighty war machines seemed to signify a return to 
naval greatness.  The centenary had already greatly raised awareness of Britain’s navy 
past and present.  In 1905 cigarette cards were popular, and the avid British consumer 
could choose from any one of First Lord, Flagship, Admiral, HMS, Royal Navy or 
Victory brands, or complete their set of fifty Nelson-themed cards.
74
  Those interested in 
the latest technical innovations could also view films on Nelson; after dreadnoughts 
began to be launched they too became the feature of newsreels.
75
   
 Propagandistic works on the Royal Navy in general and on Nelson in particular 
remained popular.  Joseph Conrad’s 1906 The Mirror of the Sea left no doubt that “the 
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man and the ships he knew how to lead have passed away, but Nelson’s uplifting touch 
remains.”  And Nelson’s touch would forever remain: “Like a subtle and mysterious 
elixir poured into the perishable clay of successive generations, it grows in truth, 
splendour, and potency with the march of ages.”  Conrad’s work continued with a lyrical 
interpretation of the value tradition held for British supremacy: “We must turn to the 
national spirit which, in its continuity to good and evil fortune, can alone give us the 
feeling of an enduring existence and of an invincible power against the fates.  In its 
incorruptible flow it preserves the greatness of our great men, amongst them the 
passionate and gentle greatness of Nelson.”76 
 Percy Silburn took much the same approach in his 1912 The Evolution of Sea-
Power, writing of the role Britain’s naval past would play in the country’s future: “the 
modern British sailor will go into action confident of success, for he has the prestige of 
centuries behind him.  He cannot understand defeat, nor should he; he is only too 
anxious to emulate the fighting spirit his forefathers displayed at the repulse of the 
Armada, at the Nile, and at Trafalgar.”77  Silburn also made an appeal that would have 
made Jacky Fisher proud, writing “The British empire of the seas cannot stand unless the 
sea-sense of the nation is kept alive and is rekindled […] this, then, calls for a vigorous 
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programme of education on the subject of sea-power by the State authorities and by the 
Press of the empire.”78   
Author Frank T. Bullen felt similarly in his 1906 Our Heritage the Sea.  Bullen 
stated in his introduction that Our Heritage the Sea was written because “it is a 
wonderfully inspiring theme for Britons, this growth of sea-power, and one that should 
hold a predominant place in the curricula of our schools of all classes.”  He helpfully 
pointed out that naval history “should not be a hard task to teach it to our boys, for the 
story is so interesting, so full of thrilling romantic interest, that even in the hands of the 
dullest teacher it could hardly be made dry.”79  Pro-naval accounts also appeared in 
handier versions.  Bartimeus, the pen name of author Lewis Anselm da Costa Ritchie, 
penned a number of naval short stories that were eventually compiled into book form.  
Due to their format, Bartimeus’ stories were brief and pithy.  One, 1914’s “The Legion 
on the Wall,” features a group of Royal Navy officers comparing their lot to the last 
Roman soldiers in Britain: “they had been brought up in all the brave traditions of their 
Empire….When you think of it, there wasn’t much left to fight for, except their proud 
traditions.  And yet they fought to the last.”80  Another, “A Tithe of Admiralty,” features 
a fifteen-year old naval cadet; as the narrator says, “if his imagination was coloured by 
the periodicals and literature of boyhood, who is to blame him?”81 
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Bartimeus had the right idea.  Although full-length naval works were still 
popular, periodicals and newspapers were still how the majority of Britain’s middle class 
received their naval news; a 1906 survey of one area’s working class found “the kind of 
reading in which the average working-class men and women of Manchester and Salford 
delight consists of sporting and ultrasensational newspapers […] the most jingo shade of 
insular ‘patriotism’ [is] served up in regular instalments [sic] to the rising generation.”82  
This was the market the Navy League had broken into in the mid-1890s, and their work 
continued after the dreadnought era began. 
 The Navy League remained a major pro-naval player, and its popularity only 
increased during Fisher’s tenure.  The League had 14,000 members in 1901; by 1914 
they could boast 100,000.
83
  As it grew the League still devoted a great deal of energy to 
youth education programs.  A 1913 article in the Navy League Quarterly codified the 
League’s position that “the Defence of the British Empire” was “the Duty of Every 
British Boy.”84  To further this goal the League distributed textbooks on naval history 
and classroom posters of dreadnoughts, and gave school lantern-slide lectures on the 
Navy; more advanced students were dealt with by the League’s Universities Sub-
Committee.
85
  E.L. Churchill described in 1907 the importance the League felt naval 
history held for Britain’s youth: “surely nowhere can more types be found of what a boy 
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should aim at being and a man should be than in the British Navy.  The two leading 
characteristics of that service are modesty and devotion to duty.”86 
 Of course, the League also continued its work with Britain’s general population.  
Their members were predominantly middle-class, and this market was securely catered 
to: in 1912 alone the League held 400 public meetings and distributed 1.5 million pro-
naval leaflets.
87
  The League also ran special larger events such as the 1909 play A Plea 
for the Navy.
88
  One Navy League project, the Trafalgar Fund, proved so popular the 
League eventually had to borrow from the Fund to cover other expenses.
89
   
The Admiralty proved willing and able to assist the League in matters of national 
naval support.  Fleet reviews were one way to increase the public’s interest in the navy.  
Originally reserved for coronations or other public commemorations, fleet reviews 
became increasingly common in the Edwardian period.  There were three reviews in 
June and July of 1909 alone; more importantly from a naval publicity standpoint, one of 
them was held specifically for the benefit of the press.
90
  Naval journalist Filson Young 
explained the process: “It was the custom of the Admiralty, when the Fleet was 
mobilized for manoeuvres, to invite certain newspapers to send representatives as guests 
[…] and to give these guests a week of voyaging and entertainment before the actual 
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manoeuvres began.”91  After the journalists spent their week aboard, the review would 
move to a major city and give the general public its own opportunity to see Britain’s 
naval power up close. 
One 1909 London fleet review provides an example of the spectacle associated 
with these naval visits.  Londoners could buy dreadnought-themed food, clothing and 
children’s toys near where the fleet lay in the Thames and then take trams shaped like 
miniature dreadnoughts down to the water’s edge to view “the fleet that stirs our blood 
and dazzles us with the splendour of its strength,” as the Daily Mirror described the 
event; the youngest naval enthusiasts were given children’s programs specially prepared 
by the navy.
92
  Four million individuals visited the 1909 London review; fleet gatherings 
became such an economic force that Glasgow specially requested, and received from the 
Admiralty, its own review in 1912.
93
  As Admiral Fisher’s colleague Viscount Esher 
wrote in 1911, “[Henry] Haldane and Henry Wilson and all the Generals in the Empire 
cannot deflect the mind and hearts of the people from their elemental love for the British 
navy.”94 
This elemental love had increased greatly by 1910.  In this jingoistic age, naval 
enthusiasm sometimes swelled dangerously close to something Fisher and his 
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compatriots could not control.  The Admiralty had certainly done its share of blustering, 
particularly in the Fisher years; one 1907 press release declared “the British Empire 
floats in the British Navy.  It is our all in all.  Victory at sea, desirable to foreign States is 
a sine qua non to our continued existence.  We must win at sea or perish as a nation.”95  
And Fisher had encouraged many a journalist to print pro-naval articles.  Arnold White 
was one of Fisher’s closest allies in the press, and he continued to champion the 
Admiralty, as in his 1911 book The Navy which claimed that “in the next great sea war 
the fate of the Empire will be settled in one great moment – when the two fleets meet.”  
But White began sounding notes of concern about the Royal Navy’s strength; that same 
year he wrote “defeat of a British fleet is defeat forever.  British defeat at sea is eternal, 
irreparable, irredeemable.  Our Fleet is our all-in-all.” 96 
Arnold White was not alone.  Fisher had silenced Admiralty critics of his 
dreadnought program by turning to the press to demonstrate widespread public support 
for increased naval building.  But war scares resurfaced nearly every year, and many 
British newspapers were now calling for yet more ships and great battles.  Some of this 
took the form of the same desire for a battle of annihilation that animated the Admiralty.  
The Spectator editorialized in 1910 that Trafalgar had been won “because our Fleet, 
inspired by a great tradition and a great man recognized that to win you must attack – go 
for, fall upon, fly at the throat of, hammer, pulverise, destroy, annihilate – your 
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enemy.”97  Military historian Spencer Wilkinson stated in a 1909 lecture at Oxford that 
“the historian sees in Trafalgar and in Tsusima [sic] nothing but the inevitable 
consequence of the previous lives of the navies concerned.”98  However, more press 
outlets were also beginning to demand increased naval activity.  In 1909 the Evening 
Standard and St. James’s Gazette claimed Britain’s “very existence as a nation worthy 
in any sense of a great past and noble traditions […] is dependent on the maintenance of 
the Navy in quantity as in quality.”99  The Daily Telegraph ran an appeal for more 
battleships, declaring “we are not yet prepared to turn the face of every portrait of 
Nelson to the wall.”100 
Popular navalist organizations such as the Navy League had risen to prominence 
on an apolitical platform.  The League was more interested in the schoolyard than the 
halls of Parliament.  A young George Orwell recalled his first foray into politics: “At 
seven years old I was a member of the Navy League and wore a sailor suit with H.M.S. 
Invincible on my cap.”101  League press releases claimed “the question of the Navy lies 
above and beyond all considerations of party politics,” and in the 1910 general election 
the League urged voters to “Drop Party for once and Vote for a Supreme Fleet.”102  This 
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strategy did prove viable; there were over one hundred Members of Parliament in the 
League by 1908, and while the majority were Tories there was a scattering of Liberal 
League members, including a young Winston Churchill.
103
 
But as public interest in the Navy grew, navalist organizations inevitably became 
involved in political matters.  No matter how many dreadnoughts the Royal Navy added, 
there were always calls for more.  In a 1909 Daily Mail article journalist Robert 
Blatchford called for the Navy to institute a building policy of twenty-six dreadnoughts a 
year – at a time when four was the norm – along with an immediate grant of fifty million 
pounds to the navy and national conscription from the age of ten; this article was later 
reprinted and sold as a popular pamphlet.
104
  Not to be outdone, the author James Blyth 
spoke on the state of the British Navy in his 1909 The Swoop of the Vulture: “Be strong, 
my countrymen.  Ward off war by overwhelming power.  Give up all, education (a 
useless incubus to 50% of the children) poor rates, old age pensions, what you will, give 
up all to the preservation of a navy which can terrorise the world.”105 
This new generation of extreme navalists had its own prophet within the 
Admiralty.  Lord Charles Beresford had risen to become a high-ranking admiral and 
essentially Jacky Fisher’s polar opposite; a captain serving under Beresford recalled that 
                                                          
103
 Conley, From Jack Tar to Union Jack, 133; Johnson, “The Liberal Party and the Navy League,” 26.  
Conley has identified 112 League-related MPs of all political parties; Johnson states that there were at 
least 48 navalist Liberal MPs, although not all were in the League. 
 
104
 Caroline E. Playne, The Pre-War Mind in Britain: An Historical Review (London: George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd., 1928), 145. 
 
105
 Höglund, Mobilising the Novel, 148. 
156 
 
“ceremonial had become almost an obsession with him.”106  Technological innovations 
held no joy for Beresford.  When the Admiralty began investigating the feasibility of 
submarines, another project spearheaded by Fisher, Beresford’s believed “Nelson would 
turn over in his grave” at this breach of naval tradition.107  The launching of the 
Dreadnought so antagonized Beresford that he penned a short book, entitled The 
Betrayal, about how Fisher had caused the Admiralty to abandon its past: “in 1906 the 
tradition of dignity and courtesy hitherto prevailing in the Service was rudely violated, 
and Great Britain proclaimed herself the Bully of the Seas.”108 
Beresford had long maintained an unfriendly relationship with Fisher.  Barely 
younger than Fisher, Beresford had seen his opportunity to serve as First Sea Lord 
disappear with Fisher’s appointment.  Fisher tried to placate an angry Beresford by 
offering him command of the prestigious Channel Fleet, but later severely slashed the 
same fleet under the Scheme.
109
  Now Beresford saw an opportunity to discredit Fisher 
in return.  He threw his considerable public support behind a new pro-naval rival to the 
Navy League.   
Founded in 1908 by naval journalists Harold Frazer Wyatt and L. Graham H. 
Horton-Smith, the Imperial Maritime League devoted itself to maintaining a more hard-
line navalist stance than the older Navy League.  Their stated goals included ‘the 
command of the sea as national policy’ and ‘the spreading of information about the 
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Empire and naval supremacy;’ backroom Imperial Maritime League dealings apparently 
also included a pledge to work with Beresford towards Fisher’s removal.110  Wyatt and 
Horton-Smith were both former Navy League members who had begun to push for more 
pro-naval demonstrations around the time of the Dreadnought’s launch.  Upset at what 
they perceived as a lack of political action within the Navy League, the two men began 
to agitate for action.  They gave an interview to the Standard in 1907 on the faults 
extreme navalists found with the Navy League: “never was it intended, never was it 
contemplated, that the League should be restricted to the humble role now imposed upon 
it by the committee, the role of an agency for supplying lectures in boys’ and girls’ 
schools, while not merely acquiescing in, but actually supporting, the reduction of 
expenditure upon the Fleet.”111  That same year Wyatt and Horton-Smith published an 
open letter to all Navy League members: “though it is of high importance to train the 
children of Britain in patriotism and in the principles of sea-power, that work is entirely 
subsidiary to the chief purpose of the League, which is […] to influence National Policy. 
[…] That purpose is not fulfilled by lantern lectures to schoolchildren.”112 
Other Navy League members began to publish their own articles in support of 
Wyatt and Horton-Smith’s position.  Journalist L.J. Maxse told the National Review that 
the two men “realise that the British Navy as we know it to-day is the child of agitation 
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and can only be preserved by agitation.”113  Finally, at a contentious Navy League 
meeting in July 1907, it became obvious that the ultra-navalists would soon form their 
own organization.  Many spent the meeting berating the Navy League for its perceived 
failures.  F.T. Jane summed up the thoughts of those preparing to strike out on their own: 
You have got on your NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, and on the form of 
membership, the portrait of Nelson.  You claim to have founded the LEAGUE to 
keep up the spirit of Nelson.  Do you mean to tell me that the spirit of Nelson is in 
any way whatever to be associated with cutting down the Navy because 125 
Radical M.P.’s sent in a petition to the Prime Minister?  Is that the spirit of 
Nelson?  Is this LEAGUE founded for Nelson, or is it not?  Is it founded to keep 
up the spirit of Nelson?  Because Nelson died for his country, the least we can do 
is to preserve the spirit he died for.
114
 
 
The Imperial Maritime League did follow its original charter.  Although by 1910 
the Maritime League had formed its own youth organization and was delivering lectures 
in British schools, by and large its members focused on political activism.
115
  As Wyatt 
and Horton-Smith stated, “we did not propose merely to vent platitudes about the 
necessity of naval strength to the British people, and then (like the committee of the old 
Navy League) at once shirk every issue upon which the preservation of that strength 
depended.”116  They made good use of their connection to Charles Beresford.  The back 
matter of Beresford’s anti-Fisher book contained recruiting advertisements for the 
Maritime League, assuring readers “Vital and Undefeated; Alone and Undismayed; the 
Imperial Maritime League combats: To Sustain our Naval Supremacy; To Redeem our 
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Naval Rights’ and to Revive that ‘Soul of Greatness’ which inspired all men of British 
blood in the days that are gone.”117  And when members of the Imperial Maritime 
League spoke of British naval superiority, it was always against the same implied foe 
across the North Sea.  When the Navy League had begun, France played the part of 
antagonist to Great Britain.  But in the age of Fisher, it was obvious that any 
preparations for a naval war were being taken against Germany. 
 Politically, imperial Germany had long had an unsteady relationship with Britain.  
But they had no navy to concern the Admiralty, and many naval-minded Germans 
looked to the Royal Navy as an example of what their future could hold.  Germany’s 
most powerful figures respected the Royal Navy.  Alfred von Tirpitz, the German naval 
secretary, wrote in his memoirs that his service “grew up on the British Navy like a 
creeping plant.”118  The German naval writer Alfred Stenzel believed “one must nurture 
the Nelsonian Spirit, and cultivate his ideas in order to achieve that [naval] greatness;”119 
to further this spirit, a copy of Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power Upon History in 
translation was placed on every German warship.
120
  Kaiser Wilhelm II was the 
grandson of Queen Victoria and had visited the Victory as a youth.  When Victoria made 
him an honorary British admiral, Wilhelm reported to the British ambassador in Berlin 
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that “wearing the same uniform as St. Vincent and Nelson” was “enough to make one 
giddy.”121 
 But an appreciation of navies past led Germany, and Wilhelm in particular, to 
begin planning for a navy of the future.  Britain had begun pumping money into her 
naval forces with the Naval Defence Act of 1885.  Germany came late to navalism; the 
First Navy Bill, devoting funds to a modern battleship fleet, was passed in 1898.
122
  But 
Germany learned quickly, and with the Kaiser’s backing additional naval laws came into 
being in 1900, 1906, 1908, and 1912.
123
  Publically, German naval buildups and the 
often-resultant British naval scares were dismissed by the Admiralty and the press.  
Esher wrote to Fisher that “an invasion scare is the mill of God which grinds you out a 
Navy of Dreadnoughts, and keeps the British people warlike in spirit,”124 and The Times 
wearily complained “the public always goes like this in March [when the year’s naval 
estimates were published].”125   
Privately, tensions were rising.  Germany had begun planning for a war against 
Britain in 1896; a decade later the Admiralty informed the C-in-C of the Channel Fleet 
that in the event war broke out “the principal object is to bring the main German fleet to 
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decisive action and all other operations are subsidiary to this end.”126  Both politicians 
and the press began to display open hostility in the Fisher era.  As early as 1902 Arnold 
White, already a steady Fisher collaborator, inquired that if “the German Fleet is a 
menace to the British Empire, does not sound human reason demand that it should be 
destroyed before the youth becomes a man, or a giant, as will be the case by 1915?”127  
The Kaiser defended Germany’s interests: “Only when we can hold out our mailed fist 
against his face, will the British lion draw back.”128 
Eventually newspapermen of all types became involved in this war of words.  As 
both countries’ naval forces increased in the dreadnought era, printed attacks became 
more vehement.  J.A. Cramb’s 1914 Germany and England waxed poetic: “if the dire 
event of a war with Germany – if it is a dire event – should ever occur, there shall be 
seen upon this earth of ours a conflict which, beyond all others, will recall that 
description of the great Greek wars: ‘Heroes in battle with heroes, / And above them the 
wrathful gods.”129  The German poet Gorch Fock, on assignment with the German navy, 
responded with his own Teutonic verses: “Beware, John Bull, beware!  German wrath, 
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the fierce, smiling anger of a Siegfried at Saxon perfidy, is about to break over you. […] 
All the old gods have come back to fight with us.  Valhalla in the Gotterdämmerung.”130 
Jacky Fisher’s creation of the naval press was now playing its own part in the 
war mania that began to overtake the Admiralty as well as the British public, and there 
were cracks developing in Fisher’s hold on the reins of naval power as well.  1909 saw a 
Parliamentary inquiry into the amount of money First Lord of the Admiralty Reginald 
McKenna had spent on fleet reviews.
131
  Charles Beresford also continued to press 
Fisher, eventually mounting a press campaign against the First Sea Lord and charging 
Fisher with dereliction of duty for not possessing any written Admiralty war plans.  
Although Beresford’s bombshell was itself a breach of policy, as any war planning 
information had to remain confidential, the charge stuck in the naval scare-prone public 
climate.
132
  In an attempt to fend off Beresford’s internal criticisms, an Admiralty 
committee headed by Fisher produced an official set of war plans in 1907. 
The Admiralty War Plans, intended more as a personal defense than an actual 
strategic document, appeared hastily cobbled together.  Despite all his reforming 
tendencies, Fisher’s conception of naval strategy remained firmly rooted in 1805; the 
plans stated that “the first active duty of our main fleet must be to endeavour to destroy 
that of the enemy.  To this rule there can be no exception.”133  Much of the plans were 
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dedicated merely to the championing of Fisher’s battlecruisers, which Fisher was at 
pains to describe in Nelsonian terms: “to regard them as an indication of decadence in 
our service – as a sign that brute force is taking the place of the art of war – is to miss 
their whole significance.  In reality they are the expression of the most cherished and 
distinctive aspiration of our greatest masters of the art […] the very type that all the old 
men from Hawke to Nelson sighed for, but never obtained.”134 
Fisher’s hasty war plans did little to silence his critics.  It must have been 
obvious even to Fisher’s most steadfast supporters that they were a stopgap measure 
from a man who believed “like poets, Fleet Admirals are born, not made;”135 at any rate 
the 1907 plans were never implemented.  Fisher’s lukewarm response to such tactical 
critiques infuriated Beresford, and the situation was not improved with Beresford’s 1909 
dismissal from the navy; the Imperial Maritime League passed out memorial cards with 
Nelson’s last words in response.136  Eventually, the verbal conflict between the two men 
and their supporters in the public arena – Beresford had simply continued his political 
career as a Member of Parliament - became so obstructionist towards everyday naval 
business that the Admiralty held an official inquiry into the feud.  The inquiry was 
hastily conducted to avoid professional embarrassment for either admiral, and both men 
were cleared of any wrongdoing.  But escaping censure was a victory for Beresford, who 
took his exoneration as an opportunity to launch a nationwide speaking tour on Fisher’s 
incompetence.  Fisher had weathered many storms of publicity during his tenure as First 
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Sea Lord, but governmental pressure to cut naval spending concurrent with public 
pressure to increase naval spending eventually got the better of the aging reformer.  
Fisher announced late in 1909 that he would step down as First Sea Lord the following 
year.
137
 
The Fisher-Beresford controversy had shaken the Royal Navy at a time when it 
badly needed a united front against external political and journalistic pressures; by 1910, 
“officers were all partisans either of Sir John, or of Lord Charles, and would not speak to 
each other.”138  For his part, Fisher believed he would soon be invited back to his 
rightful place at the Admiralty: “I’ll be back all right in 1912!  My PROPER date is 
October 21, 1912, but I’ve compromised with [First Lord] McKenna and made it Lady 
Day [March 25th] and hope the Blessed Virgin will be as propitious as Saint Horatio; but 
I doubt it.”139  The Navy certainly would have been more efficient had Fisher never left.  
His replacement as First Sea Lord was the elderly Sir Arthur Wilson, called out of 
retirement to head the Admiralty.
140
 
Once some of the controversy had died down and Admiralty business could be 
examined in the light of day, it quickly became apparent that the Senior Service’s 
tactical confusion had not improved since the dreadnought revolution.  For all his 
technological innovations, Fisher’s last days were plagued by the same complaints 
among junior officers that had been present since the Crimean War.  David Beatty’s 
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1909 complaint could have been written half a century earlier: “The men are excellent, 
but some of the officers, although very nice, are infernally stupid and had very little 
knowledge.”141  Captain Charles Ottley took his naval worries all the way to Secretary of 
State for War Richard Haldane, writing “not one naval officer out of fifty has any 
knowledge of what the British fleet will do in war, or how it will do it.”142  Fisher had 
been jealous of naval independence, but after his departure those from other branches of 
the British government were not impressed with what he had left behind.  Douglas Haig 
wrote to Winston Churchill in 1913 that “the navy stands condemned […] we should, 
presumably, be careful to steer clear of any wars.”143 
Matters did not improve under the administration of Arthur Wilson.  Fisher had 
equipped the Royal Navy with the most modern warships, but five years of his 
administration could not erase a century of ingrained conceptions of what war should be 
– particularly when Fisher spent much of his time arguing for Nelsonian battles of 
annihilation.  As public calls for an ever-greater navy increased and German saber-
rattling continued, the Admiralty’s mindset shifted more and more to the offensive.  The 
attitude of victory at any cost that would be so exposed in 1914 was extremely popular 
in 1912 when Admiral Sir Reginald Custance wrote that “the idea that safety is of 
paramount importance, and that the defeat of the enemy is only secondary, is not only 
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directly opposed to military principles, but is calculated to undermine and destroy the 
military spirit.”144 
As war clouds gathered on the horizon, it appeared that twenty-five years of 
uninterrupted navalism had produced consequences in the British fleet.  In the Victorian 
era it had been the younger generations within the service that had pointed out the follies 
of their commanders.  Of course, griping at the expense of one’s superiors remained a 
popular pastime.  But the vast majority of serving naval personnel wanted war in 1914.  
Lieutenant Commander J.M Kenworthy recalled the Navy’s mindset in the immediate 
pre-war years: “We prepared for war in professional hours, talked war, thought war, and 
hoped for war.  For war would be our opportunity.”  Admiral B.M. Chambers noted the 
same mindset in the Mediterranean, noting the “universal prayer of the squadron, young 
and old [was] ‘Give us War.’”145 
When war came in August 1914, many in Britain were unconcerned with the 
details.  The power politics of mainland Europe had provided a conflict, and the navy 
could recapture its past glories while defending the homeland and ensuring a quick end 
to the war.  Newsreel footage from August showed both men and boys sailing 
homemade dreadnoughts in the fountains of Trafalgar Square, while newspaper boys 
spread stories of great naval battles on the first day of the war to drive up sales.
146
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young soldier fresh off to Europe wrote his mother and told her not to worry, as “our 
navy will play the chief part in our share of the war.”147 
The mood in the Royal Navy was something akin to elation among all ranks and 
classes.  Reginald Tyrwhitt and David Beatty were both captains commanding a large 
number of surface units.  Tyrwhitt admitted just before the outbreak of the war that “now 
I am only longing for this desperate waiting to be over and to begin business.  I can’t see 
how we can fail to defeat Germany afloat.”148  Beatty displayed even more enthusiasm.  
He carried books on Nelson and portraits of Trafalgar and the Nile with him on all his 
warships, and kept multiple copies of Nelson’s pre-Trafalgar prayer in his cabins.  As 
early as 1909 he stated to an audience at London’s Guildhall “we are praying that should 
the time ever come, we shall be found to conform to the words of the immortal Nelson 
that we have done our duty.”149  Just days before Britain opened hostilities, Beatty’s flag 
captain Ernle Chatfield recorded Beatty’s thoughts: “He longed for it.  We had not 
fought for a century: it was time we repeated the deeds of our forefathers.”150  On 
August 5
th
, just one day after Britain had entered the conflict, Beatty wrote to his wife 
that “the enthusiasm was immense.  I have never seen such a magnificent and cheerful 
spirit.  War was a certainty at the time and we all knew it […] we are making history 
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now, and it shall be a page that will not be behind those of the glorious past, so 
courage.”151 
Even the navy’s younger members saw the war as a joyous occasion.  Stephen 
King-Hall, only twenty-one in 1914, recalled the scene created when his ship mobilized 
for war: “the ladies ashore appeared to be convinced that we were sailing for Trafalgar II 
next morning.”  Before war had even been declared King-Hall met a naval friend who 
“hadn’t the faintest idea where his uniform was, but he thanked his Maker that he hadn’t 
missed the Fleet action!”152  Douglas King-Harmon, manning a reserve battleship in 
August 1914, wrote to his father with news of the war: “the news was received with 
great enthusiasm by all hands.  The whole fleet was cheering continuously.  We are all 
ready for immediate action, and only hope that our First Fleet may leave a few of the 
enemy’s ships for us to have a flap at […] the relief is immense.”153 
This, then, was the ultimate result of the navalist age.  The cadets and 
midshipmen who manned the Grand Fleet in the First World War had grown up in a 
Britain that idolized Nelson and the Royal Navy in every way.  The mid-Victorian 
service of elderly admirals and untested ships was gone.  The surge of popular naval 
support beginning in the mid-1880s had brought the Royal Navy back to the people’s 
attention; ten years of Jacky Fisher’s tutelage had changed a reactive Admiralty into an 
organization that produced the most innovative warships on the sea. 
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But as so often occurs, the Royal Navy had suffered from too much of a good 
thing.  Public and political interest led to new ships and more men, but Parliament and 
The Times eventually clashed, leaving the Admiralty caught in the middle.  Fisher the 
economizer had created ships more expensive than anything in the Navy’s history, 
resulting in Parliamentary grumbling about cost-cutting even as the jingoistic press 
called for more and more warships of all types.   
Sir John Fisher had modernized the fleet to an astonishing degree, but when it 
came to tactical ideas he remained a devoted student of the past.  Fisher’s almost 
religious devotion to the Royal Navy’s of a century prior and Nelson in particular played 
well with his greatest allies of the press and the public.  He rose to public prominence at 
the time of the Trafalgar centennial and was a man uniquely suited to his moment, 
bridging the gap between Nelson’s naval glories – easily understood by a general public 
that had been raised on the faint but persistent cultural memory of Trafalgar and the Nile 
– and the unsettling new world of battleships that could sail further and hit harder than 
anything that had come before.  However, Fisher’s modernizations seemed to peter out 
soon after the Scheme.  He pushed many of the innovations that would be a staple of the 
First World War at sea, particularly submarine warfare, but never devoted the resources 
to such programs that were funneled to Fisher’s personal, supposedly Trafalgar-
recreating idea of the battlecruiser. 
By 1914 the Royal Navy appeared as if it would easily recapture the glory of 
Trafalgar.  A nation and a navy raised on the stories of Nelson and the value of naval 
warfare expected a quick battle of annihilation.  Yet underneath the glittering exterior of 
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a fleet of dreadnoughts lay a simplistic conception of what modern warfare entailed.  At 
its core the navy of 1914 suffered from the same malaise that had stunted the navy of 
1854 and so worried the Admiralty of 1885.  The cultural and professional edifice of 
Nelson had overshadowed his actual lessons – that wars could not be won in a day, that a 
battle of annihilation required a sacrifice to match, that decentralized command was the 
way to victory.   
Through a century of technological change the Royal Navy’s spirit had remained 
the same.  It had kept the service viable through decades of uncertainty, but in a war of 
submarines and zeppelins the mere spirit of 1805 could no longer suffice.  Professional 
competence and pride in one’s fleet were important parts of the First World War Navy, 
and they would serve the navy well in the long days of waiting that lay ahead.  But the 
British public demanded more, the British press demanded more, and most dangerously 
the Royal Navy itself demanded more.  In August 1914 nearly the entirety of Britain 
from sea lords to newspaper boys expected and demanded a second Trafalgar within the 
year.  The Admiralty had the comforting weight of a century of tradition behind it and 
only hope ahead.  It remained to be seen if both would be enough. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION – WARRIORS AND STATESMEN1 
 The inevitable twin of the Royal Navy’s high expectations was a resultant quick 
disappointment when a new Trafalgar failed to materialize.  In the first months of the 
Great War, the British public remained extremely enthusiastic for any expected naval 
engagements.  The boys’ magazine Chums printed an account of British battlecruisers 
valiantly fighting against all odds before the war was two weeks old.
2
  By October naval 
news had permeated London, with revivals of plays about Nelson’s life; a patriotic 
London art gallery exhibition titled ‘Some Modern War Pictures’ displayed renderings 
of historic British naval battles.
3
  Souvenir handkerchiefs could be purchased printed 
with images of Nelson’s flagship and Britain’s latest battleship, the Queen Elizabeth, 
labeled ‘For the ships may change / But the spirit remains.’4  In a short story written later 
during the war, the author Bartimeus recalled the general feeling when “with the red 
dawn of August 4th, 1914 […] came war at last.”  In Bartimeus’ version, local 
yachtsmen “pulled a deep breath of something like relief” at “a war of the sea.”5 
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 Yet as days turned to weeks without expected naval results, public confidence in 
the Royal Navy began to waver.  By the end of August, naval writer Fred T. Jane noted 
that “people are disappointed that we have not had a Trafalgar or a Tsushima.”6  In a 
later work, Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon captured the uneasy feeling of the public after 
the first months of war: “People asked: ‘What is wrong, where is our Nelson?’  The 
Public […] confidently believed our day at last would have come – Trafalgar would be 
repeated, and ship after ship of the German Navy would be sent to the bottom.  Such 
were the uneducated hopes of the British nation.”7   
In August, the disappointment was that victory had not yet come.  Public 
intellectual Gilbert Murray’s pamphlet ‘Thoughts on the War’ displays dissatisfaction 
that German losses had not been great enough: “For my part I find that I do desperately 
desire to hear of German dreadnoughts sunk in the North Sea….When I see that 20,000 
Germans have been killed in such-and-such engagement, and next day that it was only 
2,000, I am sorry.”8  By the end of 1914 the first concerns that there would not be a new 
Trafalgar had begun to surface.  Naval correspondent J.R. Thursfield released his own 
pamphlet, ‘The Navy and the War,’ that aimed to bolster public spirits.  Thursfield spoke 
against the “most unworthy note of vexation and disappointment [that] is beginning to 
make itself heard in too many quarters concerning the Navy and its doings.  ‘What is the 
Navy doing,’ people are asking, ‘and why is it doing so little?  There has been no big 
                                                          
6
 Jan Rüger, The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007; Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare), 256. 
 
7
 Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, The Jutland Scandal (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1925), 2-3. 
 
8
 Peter Buitenhuis, The Great War of Words: British, American, and Canadian Propaganda and Fiction, 
1914-1933 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987), 46. 
173 
 
battle as yet, and there seems to be no prospect of one.’”9  Although Thursfield 
acknowledged that “wherever we look abroad on the seas we see nothing but 
disappointment, disaster, and destruction,” he sounded a hopeful note for the future: 
“there is no reason to think that the children of Nelson will prove less stout in endurance 
than their sires.  The strain is undoubtedly far more intense in these days, but it is certain 
to be far less prolonged.”10 
The children of Nelson, however, were already chafing at their own forced 
endurance.  Like their land-bound public supporters, most of the Royal Navy had been 
eager for a fight at the war’s onset.  Some sailors did disapprove of the public’s 
enthusiasm.  Sydney Fremantle informed his family that war was certain a day before the 
official declaration on August 4
th, and was unsettled how “one and all, they took the 
news (which so far had not been made public) so light-heartedly that I could stand it no 
longer.”11  But the vast majority followed the lead of Admiral C.C. Penrose Fitzgerald, 
who pioneered the handing out of white feathers to civilian men who had not yet 
volunteered to fight.
12
  Stephen King-Hall recalled “how certain 60 per cent of the mess 
was, that if war did break out, we should find ourselves ‘doing and dying’ in the first 
forty-eight hours.”13  Young cadet G.C. Harper explained how he came to accept the 
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idea of a naval war, writing “A week ago the very last thing I wanted was a war […] but 
having got this far I saw it was the chance of a lifetime – besides being an excellent 
thing for the country.”14  This attitude went straight to the top; the future King George 
VI, an 18-year old midshipman aboard HMS Collingwood, recalled in his diary: “In the 
Grand Fleet everyone was pleased [war] had come at last.  We had been trained in the 
belief that war between Germany and this country had to come one day, and when it did 
come we thought we were prepared for it.”15 
What is so astonishing in retrospect is just how quickly the navy’s patient waiting 
for battle turned to despondency.  After less than a month of war, young G.C. Harper 
realized “there seems an awful chance that we may go through the war without an 
action.”16  In the highest echelons of command, these sentiments were reprised.  Vice 
Admiral David Beatty reassured his wife on the 5
th
 of August: “thank heavens it’s 
summer months and before the dark nights of winter are on us it ought to be all over.”17  
Less than three weeks later Beatty again wrote to his wife, this time with less cheerful 
news: “This waiting is the deuce, and as far as we can see has no limit […] For thirty 
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years I have been waiting for this day, and have as fine a command as one could wish for 
and can do nothing.  Three weeks of war and haven’t seen the enemy.”18 
David Beatty was an especially vociferous believer in the value of the quick 
knockout naval engagement; again before August was out he had complained that it 
“looks as if we should go through the war without ever coming to grips with them.  Such 
a thought is more than I can bear.”19  And late in October, as a momentous naval 
anniversary approached: “Tomorrow is Trafalgar Day, the powers that be have forgotten 
it.  Ye shades of Nelson that we should be in the hands of such is past enduring but one 
is powerless to do anything but wait wait day after day.”20 
However, Beatty was not alone in his pessimism.  Commodore Roger Keyes 
demanded to know “when are we going to make war?”21  G.C. Harper felt for the crews 
of three British cruisers torpedoed in September, noting that his fellow naval cadets “are 
longing – now – even to get blown up by a mine – anything rather than spend the whole 
war doing nothing.”22  By December, the waiting had become interminable for naval 
personnel.  Sub-Lieutenant Bowyer-Smith aboard HMS Superb detailed his thoughts on 
another North Sea patrol: “Are we to be disappointed again?  Heaven forbid – if the 
raiding squadrons get back untouched we will be dirt in the eyes of the public.  We are 
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already unpopular I believe & the man in the street can not or will not realise the size of 
the North Sea.”  Bowyer-Smith, like thousands of others, was coming to grips with the 
reality that the naval war promised only “cold, coal, and the disapproval of the people of 
England […] to keep us going.”23 
The same disapproval permeated the highest levels of the Senior Service.  Jacky 
Fisher had been recalled to his historic post of First Sea Lord soon after the war began.  
From this lofty perch he offered traditional Fisheresque motivations, counseling ranking 
officer of the British Grand Fleet John Jellicoe to “let everyone be optimistic, and shoot 
the pessimists!”24  Privately, however, Fisher was writing to Winston Churchill that “we 
have done nothing else this whole war but lose opportunities!”25  Public and official 
pressure continued to build on the Royal Navy.  By the end of 1914 the naval war had 
spread.  In August the Royal Navy’s pursuit of German naval units ended ingloriously, 
not for the last time, at the Dardanelles; in December two minor surface actions were 
fought in the South Atlantic near Argentina.  But to a navy conditioned to expect success 
these were sideshows, and patience was wearing thin.  Winston Churchill declared in 
December that “if the Navy and the Admiralty can’t beat the Germany in 1915 […] the 
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former should be shot and the latter sacked.”26  For over a century the Royal Navy had 
maintained its reputation of consummate professionalism, Britain’s strength in times of 
war and her guardian in times of peace.  Now, as the conditions of the First World War 
spiraled ever further away from what the Admiralty had expected and hoped for in a 
naval conflict, Captain Herbert Richmond could only conclude that “we are the most 
appalling amateurs who ever tried to conduct a war.”27 
Despite its best efforts, the Royal Navy of 1914 would never fight the new 
Trafalgar so many of its members both old and young had dreamed of.  The first two 
years of the First World War brought nothing but disappointment to those involved with 
the navy, to the point that cadet Harper would rather be sunk in action than spend 
another day on patrol.  In 1916 the main British fleet would finally come to grips with its 
German counterpart at the Battle of Jutland, but the result was a disappointing stalemate 
that left two thousand Britons dead.  Two years of waiting for Trafalgar followed by the 
disillusionment of Jutland did nothing to improve the morale of either British seamen or 
their private-sector critics, both of whom accused the Royal Navy of cooling its heels 
while the army defended British honor at the Somme.  What the British public and many 
naval officers never quite came to grips with was the fact that the navy was doing 
everything asked of it. In the first days of the war, the entire British Expeditionary Force 
was transported to France without a casualty; the Channel that so thoroughly blocked 
Napoleon a century prior was little more than a speed bump to the modern fleet.  Patrols 
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and sweeps were unexciting, but they kept Britain in the war by ensuring the safe 
delivery of thousands of tons of materiel. 
What so damaged the navy’s conception of the war was its institutional 
conception of its own past.  Nelson had blockaded the French fleet for years, and British 
ships would continue to do so for another decade after Trafalgar.  Yet all anyone 
remembered by 1914 was the glorious moment of battle.  This fetishization of an 
apocalyptic naval conflict that would define entire wars in a day was endemic 
throughout the Royal Navy, from cadets to the Admiralty.  It is extremely significant 
that of all the heated policy debates throughout the century, particularly during the 
navalist age from 1885 onward, there was never a push to define naval warfare as 
anything more than a battle of annihilation.  Sir John Fisher, perhaps the greatest 
reformer the modern Royal Navy has seen, brought myriad new technologies to the fleet 
but couched them all in the language and tactics of Nelson’s day, a man he considered 
his personal hero.  Fisher’s greatest naval critic, Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, 
remained committed to the conservative Royal Navy of the 1890s – but he too 
appreciated Nelson’s legacy enough to pen a book about the vice-admiral’s life.  
Between the 1880s and the First World War the global naval landscape shifted 
appreciably.  France followed the jeune ecole school of many small warships, the United 
States constructed large cruisers, Germany developed dangerous submarines.  But 
Britain’s overarching goal never faltered – the most powerful warships, and more of 
them.  Even Fisher’s most audacious technical project, the battlecruiser, was designed as 
‘the very type that all the old men from Hawke to Nelson sighed for.’ 
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But perhaps this desire for ultimate victory at sea can be understood more with a 
broader view of the navy’s history.  The byword of the nineteenth-century Royal Navy 
was change, and more often not this change was forced upon Britain rather than begun 
by the Admiralty.  From the earliest paddle frigates to the most advanced dreadnoughts, 
the rapid pace of technological advancement over the course of the century seemed 
specifically designed to throw Admiralty planning into chaos.  It is a testament to British 
naval might that Great Britain found itself in the unenviable position of having to 
convert a numerically dominant fleet over to new designs no less than three times in one 
hundred years – the introduction of steam line-of-battle ships in the 1840s, the ironclad 
revolution of the 1860s, and the dreadnought era. 
Yet these rapid technological changes created a backlash among naval 
authorities.  It is important to remember that men who came of age in Nelson’s navy led 
its improved successor for another half a century.  Combined with the Slump of the 
1820s and 1830s, this meant that by midcentury the Admiralty was controlled by a 
smaller and smaller group of elderly officials.  It has become almost trite to point 
towards Admiralty pronouncements of the danger of steam power to British supremacy 
as an example of backwards naval thinking in this era, but these attitudes existed and 
were dangerously real.  Try as they might, Nelson’s erstwhile successors could not delay 
the introduction of steam forever – so they sought solace in the only place they could, 
the memory of Nelson.  In an age where the Royal Navy was shaken to its core by 
technologies that threatened to redefine war at sea, high-ranking officers turned to the 
Nelsonian legend to provide a visible and concrete link to the navy’s glorious past. 
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This attitude was only reinforced in the mid-Victorian era.  The Crimean conflict 
was a successful war, and the Royal Navy certainly performed better than the army.  But 
without a decisive battle at sea, the Crimea soon faded into naval obscurity.  The 
bombardment of Kronstadt was the last engagement for the men who came through the 
ranks with Nelson, but the ensuing ironclad era brought no changes in the navy’s ideal of 
battle.  Instead it was the Crimean War that was ignored, and the Admiralty hoped that 
the next war would bring a return to Trafalgar’s form. 
This use of Nelson remained excusable when used to bolster morale and establish 
a connection between grand British fleets and patrolling cruisers throughout the world of 
the Pax Britannica.  However, the navalist age took Nelson’s legend in a more perilous 
direction.  From the mid-1880s onward, in the darkest days of spit and polish, the actual 
Nelson began to be forgotten.  In the late-Victorian Royal Navy the man who endeared 
himself to generations of Britons with his willful disregard of the rules became the 
greatest example for following them.  Commanders frowned at independent action, 
preferring that subordinates live by the letter of Nelson’s example rather than its spirit.  
This trend reached its lowest point with the death of George Tryon and the Admiralty’s 
resultant absolute devotion to order at all costs.  Nelson wrote that ‘nothing is sure in a 
sea fight;’ a century after his death the navy that claimed to represent Nelson’s legacy 
produced battle orders that stretched for hundreds of pages.  Nelson blockaded his 
enemies for years; by the dreadnought era naval theorists and admirals alike believed 
that wars could and should be won in a matter of hours. 
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The navalist era also marked the point at which the British public reenters the 
Nelson mythos.  Unlike their naval cousins, the majority of Britons had gradually let go 
of Nelson after the Napoleonic Wars; he was still a hero, still an inspiration to poets and 
sculptors, but Nelson’s story was kept alive with the same fervor as it was in Whitehall.  
The naval scares that began in the mid-1880s changed all this.  As the Victorian era 
became the Edwardian and global politics grew ever more complex, splendid isolation 
was replaced by a growing awareness that conflict could very well be on the horizon.  
Here Nelson served the same function for the general public that he had for the 
Admiralty thirty years prior – as either a backbone or a crutch, depending on one’s point 
of view.  Reassured that the Royal Navy remained modeled on Nelson’s example, 
members of groups such as the Navy League held the Admiralty up as the model of 
British preparedness and defense. 
During the Crimean conflict, the British newspaper industry had pressured the 
Admiralty for a decisive battle that never came.  In the navalist period, it was the 
opposite; many high Admiralty figures, not the least of which was Jacky Fisher, 
purposely fed naval information to the press, which in turn promoted naval interests 
among their burgeoning middle-class readerships.  By the first decade of the twentieth 
century this had become an entirely self-reinforcing system.  The Admiralty would 
release documents, whether publicly or to one of their chosen naval journalists such as 
Arnold White, claiming that France or Germany was embarking on a new wave of naval 
construction; the British public, led on by various naval leagues and jingoistic 
journalists, clamored for increases to naval funding.  And it was all predicated on 
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Horatio Nelson, the one common figure that by the Trafalgar centennial in 1905 every 
Briton could recognize as a symbol of British naval greatness. 
This, then, was British naval culture on the eve of the First World War.  In 1914 
the man in the street would have lived through nearly three decades of constant naval 
scares, fear mongering newspapermen and invasion literature; if he was a member of the 
Navy League or the Imperial Maritime League he would also have received news about 
the challenges facing the navy first-hand at public lectures and meetings.  Counteracting 
this would have been the image of Nelson, now omnipresent in a way it had not been in 
a century; cigarette cards, clothing, movies, advertisements, all establishing a connection 
between the modern British navy and the heroes of Trafalgar.  If he lived in a major city 
there would have been fleet reviews, with their attendant naval supporters also adamant 
that this connection to the past was alive and well. 
This connection to the past would have been accepted fact in the Admiralty of 
1914 as well.  For half a century young naval officers had criticized their superiors 
through backroom channels as too old-fashioned, too reactionary, too concerned with 
style over substance – and had then moved up the promotional ladder and fallen into the 
same trap (it is helpful to remember that Admiral Lord Charles Beresford had castigated 
the Royal Navy long before he became its staunchest defender).  Just as the public had 
their Nelson, the navy had its own – and he was a vengeful god of battles, willing to 
accept a thousand casualties for one enemy ship sunk.  Here tactics were forgotten in 
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favor of the rush to a decision; even a reformer such as Admiral Fisher pushed for 
surprise attacks and vast naval engagements over any form of raid or blockade.
28
 
These two legends of Nelson, similar in substance but used for different 
purposes, combined to form the young men that went to sea in August 1914.  A British 
naval cadet, in his late teens or early twenties, would have been couched in Nelsonian 
lore his entire life.  As a child in the 1890s there would have been Navy League lectures 
at school, dreadnought toys and games, textbooks extolling the virtues of Nelson and his 
captains, and special youth exhibits aboard ship at fleet reviews.  The centenary of 
Trafalgar would likely have brought him to a museum or traveling exhibit on Nelson and 
the navy; the years of naval scares leading up to the First World War inculcated him 
with a belief that devastating war lurked always just beyond the horizon.  When war 
came he would have been glad for it, and for the opportunity to participate in the new 
Trafalgar that was sure to come. 
Navalism was a tool used by Parliament, social organizations, the press, and the 
Admiralty to drum up support in various ways.  Each of these groups had their own 
Nelson.  Jacky Fisher’s Nelson was something akin to a demigod, a violent avenger who 
would crush Germany or anyone else in Britain’s way with a preemptive strike or a 
crushing battle.  The Admiralty’s Nelson was proof positive that their new ships of war 
could make do with old tactics; following Nelson’s strategy of a ‘pell mell’ battle would 
be enough to bring Britain home victorious in any fleet action, although how this was to 
                                                          
28
 One of the few (perhaps the only) high-ranking naval officials to barely mention Nelson in either official 
or private correspondence is John Jellicoe.  He alone seems to have realized the dangers of conflating the 
past with the present, a lesson that would go unheeded at Jutland. 
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be achieved with initiative legislated out of captains and admirals remained to be seen.  
Politicians saw Nelson as a tool, and both Liberals and Tories rode navalist support to 
Parliamentary victories on the strength of laying a few wreaths on Trafalgar Day.  For 
the press Nelson was a shining example of what Britain could be at its greatest, a call to 
duty and service and a weapon to be wielded whenever there were rumblings of naval 
budget cuts.  The public Nelson was a comfort, a reassurance that if war came the Royal 
Navy could pick up where it left off a century prior and immediately return to its prior 
successes. 
Every group that took part in the navalist age had its own Nelson, but they all had 
one.  It was impossible to be a naval supporter in 1914 and not have an opinion on the 
man acclaimed by near-unanimous consent to be the greatest naval leader Britain had 
ever produced, at least until the new Nelson defeated the Germans.  Horatio Nelson was 
a link to the navy’s past for all Britons, an unbreakable thread connecting bygone heroes 
to their modern compatriots when nothing else remained to compare the navies of 1805 
and 1914 on a direct technological level.  The Nelson of the public and the press 
remained a simple hero, to be admired and emulated for generations to come.   
The navy’s Nelson was more dangerous.  Based on a misinterpretation of 
Nelson’s tactics and strategic conceptions, the Nelson that held sway with Sir John 
Fisher and the Admiralty was the culmination of a century spent trying to live up to a 
legend of annihilating battles that had no basis in reality.  It is an oft-repeated canard that 
the British army in the First World War can be likened to lions led by donkeys.  In the 
Royal Navy, however, the entire service from John Jellicoe to the lowliest cadet was 
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animated by the same spirit.  The Royal Navy could be better termed as an elephant.  It 
was at times painfully slow, both to adapt and to stop once it had chosen a new course.  
It was powerful, both technologically and in its own self-induced moral and spiritual 
ascendancy.  And, like an elephant, the Royal Navy never forgot a thing; nor did it try. 
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